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FOREWORD
This is a history of the Deep Space Network (DSN) which is
r,_n,_ged for NASA by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory located
=- Pasadena, california. It is a companion document to an
a_rlic_ i_toric i pu]zlication by the s_me _uthor which
de_it with the I,nSA communications and earth-orbital networks
managed by the Goddard Space Flight Center. With publication
of the DSN history, each progenitorial segment of today's
_or!dwide NASA tracking and data acquisition network has had
tLe story of its origin and evolution ably committed to the
printed page by Mr. William R. Corliss.
in telling the story of tne DSN, Mr. Corliss recaptures and
summarizes the events and decisions which le_ to the develop-
ment of this needed networ_ c_pability and highlights the
ne__ _r_t : _unt._butions to NASA's lunar and planetary
expiorci_tea programs. It is hoped that each reader will
gain an appreciation for the role of the dedicated people --
Government, contractor, and host country personnel -- who
made the exploration of deep space possibl_ by providing
that vital link, communications. Many of you receiving
this document_ _f course, have played roles in creat!Dg
the Deep Space, Netvvrk, and I hope in reading it wil± recall
nct just the problems but also the many satisfactions that
were experienced along the way.
Gerald M. Truszynski
AscocJ_Lte Administrator for
TracKing and Data Acquisition
Precedingpageblank
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PRE FAC E
This history of the DSN is intended to complement the histories of the
MSFN, STADAN, and NASCOM published in 1974 as NASA CR-140390. Even-
tually, it is planned to update and combine all of these histories and present
them as a unified history of NASA tracking-and-data-acquisition activities.
As in the earlier histories, I have tried to capture both the political
and technological events of network design and operation since NASA was
formed---and a little before. In this middle ground, historians and engineers
may each find some lack of detail in their respective disciplines, but I hope I
have achieved a happy balance.
William R. Corliss
Glen Arm, Maryland
May 1, 1976
Precedingpageblank
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Chapter I. DSN OVERVIEW
The Deep Space Network (DSN) has been managed and operated by the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) under NASA contract ever since NASA was
formed in late 1958. The tracking and data-acquisition tasks of the DSN are
markedly different from those of the other NASA network, STDN. STDN, which
is an amalgamation of the satellite tracking network (STADAN) and the Manned
Space Flight Network (MSFN), is primarily concerned with supporting manned
and unmanned Earth s_ellites. In contrast, the DSN deals with spacecr_ft that
are thousands to hundreds of millions of miles away. The radio signals from
these distant craft are many orders of magnitude weaker than those from
nearby satellites. Distance also makes precise radio location more difficult;
and accurate trajectory data are vital to deep space navigation in the vicinities
of the other planets of the solar system. In addition to tracking spacecraft
and acquiring data from them, the DSN is required to transmit many thousands
of commands to control the sophisticated planetary probes and interplanetary
monitoring stations. To meet these demanding requirements, the DSN has
been compelled to be in the forefront of technology. The fact that the DSN has
met or exceeded the demands of flight projects illustrates that it has done its
job very well indeed,
The very excellence of the DSN's radio "ears" has been an unexpected
boon to radio astronomy. The big, high-precision parabolic antennas in the
United States, Australia, and Spain attract radio astronomers who generate many
more requests for antenna time than the DSN can possibly fill.Thus, the DSN has
made a significant contribution to ground-based radio science which is above and
beyond the unique accomplishments of the Mariners, the Surveyors, the Pioneers,
the Vikings, and other deep-space vehicles.
The concept of a special network to support spacecraft beyond Earth
orbit is scarcely two decades old. Even in the mid-1950s it was "blue-sky",
to use the terminology of those days, to contemplate even lunar probes. No
one dreamt seriously of spacecraft cruising past the moons of Jupiter, photo-
graphing Mercury's surface, or landing on Mars. The forward-looking tech-
nology of the DSN has contributed to making these mo-,'e ambitious ventures
possible.
Chapter 2. PRE-NASA TRACKING DEVELOPMENTS AT JPL
Missile Testing and Lunar Probes
Several technical accomplishments that are cornerstones of the present
DSN evolved while JPL was working under the auspices of the U.S. Army. To
understand the impetus that spawned the crucial phaselock loop, the low-noise-
temperature receivers, and the basic plans for a deep space tracking and data
acquisition network, the aerospace political environment of the 1940s and 1950s
must be recapitulated briefly at this point.
Although the German V-2 had failed to turn the tide during World War
If, its technical success made it obvious to military planners that long range
rockets had an import_ant place in future warfare. In 1944, even before hostili-
ties ceased, GALCIT 1 was developing the Private-Corporal-Sergeant series of
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles under U.S. Army contract. The WAC
Corporal sounding rocket was also first tested in 1945. 2 The testing and
deployment of the Sergeant missile ran well into the 1950s and, while the
Sergeant was not a deep space probe, the radio guidance ideas developed dur-
ing its evolution fed directly into DSN technology.
The pace of missile development picked up rapidly in the early 1950s
when it seemed that the Russians not only had nuclear weapons but were also
building big rockets for delivering them across intercontinental distances.
JPL was introduced to the Earth satellite business during Project
Orbiter, 3 the DOD-sponsored plan to launch an American satellite using an
ABMA Redstone booster and JPL upper stages. Orbiter was ostensibly
shelved when the Navy's Project Vanguard was chosen as the official U.S.
satellite program for the International Geophysical Year (IGY). Orbiter did
not die, however, and when Vanguard faltered, ABMA and JPL were quickly
able to launch Explorer 1. To track Explorer 1, JPL had built the Microlock
network of doppler-telemetry stations in the late 1950s. In this manner, JPL
acquired its first taste of network development and operation.
1GALCIT (Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of
Technology) was JPL's immediate predecessor. It was founded in 1936 by
Theodore von Karman.
2William R. Corliss, NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968, A Historical
Summary, (Washington: NASA SP-4401, 1971) p. 9.
3R. Cargill Hall, "Early U.S. Satellite Proposals, " Technology and Culture,
IV (Fall 1963), pp. 410-434.
3Completing the JPL historical sequenceleading from small missiles tO
deep space vehicles were the lunar probes Pioneer 3 and 4. 4 These probes went
well beyondthe practical range of Microlock and Minitrack, the two extant U. S.
satellite tracking networks. The ARPA (AdvancedResearch Projects Agency)5
which fundedthe Pioneer Program, recognizedthat a new kind of tracking net-
work would be neededfor spacevehicles that went far beyondthe Earth. In fact,
ARPA Order No. 1 provided for the establishment of a three-station deep-space
network designed by JPL. Called the ARPA Network or World Network, it was
the direct forerunner of today's DSN, although it was not completed under ARPA
auspices.
Significant Technical Developments
Before JPL was transferred from the Army to NASA in 1958, military
programs had already sparked many technical developments crucial to the
later DSN. Some of the more important of these are reviewed below.
The Phase-Lock Loop. The phase-lock loop is essentially a way to maximize
the efficiency of a communication system through the use of a priori knowledge.
To illustrate, knowledge of the transmitter frequency of a deep space probe
makes communication with it much easier. The concept of the phase lock loop
is much more involved than this, but it also employs a priori information. The
inLerested reader is referred to two key papers by JPL personnel for details. 6
The use of a phase lock loop as a narrow band tracking filter was first suggested
by Lehan and Parks of JPL in early 1952 7 for use in the Corporal missile pro-
gram. In 1953, Rechtin and Victor developed a phase lock loop as a narrow
bandwidth tracking filter with optimum performance over a wide range of signal-
to-noise ratios. In simple terms, the phase lock loop provided a very efficient
method of detecting and following narrow-band radio-frequency signals from a
dis, rant spacecraft despite the presence of inescapable wideband noise from the
cosmos, the Earth itself, and the communication equipment. The phase lock
4pioneers 1, 2 and 5 were Air Force lunar probes. JPL was not involved
directly.
5Founded by DOD on February 7, 1958, in response to President Eisenhower's
declaration that the United States would have a space program.
6R. M. Jaffe and E. Rechtin, "Design and Performance of Phase Lock Circuits
Capable of Near Optimum Performance Over a Wide Range of Input Signal and
Noise Levels, " IRE Transactions, IT,4 (March 1955), pp. 66-76. H.L.
Richter, Jr., et al, "Microlock; A Minimum-Weight Radio Instrumentation
System for a Satellite, " Jet Propulsion, XXVIII (August 1958), pp. 532-540.
7Anonymous, "A History of the Deep Space Network to 1 January 1969"
(Pasadena-JPL 890-9, January 15, 1971) p.-5-2.
Reproduced froml best
available copy. _/_
loop, though not conceived for deep space operations, turned out to be nearly
ideal for such applications.
The first space program manifestation of JPL's phase-lock-loop con-
cept was the already-mentioned Microlock doppler tracking and data acquisi-
tion system, which was initially developed primarily for ABMA's Jupiter-C
Reentry Test Vehicle (RTV) shots. Microlock's most important application
was on the Army's Explorer 1 flight, where it successfully tracked the first
American satellite. (Figure 2-1)
Microlock's approach to tracking was primarily recovemng doppler
velocity data and in this respect differed from the Navy's Minitrack tracking
network set up all over the world to track the Vanguard IGY satellites. When
NASA inherited both Micro|ock and Minitrack in 1958, it retained the latter
and dismantled the few Microlock stations that had been established. The
phase lock loop, which was not a part of Minitrack, was retained however and
applied to all subsequent JPL spacecraft as well as Apollo and some missions
not managed directly by JPL. The phase lock loop innovation was and still is
a vital contribution to the U.S. space program.
CODORAC and S-Band Precursors. In addition to the phase-lock-loop feature
just described, JPL's basic tracking and data acquisition technology includes
two other important charact.eristics: (1) the regeneration by the spacecraft
of the carrier received from the Earth and its subsequent multiplication by an
integral fraction and transmission back to Earth; and (2) the melding of the
tracking data and telemetry onto a single spacecraft carrier. Both of these
characteristics were part of a radio guidance system that JPL designed in
1954 as an alternate guidai_ae system for the Sergeant missile. One version
of the JPL Sergeant guidar_ce system was to be a combination radio-inertial
type operating in the X-based around 10,000 MHz. The Doppler radio equip-
ment supplied range and Vatocity information; the inertial portion provided
on-board acceleration data. Another version under development was the all-
inertial guidance system. Ultimately, the Sergeant used an all-inertial
guidance system, but the concept of combining tracking information and telem-
etry on the same carrier was carried over to the present Unified S-band
system used in the DSN.
The JPL guidance system for Jupiter incorporated a specific version
of the technical advances described above in a system named CODORAC
(Coded Doppler, Ranging, and Command). CoODORAC possessed anti jamming
featureg as befitted its military application, o Many of the CODORAC tracking
and command system were incorporated on the Rangers and later JPL space-
craft. CODORAC operated in the X-band-Ha frequency realm now being ex-
lored by the present DSN for operational use. A prototype built at White
ands (Figure 2-2) included a 4-ft antenna mounted on a Nike pedestal. This
8jet Propulsion Laboratory, "Annotated History of CODORAC, " (Pasadena;
JPL Report 20-120) August 4, 1958.
IReproduced from
|best available copy.
Figure 2- 1. Microlock interferometer station at Earthquake 
Valley. 
6 
Figure 2-2. The CODORAC antenna. 
equipment never sawoperational use with Jupiter, but the pedestal was later
used in the DSN's Mobile Tracking Station (MTS).
Low-Noise Receivers. One of the great technical challenges of deep space
communication is receiving signals from a severely weight-limited spacecraft
millions of miles away. The weight limitation forces spacecraft designers to
minimize the radiated power from the craft's transmitter. The communication
burden is therefore placed upon the ground systems which must recover an
extremely weak signal nearly overwhelmed by noise. Two of the several ways
to improve the signal-to-noise ratio are by radically narrowing the receiver
bandwidth and reducing the amount of noise generated in or entering the terres-
trial receiver.
In 1958, when faced with the task of communicating with Lunar probes,
JPL was already working on bandwidth reduction using the phase-lock principle.
The problem of low-noise receivers had been under attack for several years.
JPLTs Walter Higa was working on parametric amplifiers as early as 1935 and
in 1956 published an internal memo entitled "Theory of a Low-Noise Amplifier. "
Despite these accompiishments, it was realized that neither the parametric
amplifier nor the maser amplifiers could be made operational before the first
Pioneer lunar probes. Nevertheless, this early research has paid off hand-
somely, because over the years the system noise temperature of DSN receiv-
ing systems has been reduced from 1500°K in 1958 to less than 20°K at zenith
today.
Of course, the noise problem can also be relieved by improving the
power output and efficiency of the spacecraft transmitter. Today, this is
accomplished through the use of travelling wave tube (TWT) t_ ansmitters on
the spacecraft. In 1958, though, TWTs were still in the development stage
and spacecraft designers had to contend with a low-power, somewhat inefficient
gridded vacuum tube.
Ground Communication and Control. The early missile communication and
control systems were crude indeed compared with today's world-wide, wide-
band, real-time networks linking tracking stations with centralized control
facilities. It is hard to imagine a modern space project deper_ding upcn 60
word-per-minute teletype circuits, analog telemetry, and mechanical desk
calculators; yet, such was standard equipment through most of the 1950s.
The keys to the modern transformation of data handling were several:
1. The advent in the mid 1950s of reliable, solid-state, digital
processing equipment, including large, general-purpose computers.
. The replacement of low-capacity teletype links with high-capacity,
wide-band microwave links as well as better land lines and
undersea cables.
! 8
. The development of digital techniques that permitted one to trans-
mit all kinds of information, including TV and voice, all in digital
form.
JPL was in the vanguard of this revolution of information processing.
One of its major accomplishments was the construction of the first digital track-
ing system in 1955 for the Sergeant's Doppler ranging system.
JPL also promoted the use of PCM (pulse code modulation) systems
long before they became standard in space technology. (Of all the common
modulation schemes PCM is most compatible with digital techniques and
computers.) Originally. the emphasis was on both FSK (Frequency Shift
Keying) and PSK (Pimse Si_iit Keying), but in the early 1960s, FSK assumed
prominence because it offered a 3-db performance improvement.
In November 1958, JPL completed its first communication network
connecting its tracking sites with a central computing and communieation
center at Pasadena. This center was the forerunner of today's SFOF (Space
Flight Operations Facility,. First established in January" 1956, the center
was also employed during the Explorer-1 flight in January 1958. Communiea-
tion in those days was simply a temporary patchwork of telephone and tele-
type lines from the Microlock stations to Pasadena. (Figure 2-3) The
Exptorer-1 control room was just as primitive, eonsisting of the communi-
cation terminal, timing equipment, office furniture, and hand calculators for
data processing and orbit computations.
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Choice of Radio Frequency. Ever higher transmission frequencies have been
one of the more notable trends in the evolution of the DSN. Generally, the
higher the frequency, the less the crowding of the radio spectrum and the less
the interference from natural and man-made noise. Although JPL realized
this and had already acquired substantial experience with the higher frequen-
cies in its Army missile work where weight was not critical, it was forced to
use 108 MHz for Explorer 1 and Microlock because of the international agree-
ment regarding IGY satellite transmissions. 9 Within a few months of Explorer
1, however, JPL had moved into the L-band (around 960 MHz) for the Pioneer
lunar probes. This was the first of the major quantum steps upward in fre-
quency. JPL realized _hat S-band frequencies near 2300 MHz had many
advantages and was pushing this technology as fast as it could.
Geodesy, Timing_ and Frequency Standards. Modern precision tracking of
spacecraft depends upon accurate time synchronization of all network stations
as well as the availability of precise geodetic coordinates for station locations.
Although these factors represent a significant facet of DSN history, their real
importance was appreciated by only a few in the 1950s. The importance of
Explorer 1. after all, was the simple fact that the United States had finally
orbited a satellite and, to a lesser extent, in the scientific data returned.
Precise knowledge of Explorer's orbital parameters was secondary. Conse-
quently, tracking station locations were considered to be determined accurately
enough by conventional surveying techniques. The requirement for time syn-
chronization was satisfied by the transmissions of WWV (the government
station broadcasting time signals). The Microlock network had no atomic or
other precise frequency standards.
Radiometric Tracking'Theory. When the Space Age began, radiometri_ track-
in g theory was being form0!ated by the astronomers, who customarily measure
the angles of their targets rather than distances and radial velocities, as the
DSN now does. The orbital calculations for artificial satellites were not far
different from those commonly made for our natural satellite, the Moon. The
Minitrack satellite tracking network was based on interferometry, which
measured the angles the astronomers were used to. The military used
Doppler tracking extensively on its missiles, as the C ermans had with the
V-2s, and this work was applied to the early Explore: satellites using Micro-
lock dopp!(:" data. However, the early Explorer satellites as well as
Pioneers 3 and 4 employed only one-way doppler tracking; that is, only one
radio-frequency link was established between the spacecraft and ground sta-
tion---usually the flight-to-ground li:lk---and oscillator drifts could not be
separated from spacecraft velocity changes. Beginning with the Ranger
program, two-way doppler tracking was introduced to eliminate this problem.
Space probes, it turns out, are quite different from Earth satellites in terms
9The 108-MHz frequency was state-of-the-art for light-weight, solid-state
technology at this time. Note that the Soviet Sputniks violated this agreement
by going to lower frequencies.
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of radiometric tracking. Once a probe is in deep space, it scarcely moves
against the background of fixed stars; and angle tracking is therefore of little
practical use. The significance of this short aside is that, in 1958, the
modern theory of the radiometric tracking of deep space probes was not under-
stood at all. It was not until 1965, in fact, that today's radiometric tracking
techniques were fully appreciated and applied in the DSN.
The Early JPL Networks
Before becoming part of NASA's space effort on December 1, 1958,
JPL had helped establish two tracking and data acquisition networks; (1)
flights, which was called TRACE (Traeking and Communication Extra-
terrestrial). Under ARPA's direction, it had also looked at the future of
deep space flight and, in consequence, had also proposed a worldwide track-
ing network that eventually became NASA's DSN. The proposed worldwide
network, vintage 1958, was variously called the "ARPA Network" or the
"World Network. " Because networks, with their requirements for time
synchronization, precise geodetic location, and ground system standards,
require a fundamentally different technical approach than isolated tracking
stations, both will be discussed here as being similar species.
Microlock and TRACE were designed for missiles and space probes,
respectively, but they employed similar techniques. Microlock, like its
contemporary Minitrack, did use radio :interferometry in addition to
doppler tracking but the interferometry was not intrinsic to the Microlock
concept, which was telemetry plus doppler tracking. TRACE depended upon
angle and Doppler tracking. Microlock, despite its original missile orienta-
tion, ultimately saw service not only on the early Explorer launches but
also, to a very limited extent, on the early phases of the Pioneer flights.
Neither Microlock nor TRACE survive intact today; the only remnant of
TRACE is the old Goldstone DSN Pioneer dish, but Goldstone is the hub of
the modern DSN. In actuality Microlock was a dead-end offshoot of CODORAC
technology; and it was the CODORAC line that led directly to TRACE.
The Microlock Network
The most important part of the Microlock ground station was the
phase-locked receiver which detected the spacecraft's transmitter signal and
provided for the automatic tracking of the Doppler shiftas the spacecraft
passed over the station. The phase-locked receiver sent a phase-coherent
reference signal to an interferometer receiver which permitted correlation
detection of the signal received from the elements of the interferometer.
This arrangement was very similar to thatdevised by the radio astronomers.
The helical Microlock ground antennas were usually arrayed linearly
for rocket launch tracking and in a five-element cross (Figure 2-4) for satel-
lite tracking. The two-dimensional 90 ° cross, of course, resulted in more
11
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tracking information than the simple linear array. (Minitrack interferometer
elements were also placed in a cross array.) A typical Microlock tracking site
used for satellite tracking is shown in Figure 2-5. A 25-foot equipment van,
similar to those used by furniture movers, housed all of the necessary elec-
tronics, recorders, timing equipment, con_oles, etc. These stations were
easily transportable from one site to another, giving Microlock the flexibility
needed for a variety of missile applications, its primary purpose for being.
The initial deployment of Microlock was keyed to the Jupiter missile
and its reentry test vehicle (RTV) program. The first operational stations
were placed at Cape Can_-eral and on Grand Turk for the RTV flight in
September 1966. In late 1958, four Microloek stations were set up for
Explorer at the Cape, Earthquake Valley, California, the University of
Malaysia, Singapore, and University College, Idaban, Nigeria. Communi-
cation of spacecraft telemetry and tracking data from these overseas sites
was often rather primitive. Teletype facilities were usually ndarby but it
was sometimes necessary to press native runners into service between the
Microlock hut and the local telegraph office. The station in California was of
the interferometric cross type; that at Cape Canaveral consisted of a linear
array of antennas. All overseas Microlock stations used a single helical
antenna and provided telemetry and doppler data only.
The Air Force decided to use Microlock for its Pioneer lunar probe
flights. As mentioned earlier, however, the Microlock stations were designed
at the IGY frequency of ]08 MHz, whereas the Pioneers would be transmitting
at about 960 MHz. Conseq,Jently, some of the Microlock stations were con-
vetted to the higher frequency. The Air Force, for example, converted its
Microlock station at Jodrell Bank, England, to the higher frequency and moni-
tored signals from Pioneer flights with it. Other Microlock sites listened to
Pioneer transmission on an informal basis.
Microlock could !rack anything passing overhead as long as it carried
a suitable transmitter. Thus, Microlock was able to track Vanguard and
other Explorer-class sate!lttes that were launched after the Army Explorer
program terminated. Limited use of Microlock was also made during the
Army and Air Force Pior,cer programs with stations that had been converted
to 960 MHz. Minitrack, however, became the official NASA satellite track-
ing system, and all Microlock sites were deactivated soon after JPL was
acquired by NASA.
Micro!oek Opera_ions. _,cro;ock was associated primarily with firings of
the Jupiter-C, whi,.'h had i_pper stages designed by JPL. The first Jupiter-Cs
carried reentr_ t,est ,:eb_:les. At high altitudes, the upper stage fired a test
vehicle into the atmospb_ve _t high velocities to test heat shields at ICBM
reentry veloci_*c:_ _'hree reentry test vehicle flights of the Jupiter-C
occurred on September 2_!;, 1956, May 15, 1957, and August 8, 1957. ,'_i:/_
last two flights employed no downrange Microlock stations, just the one at
the Cape. )
13 
Figure 2-5. Microlock helical antenna with supporting ground 
equipment. 
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The five Army Explorer launches took place on January 31, 1958,
March 5, 1958, March 26, 1958, July 26, 1958, and August 24, 1958. The
second and fifth flights were failures, but the other three put spacecraft into
Earth orbit where they were successfully tracked by both Microlock and
Minitrack.
TRACE
TRACE, the first operational deep space network, was not worldwide
in scope. All three TRACE stations (Goldstone, Cape Canaveral, and
Mayaquez, Puerto Rico) were in the Western Hemisphere and could not pro-
vide 24-hour surveiiiance of the spacecraft. "finis was of course recognized,
and ARPA purchased the other two 26-m antennas needed for continuous
coverage, but they could not be installed in time for Pioneers 3 and 4.
The two purposes of the TRACE station at the Cape were: (1) to pro-
vide preflight checkout of the spacecraft radio equipment, and (2) to determine
whether or not the launch was successful on the basis of telemetry and one-way
Doppler data. This station was a simplified version of the Goldstone 26-m
antenna station, consisting only of a narrow-band, phase-lock receiver channel
coupled to a manually pointed paraboloidai antenna. This equipment was
housed in a converted Microlock trailer located near the Pioneer-3
launch pad.
During the 6 to 8 hours after the launch of a Pioneer, while the space-
craft was gaining altitude and could not yet be seen from Goldstone, all track-
ing and data acquisition was relegated to a TRACE station located in Puerto
Rico. (Figure 2-6) This station was a fully mobile model of the Goldstone
station but with a 3.3-m paraboloid on a Nike Az-El pedestal rather than
26-meter Goldstone type. Since the probe was still close to the Earth during
the first few hours of flight, the smaller antenna had adequate sensitivity.
This station acquired Az-EI angle data, one-way Doppler, and telemetry.
To build the Puerto Rico station, JPL engineers took the old CODORAC
Nike pedestal out of mothballs and replaced the small X-band antenna with the
3.3-m dish. 10 The receiver likewise consisted of existing CODORAC com-
ponents. These components were assembled into the station receiving system
by the Collins Radio Company. JPL took over an abandoned Air Force radar
site near Mayaguez and placed the antenna under a radome atop a two-story
building. Looking beyond Pioneer a bit, it is interesting to not_ that much of
the Puerto Rico equipment again saw service in South Africa as part of the
Mobile Tracking Station (MTS) that was situated near Johannesburg for several
years.
The third station in TRACE, Goldstone, is the hub of DSN operations
as wel! as network research and development. A longer dissertation is in
order here.
10R. K. Mallis and Robert Latham, personal interview, July 28, 1975.
15 
Figure 2-6. The Puerto Rico station. 
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Building the Goldstone Station
Goldstone is the direct result of the ARPA decision in the spring of
1958 to launch several lunar probes by the end of 1958. 11 The Army was
instructed to launch two of these spacecraft using its Juno-II launch vehicle,
which had been developed at ABMA. The Army naturally turned to its long-
time contractor, JPL, for the payloads and the tracking and data acquisition
facilities in its portion of the newly founded Pioneer Program. 12
The flight paths of the lunar probes required, at the very least, a
tracking station at the Cape during the launch phase, another in the vicinity
of Puerto Rico for the near-Earth phase as the spacecraft appears to move
in a retrograde path climbing away from Earth, and one deep space station to
track the probe on its way to the Moon. 13 The third station could have been
placed almost anywhere in the United States, but it made sense to locate it
in the radio quiet of the California desert where it was within relatively easy
• reach of JPL personnel.
JPL had only about eight months to select a site, build an antenna,
and set up the requisite communication circuits. There was little time for
detailed site surveys. Fortunately, the Army owned considerable property
in the Mojave Desert, and it was easy to find adequate space for a tracking
station. The chosen site was a natural bowl, rimmed by hills, at Goldstone
Dry Lake on the Army's Fort Irwin military reservation. It was in this
general area that GALCIT had conducted Army rocket tests years before and
the region was therefore not unknown to JPL personnel. The site was approxi-
mately 40 miles from Barstow, California, and only 100 air miles from Los
Angbles. The ring of kills around the site helped shield it from man-made
radio noise---an essential feature for receiving the very weak radio signals
from the Moon, 240,000 miles away.
The key piece of equipment required at Goldstone was a large para-
boloidal antenna for tracking and data acquisition. Communication with lunar
probes, .from the standpoint of signal strength, had to be via a very-narrow-
beam antenna located on Earth. The narrower the antenna beam, the more
sensitive the antenna is to signals from a spacecraft caught in the beam.
With just a few months of time available, JPL had to take two crucial steps:
1. Find an already designed, very large paraboloidal antenna that
could be erected quickly.
llwilliam D. Merrick, et al, "Deep Space Communication, " (Pasadena: JPL
TR 34-10, 1960) p. 1.
12Note that the Air Force was also requested to launch Pioneer lunar probes
with its Th0r-Able rockets.
13Three deep-.space stations roughly 120 o apart in longitude are needed for
complete 24-hour tracking, but there was obviously no time to negotiate and
construct overseas sites for Pioneer.
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. Increase communication frequencies to several times the 108 MHz
selected for Microlock. The low Microlock frequencies were
suitable for nearby Earth satellites but not deep space communi-
cation because of the excessive noise at the lower frequencies.
From the standpoint of antenna design, the higher the frequency,
the narrower the antenna beam, for an antenna of fixed diameter.
Taking the frequency question first, frequency could not be raised
arbitrarily. The most important restriction here was the lack of reliable
components at higher frequencies, for both spacecraft and ground use. Using
techniques developed during its Army missile work, JPL quickly produced
spacecraft transmitters and ground-based receiving equipment that could
operate reliably at 960.05 MHz, the frequency finally selected for the Pioneer
Program.
The frequency of 960 MHz was well suited to the paraboloidal antennas
being constructed for radio astronomy, a scientific discipline that had ex-
panded apace during the 1950s. In fact, the demand for large antennas as
research instruments was so strong that the Blaw-Knox Company had a 26-m
(85-ft) diameter, polar-mounted radio-astronomy antenna that could be built
within six months at a fixed price. This was a most fortunate development.
Without such an antenna, the Pioneer communication problem would have been
insurmountable as the spacecraft left the Earth far behind.
To illustrate how good the luck was, the antenna being considered for
Goldstone had been under development for more than five years. Work had
started at the Naval Research Laboratory, but assists had come from the
Carnegie Institute, Associated Universities, and the Blaw-Knox Company.
Of course, the antenna was designed for radio astronomy and not the precision
tracking of spacecraft: It had a sidereal drive and no capacity for automatic
tracking and the provision of angular pointing data. Here again, JPL's con-
siderable experience in radio guidance came to the rescue. Based on its
confidence in JPL, ARPA decided to purchase three of the 26-m dishes; one
for Goldstone and the other two for overseas tracking sites that were going
to be established eventually. It was a calculated risk on ARPA's part, for
even though the antenna design was complete, none had yet been built. With
its stipulated launch schedule, ARPA had little choice.
JPL moved ahead with the design modifications. First, a closed-
loop, continuous tracking device had to be installed. This was to keep the
spacecraft always in the pencil-like beam of the antenna. A second modifica-
tion was the provision of an electrical feed capable of receiving the signal for
the angle-tracking receiver and servo control system. Pointing angles had
to be digitized so that they could be teletyped to a waiting computer in Pasadena
for trajectory computations. Finally, the antenna had to be "ruggedized" to
operate continuously for many hours under high desert winds and temperatures.
Construction began at Goldstone in June of 1958. (Figure 2-7)
Antenna assembly commenced August 16. By early December, both the antenna
and ground support facilities were complete. Pioneer 3 was launched December
6, 1958.
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The ARPA or World Network
Before NASA was created, ARPA was planning to expand TRACE into a
truly worldwide network for the exploratioff of deep space. Indeed, plans for the
World Network were well under way when NASA came along in late 1958. JPL
haci already completed a proposal for the new network. 14 The two overseas
st_.tions were proposed for Luzon, the Philippines, and Nigeria, Africa, based
solely for optimum Coverage. ARPA approved this plan as part of its Order No. 1.
In July 1958, however, Donald Quarles, from DOD, questioned the
utility of the proposed network sites in terms of maximum utility to all U.S.
space programs. JPL was asked to review station placement in this light. The
resultant study 15 indicated that better orbital coverage for all planned U. S.
space missions would be possible if the Nigerian site were moved north to
southern Portugal or Spain, and the Philippine site south to south central
Australia. In particular, the coverage of orbits of inclination 34 ° to 51 ° would
be much improved. Future manned flights were obviously much on the minds
of the mission planners at this stage. Interestingly enough, major DSN stations
are now located precisely _vhere this report suggested. ARPA never had the
opportunity to completely deploy its deep space network because NASA arrived-"
on the scene just before the launch of Pioneer 3. NASA ultimately acquired
and installed the remaining ARPA-procured equipment.
JPL Moves to NASA
President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10783 officially established
NASA on October 1, 1958. - JPL's transfer from the Army came almost
immediately, on December 3, 1958, with Executive Order 10783 as the author-
izing vehicle. The Arn_ held onto the von Braun team at ABMA until July 1,
1960. 16 • ,_!_-
The formation of NASA did not constitute a break in the nation's space
program, it was primarily a transfer of authority and funding. Instead of an
Army contract, JPL now worked under a NASA contract. Thus, NASA inherited
JPL's experienced personnel, its facilities (including Goldstone), as well as
JPL's vision of a worldwide tracking network for deep space probes. NASA's
plans for JPL were in keeping with this ,¢ision, and the concept of the World
Net survived the political upheavals of 1958 intact.
14jet Propulsion Laboratory, "Description of World Network for Radio Track-
ing of Space Vehicles, (Pasadena: JPL Publication No. 135, July 1, 1958).
15jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The ARPA Network, " (Pasadena: JPL TM 39-9,
1958). (This report was never found in declassified form. It is frequently
referenced in other source material !)
16Robert L. Rosholt, "An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, "
(Washington: NASA SP,-4101, 1966).
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During the Pioneer flights, the feed for the 26-m paraboloid was of the
simultaneous lobing type, using four circularly polarized turnstile radiators. The
calculated maximum range at which the 200-mw Pioneer signal could be heard
(i. e., unity signal-to--noise ratio) was approkimately 1.8 x 106 km. (Figure 3-1)
(It will be most interesting to compare the above performance figures with those
attained by the DSN at later stages of development. )
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Figure 3-1. Capabilities of tracking network for Pioneers 3 and 4.
The ground communication circuits (Figure 3-2) consisted of fulltime voice
and 60 word-per-minute teletype links. For most stations it was possible to establish
trunk tie-lines with administrative exchanges already existing in the areas. Contact
with the Puerto Rico station was through a submarine cable along the AMR.
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Trajectory computation was consumated by means of :m IBM 704 at JPL
with a back-up computer in Santa Monica. (Figure 3-3) The :,_perof Elmer et al
referenced above contains a long section on Pioneer traject_,- =nalysis. 'l_,emost
interesting fe_+,_reof the approach is the heavy, reliance on an_Le d_ta---_which
are no ]onff_L-used in the DSN at all)because of the lack of confidence in one--way
Doppler dug to possible driftof the spacecraft oscillator frequency. Even so,
Elmer et al estimate that the position of Pioneer 4 in the vicinityof the Moon was
known to within about 100 kin.
Pioneer 3 was launched on December 6, 1958, but it only reached an
altitude of 63,500 miles before it fell back to Earth, impacting somewhere in
central Africa. The total flight lasted approximately 24 hours. The Puerto Rico
station tracked it for 14 hours (out and back) and Goldstone 10 hours. Puerto
Rico was able to maintain telemetry contact out to at least 40,000 miles, while
Goldstone with its much bigger antenna had no trouble acquiring telemetry during
the entire period the Pioneer was above its horizon. The telemetry received at
Puerto Rico had high scientific value because it recorded two passes through the
then mysterious Van Allen belts. In actuality, the PUerto Rico station had
tracked Pioneer 3 as far as it could and had then shut down. Station personnel
were celebrating the first successful lunar probe flight when news arrived that
the spacecraft was falling back to Earth. The party ended quickly as personnel
left to fire up the station again.
Three months later, on March 3, 1959, Pioneer 4 departed Cape Canaveral
and became the first U. S. spacecraft to leave the Earth's gravitational field. Early
tracking and telemetry were similar to Pioneer 3. After the 100,000-mile mark,
however, a departure from the nominal launchtrajectory caused the spacecraft to
dip below Puerto Rico's :eastern horizon for 30 minutes. No tracking data and
telemetry could be obtained during this period. Subsequently, .Puerto Rico re-
acquired the probe. The first Goldstone acquisition occurred 6.5 hours after
launch when it was 60,000 miles fr_)m Earth. For about 15 minutes, the three
TRACE stations plus Jodrell Bank tracked Pioneer 4 simultaneously, providing
a four-way fix on its position. The first three passes over Goldstone (March 3,
4, and 5)lasted about 10 hours each. The final Goldstone acquisition was on
March 6 at a range of almost 400,000 miles. At about 435,000 miles, the signal
was lost as the probe's batteries ran down. At the time the signal was lost the
quality of the telemetry and tracking data was still high. With a bigger battery
on the spacecraft, TRACE could have tracked Pioneer 4 much farther.
An interesting sidelighton the Pioneer-4 record involves the 6-m dish
at GE's Schenectady facility. Its receiver was fittedwith a parametric ampli-
fier whereas Goldstone was not. The parametric amplifier is a low-noise
device and potentiallycould have given the GE tracking station an advantage
over the larger Goldstone antenna. In any event, S. K. Brown of GE claimed
that it received Pioneer 4 transmission from greater distances than JPL. 2
2E. C. Buckley, Memo for files, March 12, 1959.
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Figure 3-3. The computing center at J P L  during the Pioneer-3 
and -4 flights. 
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JPL's Pioneer antenna at Goldstone also tracked Pioneer 5, an Air Force-
built spacecraft taken over by NASA. Originally intended as a Venus fly by, weight"
limitations forced the Air Force to settle for deep space exDloration. Launched
on March 11, 1960 and transmitting at 378 MHz, the officiai tracking stations
following the flight were located at the Cape, on Hawaii, at Singapore, and at
Millstone Hili, Massachusetts. JPL, however, by modifying its receivers at
Goldstone, was able to track Pioneer 5 on an informal basis. On April 1 and 2,
1960, Goldstone successfully tracked and recorded signals from Pioneer 5,
which was then at a distance of 2.9 million miles.
Project Echo
Project Echo began in early 1959 at the Langley Research Center. The
objective was the evaluation of large, balloon-type satellites as passive communi-
cation satellites. To do this NASA planned to orbit a 100-foot-diameter
inflatable metallic balloon at about 1000 miles altitude and bounce signals off
it from East coast to West coast. JPL's Goldstone station was an obvious choice
for the West Coast terminal. The Bell Telephone Laboratories were brought
into the program to provide the East Coast site. (Figure 3-4)
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Figure 3-4. Sketch of JPL-Bell Labs Echo-1 experiment.
The plan called for setting up separate links at 960 MHz (east to west)
and 2390 MHz (west to east). Bell Labs had a 19-m parabolic dish at its Holmdel
facility in New Jersey for transmissions and wanted to use a 20-by-20 foot horn
antenna to receive JPL's transmissions at 2390 MHz. While JPL had the 26-m
Pioneer dish at Goldstone for receiving Bell Labs' 960-MHz signal after it
bounced off the Echo satellite, it needed a second antenna for transmissions at
2390 MHz. 3
JPL built its Goldstone Echo antenna, the site's second 26-m dish,
with funds provided by Leonard Jaffe's Communications Satellite Program at
NASA Headquarters. Construction commenced at Goldstone in July of 1959 and
was completed by December. It became operational in April 1960. The new
dish differed from the Pioneer antenna in its high speed, Az-E1 (azimuth-
elevation) drive, which was more suitable for tracking satellites than the
astronomy-oriented equatorial drive. The Echo site also included a 10 kilo-
watt transmitter operating at 2390 MHz, which represented the state of the
art in 1960.
The JPL antennas were not employed for tracking the Echo satellites,
just for transmitting and receiving. The Echos carried Minitrack beacons,
and the Minitrack tracking stations relayed tracking information to Goddard
Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Goddard, in turn, supplied via
teletype local pointing angles in the coordinate systems required by the four
different antennas involved. Because the Pioneer and Echo sites at Goldstone
were 7 miles apart, a computer operating in real time was needed to correct
these pointing angles for parallax. 4
Each JPL antenna had mounted upon ita telescope with a TV remote
monitor for optical tracking of the balloon satellites,which were big enough
to be seen easily with the naked eye. Provisions were also made for radar
tracking of the Echos in the S-Band from the Echo antenna, but this did not
prove necessary during the experiements.
The signal power reflected into the ground antennas by the metallized
spheres was expected to be very small. Therefore, an effort was made to
reduce noise temperature. JPL installed parametric amplifiers at both
antennas. They had been under development at JPL for several years, and
Echo saw their first operational use by JPL. Bell Labs used a liquid-helium-
cooled, solid-state maser at Holmdel, which reduced its noise temperature
down to 24°K 5, which was considerably lower than JPL could manage with
3jPL was most interested in experimenting at these frequencies, which are
in the so-called S-Band, for they were deemed highly desirable for future
deep space work.
4William C. Jakes, Jr., and Walter K. Victor, "Tracking Echo I at Bell
Telephone Laboratories and Jet Propulsion Laboratories," in Space Research
II, H. C. van de Hulst et al, eds., {Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Co., 1961} pp. 206-214.
5John R. Pierce, "Practical Problems of Satellite Communication, " Astronautics,
vol. V (May 1961)pp. 34-35, 90, 92, 94.
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parametric amplifiers (about150°K). Thus, the Echo Project, which super-
ficially seemed a diversion from deep space tracking and data acquisition, was
a proving ground for several new developments.
Echo 1 was launched on August 12, 1960, and Echo 2 on January 25,
1964. Both inflated successfully in 1000-mile orbits. Echo 1 was 100 feet in
diameter, Echo 2 somewhat larger at 13_ feet. Several communication
"firsts" resulted from the Echo 1 flight, v Within two hours of the launch, a
recording of President Eisenhower's voice was transmitted from the West
Coast to the East Coast. This experiment was more significant than planned
because solar disturbances had seriously curtailed long distance ground
communications at this time. Facsimile signals were transmitted later. Many
other experiments of importance to long distance communications followed.
The actual tracking of Echo 1 proved more difficult than expected when
pointing angle predictions turned out to be inaccurate. The problem .was not
with Minitrack but rather with the large orbital perturbations of the satellite
caused by density changes of the atmosphere. The Echo balloons, being of
large cross section and light in weight, were affected much more than other
satellites in orbit.
Following the completion of the Echo-1 experiments, the Echo antenna
was taken over by the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition at NASA Head-
quarters. The entire antenna was moved in 1961 to a new area at Goldstone
called the Venus site, where it was hereafter relegated to research and test-
ing. (Figure 3-5) The Echo site subsequently received another 26-m antenna
with a standard DSN-type equatorial drive. '1
Radio Science at Goldstonel 1959-1961
Radar experiments with the Echo 26-m antenna and the Echo satellite
demonstrated that JPL was developing a valuable astronomical tool out on the
desert at Goldstone. Various experiments involving "Moon bounces" of radio
signals confirmed this. The first majo_ JPL success at interplanetary radar
came on March 10, 1961, when good radar returns were obtained from the
planet Venus. 8 These echoes were the first indisputable radar echoes from
this planet. MIT scientists had claimed radar contact with Venus in late 1958
6Leonard Jaffe, "Project Echo Results," Astronautics, Vol. V (May 1961),
pp. 32-33, 80.
7H. R. Brockett, personal interview, February 25, 1975.
8W. K. Victor and R. Stevens, "The 1961 JPL Venus Radar Experiment," in
Space Research III, Wolfgang Priester, ed., (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Co., 1963) pp. 886-890.
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with their Millstone Hill antenna, but their claim had not withstood careful
scrutiny. 9 In fact, another MIT attempt at the next cl_)se approach of Venus
in 1959 was also unsuccessful.
During the 1961 Venus experiment, the Echo antenna transmitted a
13-kw continuous-wave signal at the planet, while the Pioneer antenna listened
with a newly added cavity maser followed by a parametric amplifier receiver
(64°K noise temperature). This radar was operated in a two-way, phase-
coherent mode. Over 200 hours of good data were obtained while Venus was
between 50 and 75 million miles from Earth.
A scientific result that was also of immense practical importance was
the radio determination of the Astronomical Unit (A. U.) as 149, 598, 5004- 500
km, an improvement in accuracy of nearly two orders of magnitude. If the old
optical value of the A.U. had been used in Mariner-2 trajectory computations,
its flyby of Venus might have been at a much greater distance with an attendant
loss of scientific data.
On the scientific side, analysis of the radar returns suggested that
the rotation of Venus was very slow and perhaps "locked" in a 225-day resonance,
but the case was considered rather weak for this conclusion.
These first small experiments in radar astronomy whetted the appetites
of astronomers. Tracking deep space probes, it developed, required ground
instrumentation that was nearly ideal for sophisticated experiments in inter-
planetary radio science.
The DSN Takes Shape
The Army Explorers and early Pioneers had been rushed into hardware
more in response to Russian and interservice rivalries than as parts of a long :_
term, carefully planned national effort in space exploration. With NASA
assuming responsibiiity for all non-military space activities and with the
international Space Race in full swing, ambitious plans were the order of the
day. Most of the major space programs of the 1960s had their genesis in the
1959-1961 period: Apollo, Ranger, Mariner, Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter, and
so 6n. It was also time to move ahead and build a deep space network that
could track and communicate with probes at planetary distances on a continuous _
basis. The intermittent lunar capability patched together for Pioneers 3 and 4
was completely inadequate in the light of future NASA objectives.
9R. M. Goldstein, personal interview, April 15, 1975. Also R. Price et al,
"Radar Echoes from Venus," Science_ vol. CXXIX (March 20, 1959) pp.
751-753,
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At firstthere were three major actors in the tracking and data acqui-
sitiontheater:
-NASA Headquarters. During the 1959-1961 period, the responsibility
for NASA-wide tracking and data acquisition was being centralized
under Edmond C. Buckley, who had moved from Langley to Washington
in 1958 for this very purpose. Initially,Buckley was Assistant
Director for Space Flight Operations and responsible directly to Abe
Silverstein, who headed the Office of Space Flight Development.
(Figure 3-6)
-JPLo Here_ development of deep space capabilities in tracking and
data acquisition were under the leadership of Eberhardt Rechtin, who
had been appointed Chief of the Telecommunications Division (Division
33) in 1958. (Figure 3-7) As the DSIF (Deep Space Instrumentation
Facility), as the embryonic DSN was then called, became more and
more significant in JPL's plans and budgets, Rechtin was appointed
Program Director of the DSIF on May 9, 1960, in addition to his
Division 33 assignment. 10 The DSN did not become an official Program
Office until 1963, but it interfaced with NASA Headquarters as if it
were long before that date. 11
-ARPA, where there were serious thoughts about the military poten-
tialities of cislunar space and the Moon itself. ARPA wanted its own
lunar tracking and data acquisition capabilities.
Saga of the ARPA Antennas. The pressure of the requirements of the Ranger,
Surveyor, and Mariner missions then taking shape on NASA's planning boards
added more momentum for the completion of what ARPA had called the World
Net before NASA took over. To complete the World Net, NASA needed two
more sites with 26-m dishes roughly 120° of longitude apart. ARPA had
already purchased three such dishes, one of which now belonged to NASA at
Goldstone. The other two were awaiting shipment overseas.
On January 10, 1959, NASA and ARPA representatives sat down to
coordinate their network plans. 12 They decided to jointlybuild a network of
five deep space stations with 26-m dishes as follows:
NASA- Ope rated ARPA Operat _d
Goldstone Spain
South Africa Japan
Australia
10R. Cargill Hall, "Ranger History," unpublished, Chapter 7.
llwilliam Bayley, personal interview, April 19, 1975.
12H. R. Brockett, personal interview, February 25, 1975.
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Each agency would get one of the antennas ARPA had already purchased. NASA
decided to place its new dish in Australia; ARPA earmarked its dish for Spain.
With these guidelines, a joint NASA-ARPA site survey team took off to locate
likely sites. 13
The military's plans for a separate deep space network soon faded.
The 26-m antenna ARPA had hoped to install in Spain became excess baggage,
something ARPA no longer really needed. Glennan, the NASA Administrator,
wrote to McElroy, Secretary of Defense, asking if NASA could have the excess
dish. A purchase agreement whereby NASA transferred $1.3 million to DOD
was worked out. NASP :ventually erected this antenna in Johannesburg, where
some modifications in its base were required due to the different latitude. In
this rather involved way, NASA obtained its first subnet of three 26-m antennas
from ARPA. (The Echo antenna, NASA's other 26-m dish at Goldstone, was
purchased much later directly from the manufacturer. )
Overseas Negotiations and Site Construction.
NASA's foreign DSN sites are few in number in comparison to those
needed for manned space flightand satelliteoperations. The DSN stations,
however, were subjected to the same _dide!ines in the area of international
relations. First, NASA wished to convince host countries that its tracking and
data acquisition stations were good for the country concerned. To this end,
foreign nationals were to be used to the maximum feasible extent in building
and operating the stations, even at the cost of extensive training programs.
NASA facilities,therefore, would upgrade a country's technical base and in
consequence be welcome additions. Edmond Buckley, at NASA Headquarters,
was the principal architect of thispolicy as well as the following guideline:
NASA in its negotiations with foreign countries should stress the nonmilitary
features of itstracking and data acquisitionfacilities. One reason for this
was the strong aversion of many countries for American military activities.
Secondly, a nonmilitary network, with sites based on thisprinciple, would be
less likelyto be gobbled up by expanding DOD networks, which often coveted
NASA's tracking assignments.
The first overseas DSN station was located at Woomera, in the state
of South Australia, approximately 110 ° west of Goldstone's longitude. The
site recommended by the NASA-ARPA survey was already a missile and
rockettest center operated by the Australian Weapons Research Establishment.
Furthermore, the United States had already gained Australia's agreement to
build tracking facilities here during the IGY. Australia had, in fact, erected
and had manned a Navy Minitrack station and installed a Smithsonian Baker-
Nunn tracking camera. In addition, the language was English and the Australians
had developed considerable technical kn0w-how. There was also thought to be
a good supply of technical manpower in the area due to the nearby rocket
activities.
13H. L. Richter et al, "ARPA-NASA Overseas Tracking Site Survey, " February
1959.
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A spot called Island Lagoon, 14 miles southeast of Woomera, had been
recommendedfor the antenna. (A dry lake nearby with an "island" in the middle
was the source of the name.) Construction began in March 1960and was com-
plete by September. The Blaw-Knox Company, under a JPL contract, assembled
and erected the antennawhich was, as mentioned earlier, one of those obtained
from ARPA. (Figure 3-8) Collins Radio supplied the electronics equipment.
The third andlast element in the DSN's first 26-m subnethad to be
roughly in the longitude band including Spainand SouthAfrica for continuous
deep space coverage. Spainwas first choice but was abandonedwhen ARPA
insisted on locating the antennaon land already leased rather than a remote
location. (ARPA wantedto avoid renegotiating existing treaties..) SouthAfrica,
however, held manyadvantages, such as being in the track of spacecraft
ascendingfrom a CapeCanaveraI launch. It also had a friendly government
anxious to help with the station. Technical talent was also available and the
lang-uagewas familiar. There is really no mystery why the NASA-ARPA site
survey team chose SouthAfrica, but an inkling of trouble far in the future did
make its way into a 1960memo to Buckley:
Currently it is plannedto proceed with the installation of a Space
Probe Station in the Union of SouthAfrica despite the recent
racial disturbances. 14
If there were any doubts of a political nature, a secondquotation from
the same memo swept them aside:
In support of the Rangerprogram, the choice of a new site for the
85 foot dish will probably make the operational date of the third
SpaceProbe Station slip. 15
Thus it was that negotiations proceededwith SouthAfrica. A prelimin-
ary contract hadbeenissued in April 1960so that the SouthAfrica Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)could begin planning the station. The
final bilateral agreementbetweenthe two governments was concluded in
September 1960.
The chosen site was near Hartebeestpoort Damabout 40 miles north
of Johannesburgon farmland purchased by the SouthAfrican government for
a radio research center. As with Woomera, NASAalready had Minitrack
and Baker-Nunn stations in the area. Under the pressure of Ranger, statien
construction beganin January 1961and wascomplete by July 1961, in time
for the first Ranger tests. (Figure 3-9) The World Net had been completed
but it was now called the DSIF.
14Robert D. Briskman, "Union of SouthAfrica SpaceProbe Station,
to Assistant Director, SpaceFlight Operations, May 9, 1960.
15Ibid.
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Figure 3-8. The 26-m paraboloid at Woomera. 
36 
Figure 3-9. The Johannesburg DSN station. 
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The AAS {Advanced Antenna System}. As NASA's plans for space exploration
matured in 1959, unmanned missions to the planets quickly moved from the
category of "ridiculous and impossible" to "feasible and politically desirable. "
In this environment, it became increasingly obvious that the 26-m paraboloids
being built for Pioneer and Echo were going to be too small for future tracking
and data acquisition requirements. The attenuation of the inverse square law
at planetary distances could be overcome either by more powerful transmitters
on the spacecraft or more sensitive receivers back on Earth. The payload
restrictions on planetary probes placed the burden squarely on the terrestrial
terminal. Primarily this meant bigger antennas and lower noise temperatures.
But how big could steerable antennas be built and at what costs ? To answer
such questions JPL inaugurated its AAS program in 1959.
A long lead time was required because several concepts had to be ex-
plored in depth. Several large antenna projects in radio astronomy had run
into serious engineering problems; viz., the Navy's Sugar Grove antenna; and
NASA and JPL did not want to join this unselect group. One of the first efforts
to focus national technical talent on the problem took place on November 6n
1959, when NASA Headquartbrs sponsored a conference on big antennas. lb
Experts responsible for several large antenna projects in radio astronomy
reported on their work and commented on NASA's problem. Three basic kinds
of antennas were built or were being built:
1. Steerable paraboloids (like the 26-m dishes but much larger, as
exemplified by the Navy's 182-m monster at Sugar Grove)
2. Fixed paraboloids with movable feeds (like the Arecibo dish}
3. Fields of small, separate, steerable antennas.
Although the engineering challenges _vere great, NASA and JPL decided to stay
with the steerable paraboloids. The general thinking at this time was to aim _
for a dish with several times the area of the 26-m antennas. A steerable
paraboloid of this size capable of continuous operation in all but the most
extreme weather conditions was felt to be within the state of the art.
To obtain some hard engineering numbers, JPL briefed industry on
the AAS on September 29 and 30, 1960, asking for proposals for feasibility
studies. Seventeen proposals were received and from these JPL selected four
contractor teams:
-t_law-Knox, Dalmo--Victor, and Alpha Corporation
-Hughes Aircraft and Consolidated Western Steel
- North Ameirican (Columbus}
- We stinghouse
16Wallace L. Ikard, "Conference on Large Aperture Antennas for Deep Space
Communications, " Memo for Space Flight Operations Files, November 23,
1959.
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The general conclusions derived from the four 4-month studies were that the
concept of a steerable paraboloid 200-250 feet in diameter was indeed feasible
andthat the most critical parts of the design were the mounting system, the
instrumentation, and the servomechanism drive. JPL then selected B!aw-
Knox to prepare a detailed feasibility study and preliminary design of a 70-m
antenna. -17 The $250,000 study was scheduled for completion by July 1962 so
that construction contracts could be let for an operational date (at Goldstone)
of January 1, 1965. Thus, the first steps were taken toward the present DSN
subnet of 64-m antennas.
Ground Communicntion and Computing. During its support of the Pioneer 3
and 4 flights, TRACE had relied upon teletype circuits to feed tracking data
and telemetry back to JPL. (Figure 3-1) The ground communication network
at this time was divided into two separate nets: A Red Net consisting of all
teletype lines and a single voice link; and a White Net made up of one voice
circuit connecting the three tracking stations with a monitoring capacity at two
message centers and with the Computing Center at JPL. The general purpose
of the White Net was coordination and troubleshooting. The combination of
the Red and White nets was adequate for primitive space probes but not for
the high-data-rate spacecraft being planned, particularly Surveyor and Lunar
Orbiter.
JPL set down three principles to guide the development of a higher
performance ground communication system, to be called the GCS (Ground
Communications System} :
lo
.
There must be enough flexibility to meet widely varying mission
requirements.
High reliability is essential and should be obtained through
maintenance, backup circuits and equipment, and good operational
planning.
3. Provisions must be built in for accommodating new circuits and
new tracking stations.
In 1961, the ground communications system was being readied for the
support of Ranger. At this point in time, each tracking station was tied to JPL
by two teletype circuits and one voice circuit. The JPL terminz[ was called
the Pasadena Communications Center. To expedite the flow of incoming data
to the mission control personnel, an operations control room was set up at the
Communications Center. A window separated the communications personnel
from the controllers, and messages between the two groups were passed through
a slot in the window. The controllers monitored their own voice circuits. When
a communications man was needed, a wave or shout got his attention. Later,
this situation was remedied by an intercom. The Communications Center had
17NASA, "Feasibility Study for a Deep Space Tracking Antenna, " NASA Head-
quarters News Release 61-191, August 25, 1961.
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a manual patching capability whereby any teletype machine in t::,e Communica-
tions Center could be linked to any long distance line and long distance lines
could be connected to teletype machines in the Computing Cent¢r. Teletype
tapes were subsequently converted into punched cards which were fed directly
into the IBiV! 709 computer. 18 During this early stage in DSN development,
JPL controlled all of the DSN communication lines. NASA, however, was
evaluating the costs involved of maintaining separate communication networks
for each of its three tracking networks, with an eye to pooling circuits in a
common system.
The techniques described above for handling telemetry and tracking
data seem quite crude by modern standards, however, it was during this
period that JPL and other NASA centers were developing the capability to
feed telemetry data directly into the computer, bypassing the preparation of
teletype tapes and punched cards.
Noise Temperature Reduction. Although JPL was developing considerable
expertise in low-noise parametric amplifiers and masers, it had not yet
reached the stage where it could employ these devices for the Pioneer lunar
probes. This was unfortunate because two "competitors" did: General
Electric at Schenectady and the Air Force at Jodrell Bank, where a para-
metric amplifier built by Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge (TRW) was employed.
A 960-MHz L-Band parametric amplifier was, however, introduced
by JPL during the Echo experiments, but this was not the same device later
used throughout the network. The Echo up-converter paramp had gain-
stability problems and was discarded for a singl_e-port type. 19 To provide
a stable temperature environment, Peltier cooling was introduced. In fact,
the paramps introduced into the DSN in January 1962 represented the first
large-scale applications of Peltier temperature stabilization in such equip-
ment.
In parallel with the parametric amplifier work, Walter Higa's group
at JPL had switched its development efforts from ammonia masers to solid-
state ruby masers when Bell Labs successfully demonstrated such devices.
By 1960, the JPL group had L-Band cavity ruby masers operating in open-
cycle dewars. These masers were used operationally in low-noise receivers
at Goldstone for Mariner 2. The principal JPL contributions in this work
were in the field of cryogenics and in converting laboratory versions of solid-
state masers to highly-reliable, field-tested equipment---a vital requirement
for a DSN station.
18JPL, "A History of the Deep Space Network to 1 January 1969, " (Pasadena,
JPL 890-9, September 1, 1970) p. 2-24.
19j. R. Hall, personal interview, July 28, 1975.
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Chapter 4. THE EARLY RANGERS
The Rangers, like the early Pioneers, were lunar probes with the
objective of crossing the quarter million miles separating Earth and Moon and
impacting the lunar surface. In 1961, merely hitting the Moon with terrestrial
hardware would have been accomplishment enough, but the Rangers were also
designed to carry instruments for studying space physics in transit, taking
pictures of the lunar surface before impalct, and analyzing the lunar environ-
ment from a landed instrument package.
The Rangers took several significant steps forward from Pioneer-3
and -4 technology. In fact, in retrospect, the program may have been too
ambitious in terms of the number of advances envisaged. First, the spacecraft
itself was to be fully stabilized in. attitude, keeping a high-gain antenna pointed
at Earth and solar-cell panels aimed at the Sun. In contrast, the Pioneers had
been simple, spin-stabilized spacecraft, maintaining their spatial orientation
like a rifle bullet. Complete attitude stabilization was a technical challenge in
the early 1960s. The second major technical advance attempted was the landing
of an instrument capsule on the lunar surface by means of a retrorocket.
Originally, five Rangers were planned. The first two were to be test
beds that would be injected into elliptical orbits around the Earth. These were
to check out the engineering of the attitude control, solar power, and communi-
cation subsystems. Rangers 3 through 5, the Block II Rangers, each consisted
of the spacecraft "bus" plus the ejectable capsule with its retrorocket. On
their way to the Moon, these spacecraft were to make measurements of cislunar
space and, as the Moon loomed large before impact, take vidicon pictures of
its surface. Just before impact, the capsule would be ejected; it would orient
itself, fire its retrorocket according to preprogrammed instructions, and ease
down to the lunar surface. Once on the surface, the capsule would right itself
and transmit data on local radioactivity and moonquakes, z
The first five Ranger shots were plagued by launch vehicle and space-
craft failures. It became apparent that additional Rangers would be needed to
obtain the close-up knowledge of the Moon's surface required for the Apollo
program. Consequently, on August 2fl, 1961, NASA added a third block of
four Rangers to be launched in 1963. _ A fourth block of five more was announced
on October 15, 1962, making a total of 14. The last five, however, were can-
celled on December 13, 1963, for reasons of economy. The single-minded goal
1For considerably more detail on the Ranger Program origins, perturbations,
and conclusions, see: R. Cargill Hall, "Lunar Impact: History of Project
Ranger, " unpublished.
2N. A. Renzetti, and B. J. Ostermier, "Communications with Lunar Probes"
(Pasadena: JPL TR 32-148, August 23, 1961).
3Official NASA Flight Schedule.
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of the Block-III Rangers was not science but the return of detailed vidicon pictures
of the lunar surface prior to impact. The Block-III Rangers were geared primar-
ilyto the engineering needs of Apollo.4 Removed from the payload were the
instrumented capsule and its retrorocket.- The politicalpressure for Ranger
successes during 1964 was most intense.
Another cornerstone in America's Moon program was the Surveyor soft lander,
which was aimed at providing information on lunar surface properties for the
upcoming Apollo manned landings. The Surveyor flightsdid not begin until
1966, but the testing of the launch vehicle, the new Atlas-Centaur, began well
before that in 1962. Tb DSN was called upon to support some of the Atlas-
Centaur test flightsfrom 1962 through 1966, a period overlapping the Rangers.
The DSN activitiesduring these tests willbe discussed later in this chapter.
The Mariner-1 and -2 launches directed toward Venus and those of
Mariners 3 and 4 toward Mars also came during the Ranger period. These
flights,however, were interplanetary in nature and required substantially
differentDSN support. Mariner 4 was in factthe firstS-Band mission supported
by the DSN. Therefore, they deserve chapters of their own.
Prolog to Ranger
Rather unexpectedly in the early 1960s, the tracking and data acqui-
sition function was assuming more and more importance in NASA's budget and,
consequently, in its organizational structure. Space flight turned out to be not
all launch rockets and spacecraft, it depended very heavily upon ground
facilities for testing, launching, and, of course, tracking and communication.
The early literature of space flight does not foresee these developments at all.
Management practicalities, however, soon forced NASA to recognize the
importance of tracking and data actluisition by placing this function on a par
with space science, manned space flight, etc. On November 1, 1961, the new
Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition (OTDA) was created at NASA Head-
quarters. Edmond C. Buckley, who had been in charge of Space Flight
Operations under Abe Silverstein (Figure 3-6) was named Director of the
new Office. (Figure 4-1) In effect, the entire tracking and data acquisition
function was elevated a notch in the NASA Headquarters hierarchy. It
remained in this position until 1966 when the Directoc of the Office of Track-
ing and Data Acquisition 5 was appointed Associate Administrator, indicating
another s_ep upward in the NASA Headquarters hierarchy.
• At JPL, as the Ranger Program got underway, DSN management
still resided in Division 33 (Telecommunications) under Eberhardt Rechtin.
(Fig_are 3-6) The growing importance of tracking and data acquisition had
been recognized in 1960 when Rechtin was given the additional title of DSIF
4R. Cargill Hall, "Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger, " unpublished.
5Gerald M. Truszynski at this time.
42
I/)
b_
0
0
_J
0
0
_J
0
0 "-_
c_
<o
I
I-4
43
Program Director, but the function stillremained immersed in JPL's tradi-
tionalfunctional organization structure. Finally, on October 2, 1963, Rechtin
was named Assistant Laboratory Director for Tracking and Data Acquisition.6
(Figure 4-2_ On the day before Christmas 1963, the DSN itselfwas officially
established , although ithad been termed such for several years. The
"official"DSN incorporated the DSIF (thetracking sites specifically),the
interstationcommunications (now called the Ground Communications Facility),
and the mission-independent portions of the Space Flight Operations Facility
(SFOF). (Figure 4-3) The purpose of the consolidation was the more
efficientsupport of the several new off-Lab projects theDSN was being called
upon to support, such as Atlas-Centaur (Lewis Research Center), Lunar
Orbiter (Langley Research Center), a new Pioneer series (Ames Research
Center), and Apollo. Dr. N. A. Renzetti was named DSN Manager. Before
this change, Renzetti had been Chief of Communications Engineering and
Operations. Basically, the JPL reorganization paralleled that which had
occurred at NASA Headquarters two years earlier.
A most important responsibility of the DSN Manager was and still is
the dev.elopment of an integrated plan for the support of missions in conjunction
with the Mission Manager, wherever he might be in the NASA and JPL organi-
zations. But before detailed support plans could be discussed, mission
planners had to have some measure of DSN capabilities in order to prepare
conceptual designs of their spacecraft and missions. It has been the custom
of DSN management to prepare periodically comprehensive summaries of
DSN capabilities---snapshots, as it were---in a series of documents given
wide distribution. 8
The next step in matching mission requirements with DSN capabili-
ties consisted of informal meetings between DSN and mission engineers.
During most of the 19606, the DSN provided additional flexibility through the
addition of "mission-dependent" equipment at its stations and the SFOF. These
special equipments performed functions not built into the DSN at that time,
such as the provision of special commands or unique recording apparatus.
Every program had its special equipment and own personnel to operate it at
DSN stations during this period, and this proved awkward and inefficient for
all the flexibility it provided.
Ranger, being an in-house JPL project, did not involve as many inter-
faces with other organizations as did Atlas-Centaur. It was during the Atlas-
Centaur Program that the first NASA tracking panel was created to replace
informal discussions of requirements and capabilities with a better organized
forum. Tracking and data acquisition panels were soon set up for other
6W. H. Pickering, JPL Interoffice Memo 200.
7W. H. Pickering, Interoffice Memo 218, December 24, 1963.
8A typical example: E. Rechtin, "System Capabilities and Development
Schedule of the Deep Space InstrumentationFacility, 1963-1967, " (Pasadena:
JPL TM 33-83, March 2, 1962). Other examples may be found in the
Bibliography.
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missions, enabling support problems to be ironed out in a more definitive way.
Minutes were kept of these meetings and some of the disadvantages of informality
thus eliminated. Later, the negotiation of requirements and support became
even more formal when the SIRD (Support Instrumentation Requirements Document)
and its response the NASA Support Plan became the order of the day.
The DSN at the Beginning of Ranger
The Ranger flightsspanned nearly four years. During this period, the
DSN evolved steadily. Although the Rangers were L-Band missions (960 MHz),
S-Band technology was being rushed into hardware for Apollo and Mariner
planetary missions. Several other technical improvements were in the works,
too, but the DSN had to retain some degree of uniformity relative to the fixed
Ranger spacecraft. Insofar as the Ranger spacecraft were concerned, the
major DSN change was a reduction from 1500°K to 200°K in noise temperature
between Rangers 2 and 3---a result achieved through the introduction of
parametric amplifiers at all sites. In November 1961, the noise temperature
at Goldstone was reduced further to 50°K when an L-Band maser was installed.
This, of course had no effecton spacecraft design but did improve the ability
of Goldstone to receive faintsignals.
Tables 4-1 through 4-2 define DSN capabilitiesduring Rangers 1
through 5.
Table 4-3 indicates the presence of an MTS (Mobile Tracking Station)
at Johannesburg. Basically, the MTS was the same equipment employed at
Puerto Rico during Pioneer. In 1959, the Puerto Rico stationhad been fitted
with a 25-watt transmitter and moved to Goldstone for checkout and then to
South Africa. There itwas emplaced on a hillnear the Johannesburg 26-m
dish to help it acquire spacecraft coming down the Atlantic Missile Range.
(Figure 4-4) The narrow beam of the 26-m dish, its relatively slow tracking
velocities, and the hills surrounding it made an acquisition aid, such as the
MTS, desirable.
In the configuration described in Tables 4-1 through 4-3, the DSN was
expected to provide the following:
1. Tracking data---two angles, either hour angle and declination or
azimuth and elevation plus one-or two-way Dopple,.
. Commands---transmissions to the spacecraft required for mid-
course and terminal maneuvers, changes in telemetry mode,
antenna switching on the spacecraft, and other functions.
3. Telemetry data---from both the spacecraft and the instrumented
capsule on the Moon's surface.
Details of the DSN configuration and its performance will emerge in
the subsequent description of Ranger operations.
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Table 4-3. DSIF STATION CAPABILITIES
Station
,MTS
:Pioneer
:Echo
Woome ra
Johannesburg
Receive
X
X
X
X
X
Transmit
• I Command
I
x I
X a ], X a
i
x I x
xc I
:d 1 xd
Two-way
doppler
X
X
aA 25-w transmitter available for command capability only during Ranger
missions 1 and 2.
bprecision pseudo-two-way doppler only (0.35 m/sec accuracy).
CA 50-w transmitter for two-way doppler during Ranger 5.
dTwo-way doppler and command transmitter capability for Ranger missions
4 and 5.
NOTE: In addition to the above capabilities, all stations had angle tracking
and readout, one-way doppler measurement and readout, and
received signal strength roeasurement capabilities.
50 
Figure 4-4. Photograph of the Mobile Tracking Station (MTS) 
located at Johannesburg. 
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Ranger Tracking and Data Acquisition
Ranger 1. The Ranger-1 mission had the following objectives:
1. To test the basic elements of the spacecraft and DSN
2. To evaluate the performance of and gain experience with the Atlas-
Agena launch vehicle.
o To test spacecraft scientific instrumentation and, on a non-
interference basis, measure scientific phenomena along the
flight path.
The Ranger spacecraft was simplified for the two test flights in that the landing
capsule and its retrorocket were left off. Similarly, the mission itself was
much less complex in the sense that there were no midcourse and terminal
maneuvers. The flight plan consisted of the launch from Cape Canaveral
followed by the injection of the spacecraft-plus-Agena into a 115-mile parking
orbit. A second burn of the Agena would next inject the spacecraft into a
highly elliptical orbit (788,000 x 4000 miles). Following separation from the
Agena stage, the Ranger solar panels would be deployed and spacecraft power
system turned on. The attitude-control system would be turned on next so
that the spacecraft could turn on its roll axis and acquire the Earth with its
optical sensors. The objective was to have the spacecraft coasting with its
roll axis pointed at the Sun and its high-gain antenna aimed at the Earth.
In addition to the standard DSN equipment (Tables 4-1 and 4-2), the
following mission-dependent equipment was installed for Ranger 1:
-Scientific data teletype converter (all stations)
-Engineering telemetry digital decommutator (Goldstone,
Johannesburg, and the MTS)
-Precision Doppler system (Goldstone)
-Command coder (Goldstone)
Woomera,
The communications network for Ranger 1 (also Rangers 2 and 3) is shown in
Figure 4-5. Note that the teletype and voice links were primarily for track-
ing and administrative data. Scientific data and engineering telemetry were
recorded on tape in these days and shipped back to JPL for processing.
In mid-June of 1961, tests began at DSN stations preparatory to the
Ranger flights. Typical of these were star-tracking exercises and tracking-
and-data-acquisition tests involving aircraft. The entire DSN was exercised
using simulated tracking and telemetry data mailed to each station and then
transmitted back to JPL according to a schedule similar to that for a nominal
flight.
The actual launch of Ranger 1 took place on Aug_st 23, 1961. Due to
an Agena malfunction, the spacecraft was injected into a near-Earth orbit
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rather than the planned highly elliptical orbit. After 100 orbits, the spacecraft
reentered the EarthTs atmosphere on August 30.
The nonstandard orbit attained resulted in tracking rates too rapid for
the DSN's polar-mounted 26-m dishes. Consequently, the tracking burden fell
to the Goldstone Echo antenna (an AZ-El type) and the similar, but smaller
AZ-E1 antenna at the MTS located at Johannesburg. (See Table 4-1) Despite
the spacecraft's high angular speed, the polar-mounted antenna did track it
occasionally and did record some telemetry data. The telemetry data con-
firmed that Ranger 1 was working satisfactorily. Even though the mission
was unsuccessful, the DSN did acquire considerable tracking experience and
was able to test its procedures for operating a worldwide network for the first
time.
Ranger 2. 3"he flight plan for the second Ranger was essentially identical to
that for Ranger 1. The configuration of the DSN was likewise identical except
for the addition of a missi0n-dependent teletype converter at Johannesburg.
Network tests prior to the launch also paralleled those preeeeding Ranger 1.
On November 18, 1961, the Atlas-Agena placed the spacecraft into a
147 x 97 mile parking orbit---a satisfactory result. However, the Agena
second burn did not occur when the time came for the injection into a highly
elliptic orbit. In addition, the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) telemetry
records indicated that the Agena was rolling at an excessive rate. During
the second pass over the Cape, telemetry confirmed that the Ranger had
separated from the Agena. This fact had been suspected when the spacecraft's
signal was acquired by the MTS as it came over the horizon at Johannesburg.
The spacecraft's angular motion was so rapid that it must _u_t...........nave been in
its parking orbit. The MTS did acquire some data, but none of the other
stations was able to do much with the fast-moving spacecraft. After its fifth
orbit, even the MTS could not acquire it. The spacecraft reentered the next
day, November 19. The DSN was not designed to track fast-moving spacecraft
in Earth orbit; consequently few data were acquired under these very difficult
conditions.
Ranger 3. Ranger 3 was scheduled for lunar impact. The spacecraft and
mission were both more complex than their two predecessors. The scientific
and engineering goals were:
1. To obtain close-up photographs of the lunar surface
2. To collect gamma-ray data between Earth and Moon and in the
vicinity of the Moon
3. To acquire seismic data from the hard-landed capsule
4. To gain experience with midcourse and terminal maneuvers
5. To test spacecraft technology
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The spacecraft carried the instrumented capsule and its retrorocket on this
flight,as well as a protective thermal shroud that had to be ejected at the
conclusion of the first Agena burn. The mission design was similar to that
of the I'irstwo Rangers except that instead of injectingthe Ranger into an
ellipticalEarth orbit, the second Agena burn would send itout on a lunar
transfer orbit. The deployment of spacecraft appendages and acquisition of
Earth and Sun were similar. The midcourse correction maneuver was a new
requirement, one which had to work if lunar impact was to be attained. Here.
the spacecraft had to relinquish its lock on Earth and Sun, supply the thrust
specified by command from Earth. and then reacquire Earth and Sun. When
approaching the Moon, tilespacecraft upon receipt of terrestrial commands had
to point the vidicon camera at the Moon and orient the capsule for ejection.
maintaining, of course, lock on Earth wqlh the high-gain antenna. The retro-
rocket :.ncludedto slo_ down the instrumented package would be fired auto-
matically upon signal from the spacecraft radar altimeter. Obviously, Ranger
3 was a most ambitious enterprise in terms of the technology of the day.
No ;najor changes were made in the configuration of the DSN for this
mission, although some additional mission-dependent equipment was added.
Prominent among these additions'were acquisition aids. An L-Band acquisi-
tion aid installed at Johannesburg, consisting of a quad-helical array, provided
for the automatic acquisition of a s_acecraft by the 26-m m_tenna when acquired
l)), the broad-beam acquisition aid. 9 This experiment was also to supply design
data for an S-Band acquisition aid that would be needed when the DSN switched
over to S-Band in the future. Another acquisition aid was added at Woomera
to accommodate the wide variety of trajectories possible with Ranger 3. Some
vidicon experiment equipment was added in a rented trailer at Goldstone for
this and later Rangers. .The ground communications network remained un-
changed for Ranger 3, except that a new link had to be connected to a backup
computer at Space Technology Laboratories, replacing the one at Rand
Corporation.
The launch of Ranger 3 occurred on January 26, 1962, and once more
troubles cropped up. A failure of the Atlas ground-based guidance system
resulted in a tardy liftoff, an error that could not be corrected by modifying
the Atlas sustainer burn. The two programmed Agena burns followed, but
they were not able to compensate for the excess velocity accumulated at launch.
The spacecraft midcourse maneuver was likewise inadequate. As a result,
Itanger "_ arrived at the Moon 14 hours ahead of schedule and passed in front
of it, missing it by 22,862 miles.
An interesting facet of this story transpired when it was recognized
that no conceivable midcourse maneuver could produce a lunar impact. The
next thought was to acquire some good vidicon pictures of the Moon as the
spacecraft sped in front of it. The midcourse maneuver was planned with this
in mind. The command was duly sent and properly executed. The direction
9This eliminated the need for the MTS, which was decommissioned at the
conclusion of the Ranger Program.
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of the trajectory change, however, was opposite from that expected. It
developed that a command sign com, cntion was ambitious and had been inter-
preted differently by the spacecraft and attitude-control people. Even if the
spacecraft had been on target, this error might well have caused mission
failure. Thus a serious error was discovered and some positive good ex-
tracted from a failure. To end the tale of Ranger 3. commands were sent to
the spacecraft as it neared the Moon to point the vidicon at its target. At
this point, something happened to the attitude-control system, the spacecraft
began tumbling and was lost.
The DSNhad no trouble in acquiring Ranger 3. even though the AMR
was not able to supply downrange tracking data due to ground-equipment
failures. Personnel at the operations center in Pasadena generated acquisi-
tion information using the known launch time and assuming a nominal trajectow.
First acquisition was at the MTS m_d then. one minute later, at the
Johannesburg26-m paraboloid station. Woomera and then Goldstonc acquired
Ranger 3 as it began its long flight to the Moon. By the time Ranger 3 was
acquired by Goldstone, it had become obvious that the trajectory was such
that the spacecraft not only would not hit the Moon but would not tl 3' past it
during a Goldstone tracking period. Since only Goldstone hadvideo equipment,
this seemed to preclude the receipt of photographs of the lunar surface.
It was at this point that the decision was made to use a midcourse
maneuver to alter the trajectory so that Ranger 3 tlew past the Moon during
a Goldstone view period. As mentioned above, the correction was in the
wrong direction. The subsequent failure of the spacecraft attitude-control
system during the terminal maneuver created serious tracking and data
acquisition problems for the DSN. To try and regain control of the spacecraft,
the transmitter power at Goldstone was increased from 200 w to 7 kw. Over
200 commands were sent to the spacecraft without any apparent effect. At
the end of the Goldstone tracking period on January 31, the Echo station
ceased its Ranger-3 support activities. The DSN had tracked Ranger 3 out
to 560,000 miles.
Generally, telemetry reception at the DSN stations was very go(xt
except, of course, when Ranger 3 began tumbling near the Moon. A signal
strength problem was detected at Goldstone, when there was an S- to -10 db
difference between the Pioneer and Echo stations. Investigation indicated
that this was likely due to a combination of three things: incorrect cable
calibration, inadequate procedures in setting parametric amplifier gain. and
the use of a transponder with incorrect dial calibration.
Several equipment failures occurred at various spots around the
network, but these were either corrected in time or replaced with a backup
system so that DSN performance was not seriously impaired. For example,
the Goldstone Pioneer station's parametric amplifier failed, but a new unit
was substituted in time to resume tracking during the next period. The
Woomera engineering telemetry encoder failed on January 27, but a substi-
tute scheme of recording data was rushed into action.
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Ranger 4. The mission objectives here were identicalto those of Ranger 3.
Similarly, the DSN, including the ground communications, were essentially
unchanged.
In early April 1962, preparations began on the DSN for the upcoming
flight. These included the usual maintenance, checkout, star tracks, bore-
sight vs. polarization tests, and the extensive schedule of adjustments and
calibrations required by a machine as complicated as the DSN.
Ranger 4 left the launch pad at Cape Canaveral April 23, 1962. AMR
equipment and the DSN Launch Station successfully tracked the spacecraft down
along the range. During this portion of the flight, telemetry signals confirmed
that the spacecrah was operating normally. At launch plus 460 sec., th_
Launch Station lost the spacecraft signal as Ranger 4 headed toward Johannes-
burg. About 17 rain. later, the MTS, still stationed at Johannesburg, picked
up the Ranger-4 signals. It was immediately evident that something had
happened while the spacecraft was out of touch over the Atlantic. One
telemetry channel was lost and so was modulation on others. The signal
level was also varying wildly. Worse yet, commands to the spacecraft to
switch over to the high gain antenna were unsuccessful. Thus, no further
engineering or scientific telemetry could be gathered.
The DSN was able to track the Ranger-4 transponder signal until the
batteries ran down 10-1/2 hours after launch. (Obviously, the solar panels
could not be errected and oriented toward the Sun with the command system
out. ) The signal from the instrumented capsule aboard the spacecraft could
still be heard, however, and the network was able to follow it until two
minutes before the craft passed behind the Moon April 26.
The United States subsequently claimed that the spacecraft impacted
on the far side of the Moon, but the Russians claimed that it did not. Gold-
stone Doppler data, which was necessarily one-way Doppler data due to the
trm_sponder loss, was sufficient to prove that impact had indeed taken place. 10
Ranger 5. The Ranger-5 spacecraft duplicated Rangers 3 and 4; the assigned
mission was likewise the same. While the same DSN stations supported
Ranger 5, some important changes had transpired in the areas of ground
communications and computing.
Rangers 1 through 4 had shown a need for improvements in communi-
cations switching. Switching cords had been in use at the Pasadena Communi-
cations Center, and they had proven slow and error-prone. The early Ranger
flights had also demonstrated the need for better communications control.
Consequently, before the Ranger-5 launch, the JPL Communications Center
was reconfigured. A separate Communications Control Room was built and
push-button switching was installed, eliminating the troublesome cords.
10T. W. Hamilton, personal interview, April 15, 1975.
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Another changewas the introduction of woodenprototype television consoles of
the type planned for the SFOF (SpaceFlight Operations Facility) bein_ con-
structed at JPL.
Ranger 5 brought another problem: the simultaneous support of more
than one spacecraft (Mariner 2 in this instance). The three-day Ranger
flights had seriously fatigued DSN personnel. With the months-long flight to
Venus coming up as well as multiple missions, changes had to be made. One
response to the problem was the appointment of a full-time communications
operation supervisor in mid-1962.
Another significant change accomplished prior to Ranger 5 was the
computerization of a great deal more mission data handling. During the
early Ranger flights, each station recorded the telemetry received on tapes
which were then mailed back to JPL. The delays involved were unacceptable.
An attempt to process scientific telemetry at the stations was made during
Ranger 1 and 2. This involved demodulation, decommutation, conversion
from binary to octal, and the transmission back to JPLin nonreal time via
teletype. However, realtime data were wanted, particularly engineering
data relative to the health of the spacecraft. Therefore, JPL installed a dual
computer setup involving the newly acquired IBM 7090 and a PDP-1 computer.
The PDP-1 was attached directly to the teletype lines, generating decommu-
tared scientific and engineering telemetry on tapes. (Its core was split to
handle Ranger 5 and Mariner 2 simultaneously. ) The reels of tape were hand-
carried to the 7090 for processing. Tracking data came in on a separate
teletype line, were punched on paper tape, and converted into IBM cards for
the 7090. This approach worked very well.
With these changes, the DSN was ready for Ranger 511 although it
was already tracking Meriner 2 which had been launched toward Venus on
August 27, 1962. This fifth craft in the series was launched October 18, 1962.
The boost phase appeared normal up through the loss of lock by the Launch
Station 458 see. into the flight. Both firings of the Agena also appeared
satisfactory. Approximately 31 minutes after launch, the MTS at Johannes-
burg acquired Ranger 5. The Johannesburg 26-m antenna followed suit almost
immediately. About 46 minutes after launch, the spacecraft was picked up at
Woomera. Half an hour later, the mission started to go badly. Telemetry
showed that the solar panels had opened properly but that they were not gener-
ating the power they should. Due to the limited life of the spacecraft battery,
JPL's Spacecraft Data Analysis Team recommended that the midcourse
maneuver be tried ahead of schedule. The commands were sent but it was
too late because the maneuver could not be completed due to the dead batteries.
Following the unsuccessful attempt at a midcourse, the DSN occasion-
ally picked up the spacecraft transponder signal. As with Ranger 4 more
11Note that the tracking stations were referred to collectively as the DSIF
(Deep Space Instrumentation Facility). When the term DSN is applied here,
it means the DSIF plus ground communications and data processing and display.
58
success was hadwith tracking the transmitter signal from the instrumented
package. On October21, Ranger 5 was occulted by the Moon after hurtling
450 miles aboveits surface. The spacecraft signal reappeared quickly as
Ranger 5 went into a heliocentric orbit with a 366-day period. On October 30,
the capsule signal disappearedand the DSNbroke off tracking.
The DSNhad performed well, as it had during the preceding four
Ranger nights. It would be more than a year before the DSNwould again see
Ranger spacecraft, and it would be these flights that would finally bring
success to the program.
Legacy ol the First Five Rangers. The first Rangers were the first space-
craft to be tracked by the new worldwide network. The excellent performance
record of the DSN proved that the concept of an internationally managed net-
work was sound. From the technical point of view, the value of continuous
communication between spacecraft and network stations was amply demon-
stratcd in terms of spacecraft control, collection of scientific data, and the
conservation of spacecraft weight by shifting the communication burden to
ground stations. The Ranger experience also initiated some shifts in emphasis
in network design:
1. Engineering data should be relayed back tc JPL in near real-time.
'2. Preflight checkouts should be more frequent and more compre-
hensive.
3. Spacecraft signal acquisition early in flight should be expedited
by acquisition antennas and Night-path predictions.
4. Semiautomatic monitoring of DSN station performance should be
increased.
5. SFOF performance should likewise be monitored more carefully.
6. Failure-free network operation is impossible, but failures can
be made inconsequential by good engineering.
The Atlas-Centaur
The Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle was a vital element in NASA's launch-
vehicle program. With a high energy upper stage (liquid hydrogen), Atlas
Centaur was scheduled to propel the Surveyor soft landers to the Moon. Because
the DSN supported most of the Atlas-Centaur test flights, this program is a
logical part of the network history.
The Centaur Project originated in 1958 at ARPA, with the Air Force
undertaking the actual development. On July 1, 1959, however, program
responsibility was transferred to NASA. Within NASA, development responsi-
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bility was first assigned to the Marshall Space flight Center. The first launch,
which took place on May 8, 1962, was a failure, with the vehicle being destroyed
by the Range Safety Officer after 55 seconds of flight. Thus, time-wise, the
Atlas-Centaur overlapped the Block-II Rangers and belongs logically in this
chapter, even though the DSN did not happen to support the first test flight. If
the Atlas-Centaur Program had proceeded according to plan, there would indeed
be some DSN-supported flights for this Chapter. -The Program, however,
underwent a long reappraisal after the first failure, and was reassigned to the
Lewis Research Center. With all the delays that ensued, the second test launch
did not come to pass until November 27, 1963, which puts it well after Mariner
2 and into the next chapter. In the history of a technical enterprise as massive
and complex as the DSN, chapter boundaries are bound to be imperfect.
Concurrent Technical Developments
Operational efficiency demanded that the DSN remain relatively static
during the early Ranger flights; the network was in a sense the captive of the
spacecraft program. In the background, however, several elements of track-
ing and data acquisition technology were maturing. In 1961 and 1962, the DSN
was striving for:
1. Greater sensitivity and lower noise temperatures to permit the
network to handle the more distant planetary missions planned
for the future.
2. Greater ground transmitter power to command these spacecraft.
3. More accurate tracking technology.
4. Higher capacity, worldwide ground communication circuits
operating in near real time.
5. More computerization of data processing and display.
6. Higher operating frequencies.
I_rS Band Conversion. NASA and JPL engineers had long recognized the fact
that the I__Band frequencies (about 960 MHz) used for Ranger and the first
Mariners was an awkward place to be. Not only was cosmic noise relatively
high (Figure 4-6) but manmade noise was also considerable. Furthermore,
NASA was using the L--Band on a temporary, noninterference basis. The
L-Band was not among the frequency bands set aside for space research by
the 1959 Geneva International Telecommunications Union agreement. Rather,
JPL was operating at the lower edge of a TACAN band and was in danger of
being pushed out by airline (FAA) and military transmitters.
NASA studies had shown that the region between 1,000 and 10,000
looked good for deep space work, with the upper limit being set by the
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Figure 4-6. Typical radio noise temperatures.
absorption of water vapor in the atmosphere. One of several moves in the
direction of higher frequencies came early in 1960 when JPL was encouraged
to develop the technology necessary to operate the network at higher frequen-
cies. 12 In mid-1962 Rechtin, in view of improvements in S-Band components,
recommended that the whole DSN be switched over to the higher frequencies.
By late 1962, preliminary designs had been completed and work on conversion
began in earnest. JPL's goal was to fully convert the DSN with the two 1964
Mariner flights to Mars (Mariners 3 and 4). By the summer of 1963, an
S-Band maser for the ground stations was available as were the antenna cone,
the feed, and subreflector. The problem now hampering the band change was
the stretched-out Ranger flights scheduled into early 1965. Then, too,
Mariner 2, already out in space, was an L-Band spacecraft that might have
an active life of a year or more. Some sort of dual-frequency system had to
be worked out whereby both IrBand and S-Band spacecraft could be supported
12W. L. Ikard, "Frequencies for Deep Space Communications, " Memorandum
for Assistant Director, Space Flight Operations, May 13, 1960. Actually,
JPL would have liked to operate the Rangers in the S-Band (2300 MHz) but no
reliable travelling wave tubes or masers were at hand.
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at the same time. Only then could there be an orderly shift to S-Band. This
L/S Conversion Project, as it was called, came into being during 1963 and is
described in Chapter 6.
Frequency Standards and Doppler Accuracy. The accuracy of Doppler measure-
ments is strongly affected by the natural drift of the frequency standards em-
ployed at the DSN stations. The Rangers inaugurated the use of crystal-controlled
oscillators. But even with these relatively stable time-keepers, frequency drift
during the round-trip signal time to the Moon and back was enough to cause
large navigational errors. As soon as this situation was recognized, Rechtin,
at JPL, ordered a crash program to install temperature-controlled oscillators. 13
Even so, it was recognized that with a Mariner in the vicinity of Venus, much
greater stability would be required due to the much longer round-trip signal
times. The atomic oscillator seemed to be the answer, and JPL began plans to
install such frequency standards for the 1962 Mariner flights.
To give the reader some idea of the magnitude of improvement
occasioned by the new frequency standards, the precision crystal oscillator
used for Ranger 1 improved Doppler accuracies from tens of meters per second
to tens of millimeters per second, a thousand-fold improvement. The rubidium-
vapor frequency standard installed at Goldstone in 1962 for the Mariners had a
frequency stability of 1 x 10 -11 and improved Doppler accuracy from 50 to 5
millimeters per second.
Building the SFOF. The control center employed during the early Ranger
operations was makeshift, and its shortcomings stimulated thoughts about a
more permanent and comprehensive solution to the problem of mission control.
In February 1961, Pickering at JPL formed a committee to assess the future
mission requirements and recommend a more effective way to present data
being received from the DSN to mission controllers. The committee recom-
mended an entirely new building, later called the SFOF (Space Flight Operations
Facility). NASA headquarters approved the construction of the new building
on July 21, 1961. 14 As noted earlier in this chapter, various ideas potentially
applicable to the planned SFOF were tried out during Ranger operations.
DSN at Mid-Ranger. As 1962 drew to a close, the DSN was in a state of
transition. Several new technologies were clamoring to be incorporated in the
network, but the L-Band projects still underway prevented any wholesale
changes. Mariner 2 had been successfully launched and was on its way to a
rendezvous with Venus (see next chapter) but, with the exception of this space-
craft, 1963 presented the DSN with a lull in operations. Here was an oppor-
tunity to push ahead with the expansion and improvement of the DSN.
13T. W. Hamilton, personal interview, April 15, 1975.
14T. Cargill Hall, "Lunar Impact: History of Project Ranger" unpublished,
Chapter 7.
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Chapter 5. THE L-BAND NETWORK---CONTINUED
With the launch of Mariner 2 in August 1962, the DSN began tracking
its first truly interplanetary spacecraft. The distances involved in tracking
and data acquisition were multiplied more than a hundred times over the Earth-
.Moon distance. The DSN met the new challenge mainly through increasing
transmitter power (200 w to 10 kw), uplink and reduction of the system noise
I(,mp(_rature (200°K to about 50°K at Goldstone only) on the downlink. The
inl_,rl)l-mola,-y Ni_rh1_ wr2!'e, o_f course, measured in months rather than days,
as in the case of Ranger. The way in which the DSN operated had to be
modified for long-term tracking and, in addition, the impact of concurrent
missions---the Mariners, the remaining Rangers, and the Atlas-Centaur
Flights.
The Mariner Mission
When NASA's first planetary programs were laid out in 1960, NASA
hoped to take advantage of the 1962 launch windows to send probes to both
Venus and Mars. These were the so-called P-37 and l_-;l_ missions. Mariner
A was slated for Venus and Mariner B for Mars; both were to employ the new
Centaur upper stage. But the Centaur schedule had slipped badly, as indicated
in the preceeding chapter, and by August 1961 it was generally agreed that
Centaur would not be ready for the 1962 planetary probe launches. Yet, it
was deemed very important politically for the U. S. to demonstrate its grow-
ing space capabilities, vis-a-vis the Russian's, by launching interplanetary
payloads in 1962---the next launch windows in 1964 were considered much
too far away.
JPL offered a solution in a letter to NASA Headquarters on August 28,
1961. 1 JPL proposed a Venus mission using the Atlas-Agena used for Ranger
and a hybrid (and much smaller) spacecraft based on the Ranger and Mariner-A
designs. The new vehicle was termed Mariner R (the "R" stood for Ranger).
Two of them were to be launched, R-1 and R-2. The time between the new
project go-ahead and launch was less than a year. NASA Headquarters bought
the idea.
Project organizations were formed quickly at JPL and NASA Head-
quarters as well as at the Marshall Space Flight Center {responsible for the
launch vehicle), the Department of Defense, and various contractors.
Within JPL, the organization of the tracking and data acquisition function
remained essentially the same as it had been for Ranger. With such an
1Jet Propulsion Laboratory; "Mariner-Venus 1962, Final Project Report, "
(Washington: NASA SP-59, 1965) p. 11.
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urgent project, frequent meetings of management and various coordination
panels were essential. Division 33 personnel attended the weekly internal JPL
project meetings and played key roles in the various boards, working groups,
panels, etc., a_ld in particular the Tracking, Communication, In-Flight
Measuremt:nts and Telemetry Panel. 2
The function of the DSN during Mariner flights was to obtain angular
and Doppler measurements to fix spacecraft trajectory, receive telemetry,
and dispatch commands to the spacecraft. The DSN was originally assigned
to work the Mariner spacecraft continuously during the critical periods of the
flights: launch through midcourse maneuver plus two days and 24 hours before
and after encounter with Venus. At other times, coverage was supposed to
be 10 hours per day. It was stipulated that the DSN be prepared to provide
full coverage in engineering and/or scientific emergencies upon 6-12 hour
notice. The possibility of competition for DSN services during upcoming
Ranger shots was recognized, but the problem was left for resolution when
it occurred.
The Mariner-2 DSN Configuration
No one entertained any thought of radically changing the DSN for the
new crash project. Indeed, it had to remain fairly static for Rangers 5
through 9, and for that matter Mariner R drew so much technology from
Ranger that DSN antennas really saw the new Mariners as much more distant
Rangers. The DSN stations active during Mariner 2 were as follows:
DSIF 0
DSIF 1
DSI F 2
DSIF 3
DSIF 4
DSIF 5
Launch Station, Cape Canaveral
MTS (Mobile Tracking Station), near Johannesburg
Pioneer station, Goldstone
Echo station, Goldstone
Woome ra
Johannesburg
The new numbers assigned to each station were ephemeral, for a new set of
two-digit numbers would soon replace them. (See Chapter 6)
The Launch Station located at the Cape near Launch Complex 12,
was essentially the old Ranger Launch Station, but it was now christened the
SMS (Spacecraft Monitoring Station). It possessed a 6-ft. dish antenna plus
various support equipment for checking out and following the launch of the
spacecraft. The MTS during Mariner 2 was located one mile east of th_
Johannesburg DSN station. As during Ranger, the MTS was used primarily
as an acquisition aid and for tracking and data acquisition during the critical
injection phase of the deep space missions. This mission phase transpired
over Johannesburg but at such high angular velocities that the big 26-m dish
2N. A. Renzetti, "Tracking and Data Acquisition Support for the Mariner
Venus 1962 Mission, " (Pasadena: JPL TM-33-212, July 1, 1965) p. 23.
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could not follow the spacecraft well. Goldstone-Echo and Johannesburgwere
equippedwith the new 10-kw transmitters for long-distance commandof the
Mariners. {Table 5-1) During Mariner 2, Johannesburgand Woomera had
low-noise parametric amplifiers providing system noise temperatures of
about 200°K. Maser amplifiers had been installed only at the two Goldstone
stations, yielding system noise temperatures of about 50°K. Thesemasers
gave Goldstone anunparalleled capability to hear faint spacecraft signals
amidst backgroundnoise.
As usual with a launch from the Cape, downrangeDODstations con-
tributed early tracking data to JPL. On Mariner 2, AMR stations on Antigua
of the parking orbit. In addition, a new FPS-16 instrumentation radar at
Pretoria tracked the Agena after the second burnout.
Mariner was the first mission in which a new DSN Net Control facility
functioned as an integral part of the Space Flight Operations Center (SFOC).
The purpose of Net Control _,as to inform the operations manager of the status
of each DSN station and, in turn relay messages concerning changes in plans
to DSN stations. The new SFOF building was not completed when Mariner 2
was launched, and JPL facilities supporting the flight were dispersed around
the Lab. The Central Computing Facility, which reduced the tracking and
telemetry data so that command decisions could be made, was located in
Buildings 125 and 202. The SFOC was in 125, but the Communications Center
was in 190.
As with Ranger, the primary communications links were teletype and
voice lines and augmented by airmail for the bulk transmission of scientific
data and engineering telemetry. Teletype and voice circuits, shown in
Figure 5-1, relayed only -the most critical tracking data, commands, acquisi-
tion information, and administrative data in real time between DSN stations
and the SFOC. The scientific and engineering telemetry was first encoded for
teletype transmission and was then sent to JPL in near-real time. The
overall makeup of Mariner ground communications necessarily resembled
those for the first five Ranger flights.
Summarizing, the major Changes over Ranger made in the DSN to
support Mariner were the more powerful transmitters at Goldstone and
Johannesburg and the Goldstone maser amplifiers.
The Mariner-1 and Mariner-2 Flights; DSN Support
Mariner R carried scientific instruments to make in situ measure-
ments of interplanetary space on its way to Venus. During the encounter
phase, its instruments woald also measure radiation in the vicinity of Venus,
estimate its magnetic field, and analyze its atmosphere with microwave and
infrared radiometers. The major maneuvers of the spacecraft following the
launch and erection of the I)robels appendages were the n_idcourse maneuver
(which aimed it more precisely at Venus) and encounter (which entailed
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pointing the pertinent scientificinstruments at the planet so that they could
scan it). The lattermaneuver had to be directed by commands sent from
Earth, then about 36 million miles away. The data taken during encounter
then had to be sent across the same distance by the spacecraft's 3-w trans-
mitter at the very slow rate of 8.33 bits/see.
The Mariner spacecraft were shipped to the Cape the firstweek of
June 1962. By mid-July, all seemed in readiness for the planned pair of
launches. DSIF Network Integration tests began on July 16 and, by the 19th.
the DSN was ready. The firstlaunch attempt, however, was postponed when
difficultiescropped up during the countdown. With AMR facilitiesand the
DSN Launch Station tracking it, Mariner 1 lifted off on July 22, 1962. Itonly
advanced a few minutes into its flightplan when the Range Safety Officer had
to destroy it. There had been a defective signal from the Atlas booster and
the omission of a single symbol from the computer program of the ground-
based g_idance system.
Mariner 2, however, was favored with success. There was a short
launch postponement while the defects of the Mariner-1 flight were remedied,
but on August 27 the Atlas-Agena put Mariner 2 into a 115-mile parking
orbit. The DSN Launch Station along with AMR equipment followed the space-
craft until it was lost over the horizon and passed on to downrange AMR
:stations. The spacecraft-plus-Agena coasted in the parking orbit until 24
minutes after launch when the Agena injected the spacecraft into the transfer
orbit to Venus. (Figures 5-2 and 5-3) The MTS acquired Mariner 2 approxi-
mately 28 minutes after launch; Johannesburg followed 3 minutes later.
As Mariner 2 headed out into interplanetary space, the DSN's 26-m
dishes began to feed precision tracking data back to JPL. Calculations indi-
cated that the craft's uncorrected course would miss Venus by 233,000
miles---too much for the experiments planned at encounter but still within
the capacity of the onboard propulsion system to correct. On September 9,
nine days after launch, punched tapes containing the midcourse maneuver
commands were fed into an encoder at Goldstone. The maneuver, which
required 3.75 hours to complete, was executed while Mariner 2 was 1.5
million miles from Earth.
The midcourse maneuver was successful. DSN tracking data acquired
over the next few days established that the new miss distance would be about
40,000 miles.
Mariner 2 was now falling in toward the Sun. Ninety-one days after
launch, Mariner 2 was 22.5 million miles from Earth, setting a new DSN
communications record. As Venus and the Sun drew closer and closer,
spacecraft problems began to mount as the temperatures on board climbed
and equipment overheated. The biggest loss was the spacecraft's capability
to begin encounter operations. Happily, a backup scheme had been devised,
and the required command was transmitted from Goldstone on December 14
across the 36 million miles now separating the spacecraft from Earth. The
backup plan worked and the instruments began scanning Venus. Altogether,
Mariner 2 sent back 11 million data points.
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After encounter, Mariner 2 went into orbit around the Sun. On
January 2, 1963, when 54 million miles from Earth, signals from Mariner
2 ceased.
The DSN had been scheduled for continuous tracking during the
mm'e critical phases of the Mariner-2 mission only. However, on September
16, 21 days after launch, it was put on full-time tracking for the remainder
of the mission. During this period the DSN logged more than 3000 hours of
uninterrupted support of the mission. Considering the complexity of the DSN
and its supporting communications and control equipment, this was a remark-
able record. Despite this achievement, post-mission study of DSN support
revealed several areas needing improvement:
. The parametric amplifiers, one of the newest subsystems,
caused problems at all stations. With its life expectancy of
only 1000 hours, failures were inevitable during the 3000-hour
mission. In addition to the intrinsic instability and low reliability
of the device, DSN personnel were not trained adequately in its
operation and maintenance.
2. The recorders built by the Consolidated Electrodynamics Corpora-
tion and installed throughout the network failed repeatedly. The
manufacturer subsequently beefed-up the design.
. Mission-unique equipment was frequently unreliable and required
excessive maintenance. Spare parts and documentation were
also wanting. It should be noted once again, that this problem
plagued the DSN until it developed a multimission capability in
the late 1960s.
. Throughout the mission, 6perator errors indicated that personnel
training was insufficient. Every station encountered operator
errors and, as a result, lost data.
Such post-mission introspection has been the habit of the DSN and has con-
tributed greatly toward its ever-increasing ability to support a variety of
missions in the farther reaches of the solar system.
Block-III Ranger Operations
The last four Rangers were launched over a period of 14 months,
beginning January 30, 1964, and ending March 21, 1965. From the political
viewpoint, these missions had to demonstrate some success. The reputation
of JPL was on the line following the .poor showing of the first five Rangers.
Mariner 2's successes had been most welcome and had shown that the basic
launch-vehicle and spacecraft technologies were not wanting, but Ranger still
had to succeed in its own right. The pall deepened when Ranger 6 continued
the list of failures. But when Rangers 7 through 9 were spectacular successes,
the gloom dissipated almost instantly. This section, then, finally brings the
happy ending to the Ranger story.
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The DSNhad performed well throughout Rangers 1 through 5. Its
configuration (Tables 4-1 and 4-2) remained unchangedfor the Block-III
spacecraft except for the installation of anL-Band maser and special video
equipment at Goldstone Echo. The network was, as previously noted, in
the process of switching over to S-Bandand, if it were not for the stretchout
of Ranger, the L-Band equipment wouldhave beentaken out of service in
1962. In fact, the Ranger flights marked the end of what waa to be called
later the "Mark I" DSN, a term essentially synonymous_th "L-Band network. "
The new S-Band or Mark II network was basically in place by mid-1964 and
actually supported Mariners 3 and 4, the first S-Band missions, before the
final Ranger flight.
Ranger 6. The sole scientific objective of the Block-III Rangers was the
securing of close-up television pictures of the Moon's surface to aid the
design of the Surveyor and Apollo missions. Despite the payload simplifica-
tion, the mission was rather challenging for those days. After a brie;
sojourn in a parking orbit, a second Agena burn would send :he spacecraft
off toward the Moon. The attitude control system then had to orient the
spacecraft so that the solar panels pointed toward the Sun and the high-gain
antenna was directed at Earth. The midcourse and terminal maneuvers
described for the Block-II Rangers were basically the same for the Block-
III spacecraft, except that there was no instrumented capsuie to be ejected
during the terminal phase.
The DSN began checkout and preparation for the mission during early
October 1963. The major tests evaluated network-spacecraft compatibility,
network integration, and operational readiness. The launch went smoothly
with liftoff the afternoon of January 30, 1964. The Spacecraft Monitoring
Station (DSIF 71) 3 at the Cape remained in radio contact for about 8 minutes.
During this time, however, the SMS reported that the TV cameras apparently
turned on for about one minute three minutes after launch. Johannesburg
accordingly was instructed to send up a turn-off command in the event the
cameras were on when it acquired the spacecraft. Acquisiticn at Johannes-
burg did not take place for more than a halt[ hour after launch. At that time
there were no indications that the cameras were on. Woomera confirmed
this a few minutes later.
The mission progressed smoothly through the preliminary attitude
maneuvers. On January 31, Goldstone initiated the midcourse maneuver.
Tracking data following this event showed that the flight was on target for
lunar impact and that no further corrections would be needed. On February 2,
19 minutes before impact, TV channel A automatically began tc warm up;
Chamuel B went into the warm-up mode 4 minutes later. At impact minus 10
minutes, telemetry should have shown that both of these channels were at
t_ll power. Pictures should also be arriving at Goldstone. Neither occurred.
Commands were sent to try and force the channels into the full-power mode
but to no avail. Impact occurred in the Sea of Tranquility w!thout any pictures
being sent.
_'Note the new numbering system.
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The DSNperformed well throughout the mission. It was the DSN, in
fact, that provided the only clue as to the cause of the failure of Ranger 6---
the apparent momentary turnon of the TV cameras just after launch. One
surmise was that the turnon had beentriggered accidently andthe resultant
electrical arcing had damagedthe equipment. Noconclusive diagnosis was
presented by the Ranger-6 review board, although several changesin TV
system design andspacecraft testing were recommended.
Ranger 7. Six months later, after in-depth reviews of Ranger 6 and some
changes of the spacecraft TV subsystem, another Ranger attempt was made.
On July 28, 1964, with DSIF 71 in two-way lock, Ranger 7 was launched
reestablished but unfortunately on a sideband. DSIF 71 telemetry quality was
thus poor. Ranger 7 continued without further incident to its parking orbit.
The MTS (DSIF 59) at Johannesburg first acquired the spacecraft 30 minutes
after launch. The Johannesburg 26-m dish acquired it 1.5 rain. later. Both
stations had difficulty in establishing a good two-way lock with the spacecraft
which was still low and movfng fast. Woomera acquired Ranger 7 roughly
49 minutes after launch and achieved the first good two-way lock. This
mission proceeded smoothly all the way to lunar impact on July 31, 1964, in
the Sea of Clouds about 10 miles from the aiming point. Some 4300 high-
resolution photos of the lunar surface were radioed back, some showing objects
less than :I feel in size. Ranger had finally succeeded.
Ranger 8. Almost seven months elapsed between Rangers 7 and 8. The DSN
L-Band confi_x_ration was retained in the form described in Tables 4-1 and
4-2. The launch of Ranger 8 took place on February 17, 1965 and all maneu-
vers were performed perfectly. Early tracking data indicated a course that
would miss the Moon by 1136 miles. " A midcourse maneuver was therefore
commanded at 17 hours into the flight. A terminal course correction was not
needed. Impact occurred in the Sea of Tranquility 15 miles from the target,
64 hours 53 minutes following liftoff. A total of 7137 pictures were obtained
on this flight.
Ranger 9. Ranger 9's launch date was March 21, 1965, a date that had to be
met because of the requirements of the lunar launch window and the pressure
of the upcoming Gemini GT-3 launch. Liftoff did occur on schedule and all
maneuvers were carried out successfully. In fact, the Agena second burn
put the spacecraft on a course that would have missed its lunar target, the
crater Alphonsus, by only 400 miles. At 38.5 hours into the flight, a small
midcourse maneuver corrected the trajectory. Impact took place on March
24, i965, a split second after the last of 5814 pictures were sent back to
Earth. The Ranger Program had been completed and, after much concern,
the results turned out to be of immense value scientifically and to those pre-
paring [,ar Surveyor and Apollo.
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Some More Ranger Lessons. Just as the first Rangers had taught the DSN
several lessons {Chapter 4), so did the Block-III Rangers.
The first involved the lack of diversity in the ground communication
links provided by the common carriers. A potentially catastrophic event
occurred during the Ranger-8 mission, when 9 out of the 14 circuits leading
to JPL were lost. Communications with Johannesburg and the Cape were
almost wiped out. It developed that someone near Los Angeles had severed
a coaxial cable while digging. All the lost circuits were in that single cable.
Fortunately, the interruption occurred in a noncritical phase and the circuits
were restored in time f,,r the midcourse maneuver. Under pressure from
NASCOM, the common carriers moved to provide the diversity essential to
space operations---manned space flight in particular.
A strange inconsistency was discovered in 1965 when the tracking
data from Rangers 7 and 8 were used to try and determine the precise positions
of DSN stations. No matter how carefully corrections were made a 40-m
difference in longitude remained---small but intolerable for precise tracking
calculations. An astronomically trained newcomer at JPL finally found the
reason---between Rangers 7 and 8 there had been a 100 millisecond change
in the universal time reference.
One other potentially catastrophic event occurred on Ranger 9, when
DSN transmitters failed during the final half hour before lunar impact. At
Goldstone Echo, for example, the transmitter kicked off 10 minutes before
impact and the two-way radio lock was lost. Quick investigation revealed an
unsoldered wire. No TV pictures were lost, however, because the telemetry
received was not dependent on the ground transmitter. The value of thorough
training of personnel was underscored in these emergencies. Such experi-
ences during Ranger demonstrated that missions can often be saved if redun-
dancy and flexibility are built into the system and if personnel are resourceful
and imaginative.
Atlas-Centaur L-Band Support
The Atlas-Centaur test flights, like the Ranger series, stretched
out for several years---4-1/2 years in the case of the Atlas-Centaur. These
launch vehicle tests were more flexible than Ranger flights in that the Centaur
tracking _Ads and transmitters could be modified to fit the evolving DSN;
there was usually payload to spare. Thus, we find the early Atlas-Centaur
shots worked by the L-Band DSN, later flights involved the L-S Band Conver-
sion equipment, and the last vehicles in the series utilized full S-Band support.
Only the second and third Atlas-Centaur flights fit the criteria of this chapter;
that is, full L-Band support.
Atlas-Centaur 2. The purpose of this flight was to test the launch vehicle and
all its subsystems. The 960-MHz beacon mounted in the Centaur upper stage
provided a good target for exercising the DSN, The network configuration
was basically the same as that during Mariner 2. Table 5-2 gives the tracking
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and data-acquisition parameters _eor each station. 4 The Ground Communica-
tions System (GCS) was essentially the same as that used for Mariner 2
(Figure 5-1), as were the arrangements for Net Control at JPL.
The Atlas-Centaur launch occurred on November 27, 1963, from Cape
Canaveral. The Centaur upper stage was successfully injected into Earth
orbit. The MTS and Johannesburg acquired the Centaur with no difficulty.
Woomera also acquired the Centaur but noted a subsequent loss of signal.
Neither of the Goldstone 26-m dishes were able to pick up the spacecraft. At
this time, the Goldstone antennas were operating in a slave mode using a
computer-prepared drive tape made from AMR tracking data. Second attempts
were also unsuccessful. The difficulty was apparently due to the loss of the
beacon on the Centaur. Four hours after launch the DSN ceased looking for
the vehicle.
Atlas-Centaur 3. The AC-3 launch was another orbital flight of this launch
vehicle built for the launch of Surveyor and other deep space missions. The
DSN support plan differed little from that of the second Atlas-Centaur flight.
The major change was the support of the SFOF at Pasadena, which in the
seven months since AC-2 had reached operational status. (See Chapter 6 for
SFOF details. )
After several delays, the launch took place on June 30, 1964.
Approximately 19 minutes later, the Atlas-Centaur impacted downrange,
the victim of a hydraulic pump failure and consequent short Centaur burn.
Forty minutes after liftog the DSN was secured.
The fourth Atlas-Centaur launch occurred on December 11, 1964,
but the DSN did not participate at all in this flight. The remaining Atlas-
Centaur flights will be described in Chapter 6.
Radio Science
Superficially, it might seem that JPL's planetary radar work was
just a happy offshoot of its tracking and data acquisition mission. To a sur-
prising degree, however, the requirements for radar contact with the planets
and spacecraft data acquisition and command are very similar, to wit:
-High efficiency/low noise antenna feed
-Very low noise amplifiers
-Very high power transmitters
-Signal processing technology
-Ranging systems design
4Note that the DSN stations are now numbered by a new double-digit system,
which replaces the single-digit scheme described in the Mariner-2 section.
The Goldstone Pioneer station, which is not listed in Table 5-2, is DSS-11.
The letter prefixes DSS (Deep Space Station) and DSIF (Deep Space Instrumenta-
tion Facility) are used interchangeably. Today, DSS designations are used
exclusively.
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As a matter of fact, much JPL technologyin the abovecategories was first
tested in planetary radar experiments. Not only does radio science consti-
tute a leading edgeof technologybut its scientific results in the radar
mapping of planetary surfaces andthe refining of astronomical constants
havecontributed much to NASA's planetary exploration program.
Most of the JPL developmentsin this new science occurred at the
GoldstoneVenus site. Someof the newcapabilities addedduring the time
period (the L-Band era) covered by this andthe preceding chapter were:
1961
1962
1963
1964
9-kwtransmitter, noisetemperature of 64°K (first
use of maser)
12.5-kw transmitter
100-kwtransmitter
35°K noise temperature.
It is important to note tha_.these radar experiments were conductedat about
2400MHz, in the S-Band, the segmentof the electromagnetic spectrum where
the whole DSNwas soonto locate.
Using the 100-kwtransmitter, JPL scientists were able to refine
their previous measurementsof the rotation of Venus aboutits axis. The
period of rotation reported by Goldstein andCarpenter in 1963 was 240 days
retrograde; that is, Venus according to radar measurements rotated on its
axis in a direction opposite from that of Earth. 5 Later, in 1964, the same
group first detected two bright spots (called alpha and beta) on the surface
of the cloud,-covered planet. 6 Much more surface detail was to be revealed
in later experiments.
Mars was first detected by radar in early 1963. 7 The studies
reported by Goldstein indicated that ]5oth smooth and rough surfaces were
present.
Ranging farther out into space, statistically significant echoes from
Jupiter and Mercury were detected in 1963. Within a few years, half of the
entire solar system had been probed by Goldstone radar.
5R. M. Goldstein and R. L. Carpenter, "Rotation of Venus: Period Esti-
mated from Radar Measurement, " Science, Vol. CXXXIX (March 8, 1963)
pp. 910-911.
6R. L. Carpenter, "Study of Venus by cw Radar, " Astronomical Journal_
Vol. LXXI (March 1966) pp. 142-152.
7jet Propulsion Laboratory, "Space Programs Summary No. 37-20, Volume
III, " (Pasadena: JPL SPS 37-20, March 31, 1963) p. 38.
8R. M. Goldstein, "Mars: Radar Observations, " Science, _¢ol. CL (December
24, 1965)pp. 1715-1717.
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A Second 26-m Network
The first DSN 26-m network (or subnet, as it is often called) con-
sisted of the stations at Goldsto._,_e, Johannesburg, and Woomera. This net-
work was quite adequate for the Rangers and early Mariners; in fact, the
missions of 1962-1964 punctuated long periods of nothingness. On the near
horizon, however, were Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter, and more Mariner shots.
These were not brief missions, such as the Rangers had been, but months
in duration with several spacecraft likely to be active simultaneously. To
provide adequate coverate for these overlapping missions, a second set of
three 26-m dishes, approximately 120 ° apart in longitude, was deemed
necessary.
Tidbinbilla. One antenna for a second subnet was already operational: the
Echo site at Goldstone. From the logistics standpoint, it was tempting to
locate the two other 26-m stations near Woomera and Johannesburg.
Woomera, however, was presenting staffing problems. Good technicians
were hard to get in this bleak, distant region, and those who were willing
to go were usually snapped up by the Australian missile facilities located
there. Looking for a radio-quiet spot in the same longitude sector but with
the amenities of civilization close by, NASA finally selected an area in the
Tidbinbilla Valley, 10 air miles from Canberra, the country's capital city.
The NASA site survey of August 1962 had homed in on the Canberra region
as a good location for a DSN station. In keeping with NASA plans to co-locate
tracking stations from its three networks (DSN, STADAN, and MSFN), a
substantial piece of land was required to preclude interference of co-located
equipment. An excellent spot was found southwest of Canberra in the sheep
and cattle grazing lands of the Tidbinbilla Valley. In March 1963, NASA and
Australia agreed to a lease of 150 acres to accommodate a DSN 26-m antenna
and other NASA tracking equipment. (Figure 5-4)
NASA wanted to have the station operational in time for the next
pair of Mariners scheduled for late 1964. By November 1963, the power
building had been completed and other cor/struction well under way, but the
station was not fully operational until March 1965. It missed the launch of
Mariner 4 but was in the network at the time of the Mars flyby in July 1965.
Robledo. While the Johannesburg station was particularly useful because the
injection of spacecraft into lunar and interplanetary trajectories frequently
took place in view of Johannesburg's equipment, an alternate site
in southern Europe was considered more desirable from the standpoint of
overall coverage and the question of long-term tenure in South Africa. In
addition, a station at the lower latitudes would be more useful to the Apollo
program which the DSN was committed to support in a backup role. Reflecting
back to 1958, ARPA had anticipated placing one of its 26-m tracking stations
in this region before NASA assumed the responsibility of deep space explora-
tion. NASA surveyed the area, including Italy and Sardinia, finally choosing
Spain for reasons associated with the fact that Italy was somewhat too far to
the east for a good overlap of Goldstone coverage.
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Figure 5-4. Tidbinbilla, Australia. The DSN 26-m dish. 
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When it became apparent that a new 26-m station in the neighboor-
hood of Italy had its drawbacks, the NASA site survey was enlarged to
include Spain. In early 1963, four suitable sites 9 had been identified:
Sevilla, Toledo, Malaga, and Madrid. Becatrse of its nearness to a large
city, the Robledo de Chavela site 40 miles west of Madrid was finally
chosen. In January 1964, the United States and Spain announced an agree-
ment to establish the Robledo DSN station. On February 3, 1964, Edmond C._
Buckley asked the Navy's Bureau of Yards and Docks to begin the design and
construction of the new station. 10 In the early part of 1965, the antenna and
electronic equipment were installed, and the site became operational July 1,
1965. Robledo supported the 1964 Mariner 4 mission to Mars as a backup
to Johannesburg. (Figure 5-5)
Ascension Island. Another new site under consideration in late 1963 was
Ascension Island midway between Africa and South America and 5000 miles
southeast of Cape Canaveral. The need dictating a new tracking and data
acquisition station in this part of the world was that of earlier acquisition
and command of the new Surveyor spacecraft; there was too much of a gap ,
between the Cape's Spacecraft Monitoring Station and Johannesburg even though
the AMR stations filled in some of the blank spots. The problem concerned
the direct-ascent mode for the Surveyor launch in which the parking orbit was
bypassed and translunar injection occurred before Johannesburg acquisition.
(Some Surveyor flights did use parking orbits.)
Goddard Space Flight Center also wanted a site on Ascension for its
Manned Space Flight Network for Apollo support. NASA decided to integrate
these facilities and requested permission from the United Kingdom to build
such a facility. The British agreed, and a NASA site selection team visited
the island in April 1964. JPL's facility was to be located at a spot with the
rather desolate-sounding name of D_vil's Ashpit. NASA assigned the task of__"
designing and construction of the Ascension facility to the Navy's Bureau of '_
Yards and Docks.
Station construction began in January 1965 and was completed in
March 1966, with full operational status being assumed a month later. Since
the primary function of the Ascension station was early acquisition while the
spacecraft was still close to Earth, a relatively small antenna was adequate.
Goddard MSFN was installing a 9.2-m (30-foot) Unified S-Band antenna for
Apollo, and the DSN followed suit. (Figure 5-6) This gave both networks
backup antennas in a critical spot. Although the antenna sizes were identical,
the DSN's had a polar mount while Goddard's was Az-EI which was more
suitable for satellite work. The same kind of redundancy was provided for
9During the site selection phase, NASA was aided by the Spanish Institut
Nacional de Tecnica Aeroespacial (INTA).
10jet Propulsion Laboratory, "A History of the Deep Space Network to
1 January 1969," (Pasadena: JPL 890-9, January 15, 1971) p. 2-18.
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Figure 5-5. The Robledo 26-m antenna under construction. 
I -  -- 
Figure 5-6. The 9.2-m DSN antenna on Ascension. 
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Apollo when duplicate 26-m MSFN paraboloids were co-located with similar
DSN antennas in Spain and Australia.
A Permanent Spacecraft Monitoring Station. The Launch Station, DSIF 71,or
Spacecraft Monitoring Station at Cape Kennedy, was originally established to
support Explorer and then was enlarged for Pioneer and Ranger. It was
meant to be temporary and was duly housed in trailers. Its role in the DSN
was to support prelaunch testing with the spacecraft on the pad, during launch
and in flight as long as it was in sight. Thus, DSS-71 was not a tracking
station and boasted only a hand-pointed 4-foot paraboloid. It had no command
capability. Nevertheless, it was vital to ascertain before launch that the
spacecraft communication subsystem was compatible with the DSN and vice
versa. With missions much more complex than Ranger comingalong, it was
logical to make the Cape facility a permanent one.
In line with this thinking, plans for a permanent station began to be
drawn up in late 1962. It would be an S-Band station in direct support of
Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter, and the other lunar and deep space vehicles being
planned. The remaining Ranger L-Band missions would be handled by the
temporary equipment in the trailers, which would then be phased out. One
early thought was to locate the new station at the Kennedy Space Center on
NASA land, but JPL studies in late 1962 rejected this due to the distance, the
presence of large bodies of water, and the interference of buildings. The
site finally selected was in the marshy land only a mile in back of the launch
pads used for NASA space launches. The Air Force approved the site in
June of 1964 and construction started in October that year. The station was
built by the Corps of Engineers under the direction of NASA's Kennedy Space
Center. Construction was completed in April 1965, and the permanent
Spacecraft Monitoring Station was operational a month later. (Figure 5-7)
The new building was not only constructed of solid concrete but was air-
conditioned---both welcome changes from the "temporary" trailers that had
been occupied for almost 7 years. On the roof are mounted two hand-pointed
4-ft. antennas.
Meanwhile, Back at Goldstone. The $250,0O0 feasibility study of a 70-m
antenna had been completed by Blaw-Knox in mid-1962. This was the Phase
One in this the first of NASA's "phased" projects. 11 In December of 1962,
NASA issued the second request for Advanced Antenna System (AAS) pro-
posals, this time for Phase Two, actual construction. The responses were
received December 21, 1962. Bidding were these four firms: McKiernan-
Tierny Corporation (a division of Litton Systems), North American Aviation
Corporation, The Rohr Corporation, and a team headed by Dalmo Victor
Company. On January 25, 1963, NASA and JPL announced the selection of
11Very roughly, the three stages were: (1) competitive design studies; (2)
design selection and completion of the first antenna; and (3) construction of
additional antennas.
. 
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Figure 5-7. The DSN Launch Station at Cape Canaveral. 
REPRODUCIBILITY OF THE 
C:RIG.INfi PAGE IS PoFlR 
84
Rohr Corporation to build the big antenna at Goldstone. The value of the
contract was for roughly $12 million and called for antenna completion in 36
months after contract execution (June 20, 1943); that is, mid-J966. Con-
struction actually began at Goldstone (Figu,,_es 5-8 and 5-9) in October 1963
at the new Goldstone Mars site, so named because the antenna was originally
intended to suI)port NASA's Mariner mission to Mars which actually flew in
l!)i;I, long before the fi4-m antenna became operational. 12 An interesting
aside concerns the final choice of 64-m (210 ft. ) for the size of the Mars
antenna. This was just tim size of the Australian radio astronomy paraboloid
at Parkes. NASA/JPL had received alot of hell) from the Australian designers
and had frequently answered critics who questioned the feasibility of big
antennas by pointing at the Parkesdish as a successful example. In short,
NASA,/,IPI, did not wish |.()appear to be in competition with the cooperative
Australians by building a bigger antenna. 13
An End to the Lull
The 1962-19(;4 period was one of low activity, for NASA's deep space
program had not yet matured---spacecraft were on the drawing boards but"
not in flight. The DSN used this hiatus to select and build new stations and
prepare for the Surveyors, Mariners, Lunar Orbiters, and Pioneers scheduled
for 1964-19(;7. The dividing line in technology separating this era from the
next is the change to S-Band. All of the imminent new spacecraft programs
had been designed [or S-Band; the L-Band Rangers were the last of a nearly
extinct species.
12NASA News Rele-tse fi3-13, J'anuary 25, 1943. Also JPL, The NASA/JIlL
(;-t-Meter-Diameter Antenna at Goldstone, California, (Pasadena: JPL
TM-33-671 July 15, 1974).
13Robertson Stevens, personal interview, July 28, 1975.
n 
Figure 5-8. Some views during the construction of the 64-m 
antenna at Go td stone. 
Figure 5-9. The 64-m Mars antenna at Goldstone at time of 
initial operations. 
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Chapter 6. THE MOVE TO S-BAND
The history of the DSN is really a history of stepwise increases in
capability. There have been many of these, some small and some large;
changes in antenna size, noise-temperature reductions, communication
capacity increases, and the like. The switch to S-Band, however, was perhaps
the most significant because it not only affected a large fraction of the ground
equipment supporting deep space missions but the spacecraft as well. The
usual time from spacecraft mission approval to flight is several years, so that
the move to S-Band, which began in the early 1960s, could not be consumated until
late 1964 when the first S-Band spacecraft, Mariners 3 and 4, were launched.
However, vital L-Band missions persisted until the spring of 1965 when the
final Ranger was dispatched to the Moon. This technological transition, when
the DSN was hybridized, is of critical interest here.
The L/S Conversion Project
Taking up the thread of the story from Chapter 4, the L/S Conversion
Project was designed to permit the DSN to work both L-Band and S-Band
spacecraft until the time when all missions operated in the S-Band in 1965.
The technical breakthrough making the Project feasible came when JPL engin-
eers created a "synthesizer" driven by a rubidium-vapor oscillator which
made S-Band frequencies compatible with L-Band data-handling equipment.
Each hybridized station would, therefore, consist of both an L-Band and an
L/S receiver, both feeding the unaltered L-Band system. While this equip-
ment was supporting current missions, the new S-Band equipment could be
installed alongside without interference. The switch between S-Band and
L-Band operation did pose one time-consuming difficulty however: the L-Ban_[
turnstile feed had to be replaced by the S-Band hyperbola subreflector in the
26-m dish. This was a manual operation performed at the focal point of the
dish_---a most inconvenient location.
A prototype L/S unit was tested at Goldstone's Pioneer station.
With minor modifications, it was shipped to Woomera, where it was opera-
tional in August 1964. Johannesburg was quickly converted and was ready
for L/S mission support in September 1964. Goldstone Pioneer, the third
station in the L/S triad had both L-Band and prototype S-Band equipment,
as indicated in Table 6-1. (The split between L-Band and S-Band missions
is shown in Table 6-2. ) By the end of the summer of 1964, the DSN was
ready for the first S-Band missions, Mariners 3 and 4, scheduled for
November 1964.
With hybridization complete, the task at hand was the conversion
of network stations to full S-Band. Tidbinbilla was the first full S-Band
station, never having had any L-Band equipmeht. It began supporting Mariner
4 in March 1965, four months after launch. With the last Ranger flight com-
pleted in March 1965, the L-Band stations were converted to full S-Band at
the times noted in Table 6-1.
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An interesting operational problem asserted itself as the S-Band
equipment began to track actual spacecraft. Because of the much smaller
wavelengths at S-Band frequencies, the antenna beams were much narrower
than the5' had been at l_Band. A whole new group of acquisition techniques
had 1o be worked out. Goldstone tool< the lead and promulgated its experience
to the olhcr stations. This was done successfully and, by the end of 1965,
the S-l;and transformation was complete.
Other Network Iml)rovements
By the time Mariner 4 was launched, 10-kwtransmitters had been
distributed throughout the network. This was essential if stations other than
(]oldstone 1 were to be able to command distant probes.
The most significant improvement from the standpoint of navigation
was the introduction throughout the DSN of rubidium clocks to replace the
less slablc crvslal-contro]led oscillators. With atomic clocks, all stations
could obtain the precision, two-way Doppler measurements that were essen-
tial to oviding the spacecraft to the very small aiming point in the vicinity
of Mars.
Preparations for More Sophisticated Missions
The new missions of the 1965-1967 period, particularly Lunar
Orbiter and Surveyor, forced the DSN to expand its communication and con-
trol capabilities. The data streams coming back from the spacecraft would
be broader (thousands of bits per second rather than tens or hundreds) and
the spacecraft themselves would be considerably more complex, requiring
advanced display and control equiprr{ent at JPL. In addition, more and
more missions began to overlap; gone were the days of a few short missions
well-separated in time. In the 1964-1967 period the Lunar Program paving
the way for Apollo and further deep space exploration brought the day of
many long-lived spacecraft in space simultaneously.
The New SFOF. The centralization of all mission control and computing
functions into a single area was JPL's answer to the control problems
engendered by the new overlapping mission mix. The Space Flight Operations
Facility {SFOF) building at Pasadena (Figure 6-1) was completed in October
1963. The first Block-I IBM 7094 computers were installed immediately.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, a dual-computer arrangement had been pioneered
1The Goldstone Venus site had an experimental 100-kw transmitter which was
normally employed for planetary radar. In the event that a spacecraft's
directional antenna lost touch with the Earth, the 100-kw transmitter could
supply commands that could probably be picked up by the omnidirectional
antenna mounted on most spacecraft.
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Figure 6-1. The SFOF building a t  Pasadena. 
during Ranger for data processing with good success .  This experience was 
applied during SFOF design i n  late 1962 and ear ly  1963. The initial SFOF 
consisted of an IBM 7040 connected to an SFOF teletype line and a 1301 disk 
s torage fi le connected to  the IBM 7094. With this  arrangement,  the 7040 
could be used to  print  out data in the several u s e r  a r eas  of the SFOF and the 
7094 could process  data  i n  non- real  time. This arrangement.  however, ran  
into problems and the 7040 was replaced by a 7044 computer just before the 
launch of Marixer 4. h h r i n e r  4 was the first flight project to be supported 
by the new SFOF combination of real-time and nonreal-time computing. 
The Ranger Program did not wish to convert at i ts  late stage to a 
new data  processing concept, creating in effect a situation analogous to the 
L/S Conversion Project .  w h e r e  new techniques and equipment could not dis- 
place established hardware i n  midstream. 
1965, JPL operated two data processing systems.  
Thus, during par t  of 1964 and 
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Prior to December 1, 1964, the SFOF operatedunder the aegis of
NASAHeadquarters Office of SpaceScienceand Applications (OSSA). How-
ever, becauseof the intimate relationship betweenmission control and the
DSN, Robert C. Seamans, NASA's Associate Administrator, asked EdmondC.
Buckley andhis OTDA to assume responsibility for the SFOF. 2 Almost a
decadelater this transfer was to be repeated in the oppositedirection.
Even thoughthe SFOF is no longer a part of the DSN, it was a DSN
element between 1964and 1972. To be complete, this history should encompass
this portion of the SFOF story and a more formal description of the SFOF seems
in order.
The construction of the SFOF wasbegunwith the philosophy that the
timely and soundcontrol of any space venture required the centralization of
communication terminals, the rapid processing of mission data, and the near
real-time display of mission status. This concept, of course, had already
beenused in military surveillance and commandsystems, suchas that
directed by the Air Force's NORAD. It made sensefor deep spacemissions,
too, and the four-level SFOF building at Pasadenawas the result.
The equipment in the SFOFbuilding was organized into five systems,
as follows:
. The Communications System for internal and external trans-
mission of information. This obviously interfaced with the
DSN Ground Communication System (GCS).
2. The Data Processing System for the recording and computer
conversion of data. (Fioo_re 6-2)
3. The Display and Control System for the internal distribution
of data and its display to mission controllers. (Figure 6-3)
4. The Spacecraft Television Data System for refining and inter-
preting TV data from space missions.
5. The Support System for emergency power, facility maintenance
and personnel needs.
The DSN was naturally considered a functional part of every space mission
and, for this reason, the SFOF also boasted a DSN Control Room. (Figure
6-4) From this vantage point, the worldwide status of the network could be
ascertained instantly and used to make and carry out mission decisions. In
essence, the SFOF was a centralized, multimission control center. This
approach certainly improved the effectiveness of mission control as long as
the actual missi_,n control centers resided at the SFOF. As we shall see,
however, other NASA centers wanted to control their spacecraft from !l _[r
own facilities.
i
2Maurice E. Binkley, personal interview, February 18, 1975.
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Figure (i-2. SFOF data processing control room circa 1966. 
Figure 6 - 3 .  The SIWF missioii control room circa 19G5. 
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Figure 6-4. The DSN Control Room in the SFOF c i r c a  1965. 
Ground Communications. A s  data  traffic between DSN stations and Pasadena 
increased,  NASA added more  communications links. During 1963, a third 
teletype link was installed between J P L  and the DSN stations. 
a lso one voice line already in existence. 
wave relay was set up between Goldstone-Echo and J P L  in Pasadena. 
link, capable of carrying television, was operational in 1964. 
There  was 
Late in 1963, a broadband micro- 
This 
I t  was also i n  1964 that Goddard Space Flight Center introduced 
computer switching into NASCOM (NASA Communications) which had provided 
all DSN long lines since 1961. This sped up the switching of teletype l ines 
but the technique differed markedly from that in use  i n  DSN line switching. 
Mar iners  3 and 4, soon to be launched, were committed to  the old methods. 
So the DSN was bypassed temporarilv.  
Tactical intercoms were distributed to most DSN Stati,Jils in 1964. 
With these eyuipments, conference loops could be established within a 
station: in addition, the long distnncct l ines connecting the stations with the 
SFOF could be brought into the conference. Both Australia and South Africa 
initially objected to the connection of the tactical intercom with government- 
provided communication lines fo r  security reasons.  
jections were  overcome and tactical intercoms were installed at Johannes- 
burg and the Australian stations. 
Eventually these  ob- 
The SFOF ushered in a new era of communications control. Closed 
c i rcu i t  T V  was used for  area surveil lance,  the distribution of teletype data,  
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and for relaying display data from one building to another. With the new
voice system, the same headset could be switched to the telephone, the inter-
corn, or voice conference net by pushing buttons. Speakers and microphones
could also be switched with great flexibility. • In the SFOF basement, a
semiautomatic pushbutton system switched teletype circuits. Teletype data
was now fec :firectly into the computers without a need to punch cards first.
These new capabilities first came into use during the Mariner 4 mission. 3
The addition of new DSN stations at Tidbinbilla, Robledo, and Cape
Canaveral made it obvious that the SFOF's teletype switching capabilities
should be improved in the mid-1960s. JPL consequently designed and in-
stalled a communications processor similar to that used by Goddard for
NASCOM.
The greatest pressure on ground communications, however, was
from the need for handling higher and higher bit rates. The conventional
teletype circuits in use during the early 1960s could handle less than 100
bits/sec. Surveyor, in contrast, would send back up to 4400 bits/see. Even
more demanding were the television cameras on Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter.
The latter requirement was met by building a wideband 6-MHz microwave
channel between Goldstone and Pasadena during 1965. This meant that only
Goldstone could send television pictures back to the SFOF in real time. For
the other DSN stations, JPL designed equipment that would send up to 1200
bits/sec over voice circuits and, from Goldstone, up to 4400 bits/sec over
special circuits. 4
The communication and data handling facilities are never as
"romantic" as the big DSN antennas, but it should be recorded here that the
antennas are wasted if the information they intercept from outer space
cannot be sent back and made intelligible to the people who need it,when
they need it.
Handling the Off-Lab Projects
In the mid-1960s the first significant off-Lab projects reached
operational status: Lunar Orbiter, the Interplanetary Pioneers, and Apollo
were managed by other NASA centers. The Surveyor Project was managed
by JPL but the spacecraft was built by Hughes. The informality of the
early spacecraft programs was shattered. The Surveyor mission operations
team consisted of personnel from both JPL and Hughes. No longer did
everyone know everyone else, his strengths and weaknesses, and no longer
were all functions concentrated in a small geographical area. The inevitable
2Je" Propulsion Laboratory, "A History of the Deep Space Network to 1
January 1969, (Pasadena: JPL 890-9, September 1, 1970) pp. 2-28 to 2-36.
4See the circuit diagrams accompanying most mission descriptions in JPL's
"Tracking and Data Acquisition Summaries" for detailed circuit configurations.
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consequence was a large increase in documentation, particularly interface
documents defining requirements and responsibilities. The memos and
meetings that hithertofore solved interface problems were now replaced by
the SIRD (Support Instrumentation Requirements Document) and its response
the NSP (NASA Support Plan). The use of *_,,_ SIRD was dictated by NASA
Management Instruction 2310. Behind the formal documentation, however,
were the tracking panels where the support plans were thrashed out before-
hand. 5 With so many missions reaching fruition at nearly the same time,
schedule conflicts were bound to occur in the area of DSN support. Occasion-
ally, these had to be resolved by negotiation at the OTDA/OSSA level between
Edmond C. Buckley and Homer Newell. The organization charts corres-
ponding to these interfaces usually changed from mission to mission and
the missions.
Mariners 3 and 4
The Mars launch window occurs every 25 months and opened in late
1964. and NASA scientists considered it highly desirable to send an instru-
mented probe on a flyby mission of the planet, especially since this period
was at the sunspot minimum. JPL and other NASA centers submitted
pr_,posals to NASA Headquarters, and in early November of 1962, the JPL
proposal was selected. The choice of JPL was not surprising because of
the experience it had accmnulated with Mariner 2 and the availability of
experienced personnel. ]'he Mariner-Mars 1964 Project, as it was called
officially, originally consisted of three launches. Budgetary strictures,
howc=ver, cut the number of launches to two. The launch vehicle was to be
the At!as-Agena, for the Atlas-Centaur was still not ready for operational
use.
As indicated above, interfaces were becoming more important as
:,:.\SA activities expanded and brought in more and more organizations.
?,la,:i:,._ Mars ]9(;_ was an on-Lab project, but important interfaces with
",,:,,_,^_ H(adquarters: al_d ::_wis Research Center did exist. (See Figures 6-5
and, _:-6, Also, during the launch and near-Earth phase of FLight, JPL would
interact with the Air For_e ETR (Eastern Test Rm_ge) organization and
Goddard Space Flight Center, which would provide some of its MSFN track-
ing facilities.
Tracking and Data Acquisition Requirements. The mission phases were:
launch, parking orbit (near-Earth phase), cruise, midcourse maneuver,
cruise, and Mars encounter. The DSN was not involved with the tracking
of the launch vehicle but did receive telemetry from the spacecraft via the
launch vehicle during this phase.
5F. Bryant, personal interview, April 7, 1975.
97
8_
o_
u
a.
o z ,_§zz 0o.
0,.{
o_. o _Z_o _
_7 _ Z_u
_, =_
-_ o-: zo
z
u _o
0 a. _ D
_ ZZ 0 Z 0
_( 12°- " ;--9,
o_ Iz_ S S_
_,_z_O_
I Z_ "
Z _
_Z
8_z_
O Z_ --_
___o
o_5_
_Zo__ _i_izO!_z
>%_ Z_--_O_,_
i ] = --_ == z.{z_,v z_ -
o_
&
°,_
r_
0
_J
°_,._
o
"r.
I
o_,,,i
98
99
For the flights of Mariners 3 and 4, NASA established three classes
of tracking and data acquisition requirements reflecting decreasing priorities:
Class I Mandatory requirements. These requirements con-
cerned the minimum essential primary needs for a
successful mission.
Class II
Class Ill
Requirements needed to meet all mission objectives.
Requirements defining the "ultimate" in support. 6
In future years, tracking requirements would be further refined into a system
of priorities so that decisions could be made concerning which among many
spacecraft should be supported under most foreseeable conditions.
During ihe launch phase the ETR was to provide acquisition data for
the waiting I)SN slations downrange. Once the spacecraft was acquired by
the DSN E'I']I v(,sl)onsibilities ended. The critical maneuvers from the
navigation stan(ll)()int were the injection into a good parking orbit, subsequent
injection into a Mars trajectory, and the midcourse maneuver. On this
mission the DSN was committed to round-the-clock coverage plus the pro-
vision oF backup facilities during the vital midcourse maneuver and encounter
events. The schedule of prime and backup sites is shown in Figure 6-7.
It was. ol course, the availability of stations in the second 26-m subnet that
permitted this insurance of mission backup. Since bad weather, power
outages, and equipment failures during a few crucial hours of flight could
lose a multimillion-dollar mission, DSN redundancy was a valuable asset.
With astronaut's lives at stake in Apollo, the DSN was adding MSFN "wings"
to its stations to back up the flights to the Moon. (See MSFN History)
DSN Configuration. Except for the 100-kw transmitter at the Goldstone
Venus station, all of the 26-m sites had essentially the same capabilities,
as described in Table 6-3. Pioneer, Echo, Tidbinbilla, and Robledo,
when activated in 1965, were full S-Band, while Pioneer-Echo, Woomera,
and Johannesburg (See Table 6-1) had the L/S equipment enabling them to
handle the remaining Ranger shots. All had at least 10-kw command
capability, and parametric amplifiers were standard, yielding noise tempera-
ture of about 60°K. A glance at Table 6-3 shows that the five main DSN
stations were remarkably alike. This similarity helped assure that the data
received from each would be compatible and, of course, it also meant that
the spacecraft would be "seeing" basically the same equipment regardless
of which station was working it.
6N. A. Renzetti, "Tracking and Data Acquisition Report: Mariner Mars
1964 Mission, Volume I. Near-Earth Trajectory Phase, " {Pasadena:
JPL TM 33-239, January 1, 1965) p. 11.
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The Ground Communication System for Mariner (called the Ground
Communication Facility or GCF on later missions) comprised four different
kinds of communications links:
-Teletype links operating at 60 words/min. These were leased
circuits connected to switching centers at Goddard, London, and
Canberra. The major terminal was the SFOF at Pasadena where
a semi-automatic teletype switching system was in operation.
(See Figure 6-8)
-Voice circuits. A worldwide network was pieced together from
microwave links, cables, HF radio, and hardwire circuits.
NASCOM's switching center at Goddard, comprising SCAMA
(Station Conferencing and Monitoring Arrangement) was used.
-High-speed data circuits consisting of multiplexed microwave and
voice channels.
-Wideband (video) circuits. This capability existed only between
Goldstone's communication center and the SFOF in Pasadena at
this point in time.
It should be pointed out that the mix of capabilities and the circuits providing
them varied during the mission, being scheduled as required by the mission.
SFOF Role. All of these communication circuits converged on the SFOF,
which was required to support the following mission operations:
1. Determine the spacecraft trajectory and correct it when
necessary
o Receive, record, and interpret spacecraft telemetry data in order
to assess the "health" bf the spacecraft so that corrective com-
mands could be sent
3. Calculate spacecraft position and attitude (especially the orienta-
tion of scientific instruments) and correct where necessary
.
5.
Maintain sufficient communication between the SFOF and DSN
stations to obtain telemetry data from two Mariner spacecraft
and tracking data from one spacecraft---from each DSN station
having both spacecraft in view.
Control the DSN stations and the Ground Communications System.
The operational organization within the SFOF during Mariner is
summarized in Figure 6-6. Note how DSN personnel, which included SFOF
Operations Management and DSIF Operations Management, worked with the
management of Space Flight Operations. The FPAC, SPAC, and SSAC teams
defined at the bottom of Figure 6-6 were the critical project groups making
the day-to-day (or minute-to-minute) decisions. The facilities within the
SFOF tieing all these people together were the SFOF teletype subsystem, the
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voice subsystem, andthe closed-circuit television subsystem. As the reader
may have gatheredalready, the SFOF, in a new,barely finished building, had
expandedgreatly in terms of facilities and personnel. The simple control room
of the Pioneer dayswith a few racks of equipment, a desk or two, and a console
had beentransformed into several different areas in a large building. Only the
Operations Area is shownhere. (Figures 6-9 and 6-10) This was the focal
point of the SFOFduring a mission. It contained the now-familiar status board
and other displays deemedessential to making mission decisions.
The SFOFwas and is a large data-handling machine. Dataarrive
from the tracking stations (Figure 6-11), are processed within the SFOF, and
the information is distributed to the DSNand Project Operations and science
....... f_,,,-,,-,_or, rle rl,_fo onrt n2. _¢einn r*t_nf_a] infr_r'rn_tlinn _r_ ._nf tn D,_N
_ .L U _L_._ t_ • %.JUlll I aA_6 aLU u, u _
stations.
Since the SFOF blossomed into maturity preparatory to Mariners 3
and 4. it has been accorded some extra space at this point in the history.
Mariner-3 Flight. Mariner C, later called Mariner 3, was launched success-
fully from Complex 13 at Cape Kennedy on November 5, 1964. A 100 nautical
mile parking orbit was attained. Downrange Air Force stations acquired the
spacecraft as did Johannesburg and Woomera in turn. Trouble did not show
up until two hours after launch, when the JPL SPAC group noted that the
spacecraft was still operating on battery power rather than its solar panels.
It was quickly discovered that the spacecraft was not attitude-stabilized,
suggesting that the shroud enclosing the spacec.raft had not been jettisoned.
Maneuvers designed to shake the shroud loose were commanded but to no
avail. As the battery power ran out, spacecraft signals became weaker and
were lost altogether the'next morning.
Mariner-4 Flight. The Mariner-4 attempt was made on November 28, 1964.
In addition to all the radars, cameras, and optical tracking equipment at the
Cape, there were nine down-range land-based radar stations plus three
instrumentation ships supplying radiometric data and telemetry during the
near-Earth phase. Some of these were DOD-supplied, others were borrowed
from the NASA MSFN. The ascent trajectory (Figure 6-12) was such that
the spacecraft was below the Johannesburg horizon, although a one-way lock
was achieved for 3 seconds. Woomera was the first DSN station to acquire
Mariner 4 from a practical standpoint. It confirmed that the shroud had been
ejected and that the spacecraft was on solar power. The Mariner-3 problem
had been corrected. As Mariner 4 doubled back across Africa (the Earth
was actually rotating beneath it) it was now high enough for Johannesburg to
acquire it. Goldstone Pioneer picked up Mariner 4 some 16 hours 20 minutes
after launch. On November 30, a command from Pioneer caused the space-
craft to acquire the reference star Canopus, and Mariner 4 entered the first
portion of its cruise phase.
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Figure 6-9. SFOFoverall arrangement during Mariner 4. See
also Figure 6-10.
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Figure 6-10. SFOF Operations Area during Mariner 4.
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The uncorrected trajectory of Mariner 4 would have missed Mars by
about 150,000 miles. During pass 6 over the Pioneer station on December 4,
the first attempt at a midcourse maneuver was made. During this attempt,
Mariner 4 lost its lock o_ the reference star Canopus, and the maneuver was
terminated prematurely. Canopus was reacquired when the Pioneer station
transmitted the appropriate commands. On the next pass over Pioneer
(December 5), the midcourse maneuver was consumated successfully. (During
this event, Mariner 4 was tracked by Woomera while Pioneer was sending
commands. ) The 20-second burn by the spacecraft motor reduced the Mars
miss distance to a little over 6000 miles. (Figure 6-13)
]t is important to note here that critical maneuvers, such as the
IIlILIt_UU£ _3_ ILI_II_:_L_ Y _g£ , ti._a ll',_Jl ,L,LL4E_3LLL_ ;_,,H*,,,, %,,,_.J,LJLAJL,LJL4E31.1,,A%.4LV*.,,,,v_,,L AJk I.DA&a _ • _L _[
DSN stations. In the above instance, both Woomera and Johannesburg had this
capability. Usually. however, a station in the Goldstone complex is selected
for the critical control tasks because of the proximity of the SFOF and reser-
voir of trained DSN and project personnel should problems arise. In addition,
the communication links between Goldstone and the SFOF in Pasadena are
shorter and more reliable than those to other stations.
On December 13, in preparation for long distance communication
during cruise, the Pioneer station commanded the Mariner 4 to switch over
from its cavity amplifier to its travelling-wave-tube amplifier. This transi-
tion increased the signal levels available to DSN receivers. Later, as
Mariner 4 receded from Earth, it became increasingly difficult for the DSN
to receive data at the initial rate of 33-1/3 bits/sec, despite the change in
amplifiers. This problem was inevitable and planned for; on January 3, 1965,
6.16 million miles from Earth, the spacecraft automatically switched to the
8-1/3 bits/see rate. Next, at a distance of 26.9 million miles, on March 5,
the spacecraft switched from its low-gain to high-gain antenna. Since these
changes were absolutely vital to mission success, they were commanded
automatically by the spacecraft timing equipment so that the spacecraft would
not be lost completely should contact (and command capability) be broken
inadvertantly with the DSN. The logic being that a "lost" spacecraft may be
recove:-ed more readily ii it can increase its "visibility" to the DSN through
internal, preprogrammed actions.
During the long 6-month's cruise to Mars, the DSN carried out many
tests and exercises to p_'epare it for the all-important encounter phase of the
mission. For e×_mple, encounter tests were run back on Earth using the
proof-test spacecraft model as a signal source simulating the actual Mariner
4. Various backup-mode tests and alternate-encounter-mode tests were con-
ducted to prepare for possible anomalies at encounter.
The DSN provided nearly continuous coverage for Mariner 4 during
cruise. The not_ble exceptions occurred when various stations were temp,,-
raL'ily z'eleased. By early July, as encounter neared, Woomera, Joha_r,,:s -
burg, and Pioneer were once again all tracking Mariner 4. In addition,
Tidbinbilla and Robledo had joined the network and the Goldstone Echo station
had been diverted tc the Mariner-4 mission.
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On July 14, 1965, the 228th day of the mission, commands from
Johannesburg began preparing the spacecraft for encounter; i. e., turning on
the scientific instruments and tape recorder, etc. When Johannesburg
handed Mariner 4 over to the Pioneer station at Goldstone later in the day,
the Pioneer station completed the command sequence. These commands
would eventually have been executed automatically by the spacecraft itself,
but the excellent quality of Earth-spacecraft communications permitted
mission controllers to preempt the automatic command feature.
Mariner-4 cameras acquired Mars and took a series of pictures over
a period of 25 minutes, 12 seconds, storing the data on the spacecraft tape
recorder. Before picture playback could begin, Mariner 4 passed behind
Mars, resulting in a loss of signal for about 53 minutes. After reacquisition,
Mariner 4 began sending back picture data and the information acquired by
the other instruments. The first picture playback sequence, at the low
8-1/3 bits/see rate, lasted from July 15 through July 25. A second readout
followed and was completed August 3. Following the second playback,
Mariner 4 resumed sending cruise engineering and science data.
Various DSN stations continued tracking Mariner 4 until October 1,
1965. when the Goldstone Venus station inadvertently transmitted a command
to the spacecraft to switch to the low-gain antenna. Thus, Mariner 4. was
temporarily lost some 2-1/2 months after encounter.
Scientifically, the mission was a great success, giving scientists
their first close-up views of the Martian surface.
DSN support throughout the mission was excellent. There were, of
course, many small problems with equipment and administrative procedures
that keep cropping up. These were eventually solved, usually on the spot by
innovative personnel. Two problerris are singled out here because they re-
flect upon the general technological progress of the DSN. First, the decision
to employ travelling wave masers in the network appeared premature from a
re\'iew of the many operational difficulties encountered. Too much time had
to be spent in repairing and coa.xing of equipment. Second, the high frequency
ground radio communication link with Johannesburg suffered many outages,
emt)hasizing the desirability of a cable circuit to South Africa.
All in all. the nominal Mariner-4 mission from launch to encounter,
was as succ_sslul on the ground as it was in outer space. In fa_i, Mariner 4
wa._ m)t lost lo_-cver, because with special techniques plus the availability of
the new Mars 64-m antenna at Goldstone the Mariner-4 signal was picked up
again. This "extended coverage" of Mariner 4, described in more detail in
the next chapter, contributed valuable radio science data to solar-system
researchers.
The Interplanetary Pioneers
The Interplanetary Pioneers comprised a new series of deep-space
vehicles that posed several new kinds of problems for the DSN. Despite the
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Pioneer name, these new spacecraft bore little resemblance to the preceding
Pioneers launchedby the Army and Air Force in 1958and 1959. Rather than
short-lived lunar probes, like Pioneers 1 through 4, the Interplanetary
Pioneers were conceived as deep-spacemonitoring stations plying orbits
around the S_r:betweenVenus and Mars with lifetimes of perhaps one year
each.
Oneproblem that unexpectedlycropped up with the new Pioneers
involved their great tenacity for life. Insteadof giving up the ghost after one
year. they kept radioing back scientific data for manyyears, creating the
needfor extendedDSNsupport far beyondthat originally planned. The new
Pioneers were managedby NASA's Ames Research Center at Mountain View,
Ca[i[ornia, and thus becamethe first important "off-Lab" project requiring
significant DSNsupport. Furthermore, Ames wanteda data terminal and
con:rol facility at Mountain View. This was a new situation for the DSN,which
had intended that all control facilities reside in the SFOF. f'inally, the maxi-
,mumranges of the new Pioneers would be about 2 A. U., a d':._;_anceconsider-
ably greater than the capabilities of the 26-m dishes in the 1);5 DSN. Only
the 61-m Mars antennaunder construction at Goldstonecould hopeto track the
Pioneers across the solar system. The sizeable scientific _.ontributions of
the Interplanetary Pioneers constitute ample proof that these challenges were
met.
The history of the Interplanetary Pioneers began in 1960whena small
team at Ames beganstudying solar probes. 7 Unfortunately, NASAHead-
quarters was more interested in spacecraft to monitor interplanetary "weather. "
With the assistance of SpaceTechnology Laboratories Ames adaptedits con-
cept of a small, simple, long-lived spacecraft to this monitoring mission
which was the only one "saleable" at the time. On July 30, 1964, NASA
Headquarters approved 'the Pioneer Project, and Ames began preparing for
a 1965 launch.
Compared to JPL's Mariners and Rangers, the Pioneer spacecraft
were small indeed, varying from 137 to 148 pounds each. Five were built
al_,gether (2 in Block I, 3 in Block II), but only the first four were launched
suc,_'essfully (Pioneers 6 through 9). The plan was to place some in solar
orbit between Earth and Venus and others between Earth and Mars. Such
smal[ spacecraft, however, could not afford the Earth-pointed parabolic
antennas of the Rangers and Mariners and three-dimensional attitude control.
The unique Pioneer engineering approach involved spin-stabilizing the space-
craft in solar orbit and using a mast-type antenna that concentrated the
spacecraft radio transmissions into a thil_ disk. By maneuvering the space-
craft attitude through the DSN, the designers hoped to keep the Earth located
witMn that disk. Clearly, the DSN had a new kind of target, and one that was
managed and controlled elsewhere.
7William R. Co_liss, "The Interplanetary Pioneers, Volume I: Summary, "
(Washington: NASA SP-278, 1972) p. 2.
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As of this writing, some of the Interplanetary Pioneers have been
operating out in space for more than a full decade. Understandably,the
requirements for Pioneer tracking and dataacquisition changedconsiderably
through the years in the context of competingmissions, spacecraft emergen-
cies, the number of DSNstations in operation, special astronomical events
(conjunctions, etc. ), and our improving knowledgeof the interplanetary
milieu. It is impossible to documentevena fraction of these voluminous
requirements here. Instead, Table 6-4 is offered to illustrate the most
important types of Pioneer operations requiring DSNparticipation. Note
that the Pioneers required two different typesof orientation maneuvers; one
shortly after launch and another to establish optimum radio contact before
the cruise phase. Tables 6-5, 6-6, and 6-7 provide additional insights into
the growing complexities of scheduling thetracking of the manyprobes out
in deep space. The data in the tables are, of course, only typical andkeep
changingweek by week.
The basic tracking and data acquisition support for the Interplane-
tary Pioneers was the task of the DSN's26-m paraboloids. The 64-m
antennaat Goldstone's Mars site (DSS-14)did not become operational until
almost six months after tile launch of Pioneer 6 which occurred in December
1965. However, as various Pioneers forged beyond the detection capabili-
ties of the 26-m dishes, DSS14 andvarious other antennasin the 64-m
subnetthat was eventually built worked them whenrequired. (SeeChapter
7.) On occasion, the 26-m antennasof the MSFN also tracked various of
these interplanetary weather stations. During the first decade, manycon-
junctions, passagesbehind the Sun (occultations), and other astronomical
events have permitted a host of unique radio science experiments. By
pooling the capabilities of DSNand MSFN, scientific coverage of these
unusual situations has been very productive.
During the years the DSNintroduced several modifications aimed
at increasing its ability to pick up£he faint signals from the distant Pioneers
with its 26-m antennas. Includedhave beenimproved masers, more
efficient microwave equipment, linear antennapolarizers, 3-Hz carrier
tracking loops, advanceddemodulationhardware, and (for Pioneer 9 only)
special decodingsoftware for experimental convolutional codingdevices.
Over the years the 26-m antennathreshold range of detection for Pioneers
has beenincreased from 0.4 to 1.5 A.U. These improvements have, of
course, benefited other missions too.
As was common during this period of DSNdevelopment, stations
were burdenedwith special mission-dependentequipment. In the case of
Pioneer, this apparatuswas designedto provide telemetry data processing
in real time. Called GOE(GroundOperational Equipment), these racks
consisted of a commandeneoder, a computer buffer, bit synchronizer, and
various test equipment. The Pioneer Project supplied this GOE, but the
DSN stations had to find room for it, operate it, and maintain it.
Pioneer 6. The first of the Interplanetary Pioneers was launched on
December 16, 1965, from Cape Canaveral aboard a Delta rocket. Twenty
C_
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Table 6-5. GENERAL PIONEER TRACKING REQUIREMENTS AS OF MARCH 1969a
Pioneer Nominal mission
6 DSS 14 daily coverage 4-8 hr/day; absolute minimum,
DSS 14 daily coverage 3 hr/day
E
DSS 14 daily coverage; 4-8 hr/day; absolute minimum,
DSS 14 daily coverage 3 hr/day
DSS 12, 42, 51, 62 and DSS 11, 42, 61; continuous coverage;
absolute minimum, DSS 12, 42, 51, 62 and DSS 11, 41, 61,
two tracking missions/day for a total of 16 hr/day
DSS 12, ,42, 51, 62; continuous coverage; absolute minimum,
DSS 12, 42, 51, 62 and DSS 11, 41, 61 and MSFN; two track-
ing missions/day for a total of 16 hr/day, with 1 hour over-
lap
DSS 12, 42, 51, 62; continuous coverage; absolute minimum,
DSS 12, 42, 51, 62 and DSS 11, 41, 61 and MSFN; two track-
ing missions/day for a total of 16 hr/day
aThese requirements vary with time, of course. This table is illustrative only.
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Table 6-6. TYPICAL TRACKING REQUIREMENTS FOR A PIONEER FLIGHT.
Time/distance coverage Data required Data presentation
Class-I requirement
A. Launch-vehicle second-
stage engine cutoff
(SECO) to SECO--plus-
60 sec
B° Launch-vehicle third-
stage burnout to third-
stage spacecraft separa-
tion (minimum of 60 sec of
data if available)
Class-II requirement
A. SECO to SECO plus 180 sec
B. Ascension (ETR Station 12)
rise to Ascension set.
Class-III requirement
SECO to third-stage ignition;
third- stage spinup to third-
stage burnout; DSS tracking
coverage sufficient to define
the free-flight orbit
Time, azimuth,
elevation, range
Data points per sec:
1/10 minimum,
1/6 desired,
1/3 maximum
Acceleration
The data to be converted for
presentation in NRT by tele-
type to the SFOF as follows:
(a) Decimal raw-data format
(b) Orbital elements and
injection conditions of
parking orbit
(c) Orbital elements and
injection conditions of
transfer orbit assuming
nominal third-stage burn
(d) Orbital elements and
injection conditions of
transfer orbit based on
actual third-stage burn
Voice link and/or single-
sideband data link in NRT;
initially launch plus approxi-
mately 2 hr, and as required
to meet accuracy require-
ments
Fr_PRODUCIBILITY OF THE.
:._r_ AT_ PAGE IS POOR
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:.-a'_r:_tes "after launch, control was transferred from the SFC[, _c J(,nanm_r_:urg,
wi'.e_'e the Type-H orientation was handled. (The Type-I orienl::tir._._ r.lareuve:'
is _utomatic and normally requires no DSN participation. ) A!t.koug_ _o_,_,e
minor problems :vere experienced in terms of late locks onto :_m spacec_-aft
si<na!, th:_ ;: a.n generally went according to plan. On _a,_aary 15, JPL's
S}(,F sh, r. c:Jntrol with the Ames Pioneer control station ;_,: t! ! :t _ime.
:2, ;._rdary 23. the transfer of all control functions had bec_z (:on-!,ie::e_. As
_h,_ _.pacecraft-to-Earth distance increased the bit error rate _;so increased.
To reduce this error rate, the first reduction of bit rate (frc.m 256 to 64 bits/
sec_ was commanded on March 17. Such changes in bit rate occurred frequently
as distance and other conditions changed. Type-I and Type-Ii orientations were
also commanded to confirm and improve spacecraft attitude. At the end of the
nominal 6-month mission on June 13, 1966, Pioneer 6 was s:_ii a healthy space-
craft, and the mission was correspondingly extended. Many years later Pioneer
6 was still sending back scientific data. With the 64-m antennas the DSN was
able to track this spacecraft continuously. (See Chapter 7. )
Pi_::neer 7. The launch and DSN acquisition of Pioneer 7 tooZ place August 17,
19,t;. Tracking from launch to cruise phase was excellent; lhe spacecraft
was operating beautifully. On August 31, however, the spacecraft travelling
wave tube began operating erratically and the spare was switched in by
command. This spacecraft was also operating well at the end of its nominal
mission and like Pioneer 6, required the DSN to plan for an extended mission.
By November 28, 1969, the inward Pioneer 6 and outward Pioneer 7 were
aligned so that both were tracking simultaneously in a "radial-spiral" radio
science experiment.
Prancer 8. This spacecraft yeas the first from Block II. It was launched
v,'_thout incident on December 13, 1967. The trajectory was such that track-
ing rates at Johannesburg were excessive and Woomera was therefore desig-
nat,_d the initial acquisition station. The Earth-escape hyperbola for Pioneer
8 ,_,as less energetic than planned and the resultant solar o::b_ was conse-
,j._::,_dy less eccentric and more inclined than desired. Spacecraft perfor-
ma,ce, however, has been excellent.
i:i_,.mer 9. Liftoff occurred on November 8, 1968. Twenty-six minutes later,
Jommnesburg reported a momentary signal, but this was 10 minutes after
predicted acquisition. Furthermore, the signal was 16 db too low. Two-
way lock was finally achieved 44 minutes after launch. Receiver signal
leve_s later rose to normal levels, and the mission then countinued according
to plan. This spacecraft carried a Convolutional Coder Unit (CCU) which
p-rovided, in effect, a 3 db gain over the previously launched Pioneers. This
"coding gain" was measured experimentally and was so effective that the CCU
idea was subsequently applied to other NASA spacecraft.
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Pioneer E. This flight, the fifth and last of the Interplanetary Pioneers, began
August 27, 1969, and was a launch failure.
The Remaining Atlas-Centaur Test Flights
In 1965, both the Atlas-Centaur and Surveyor (the first spacecraft
designated to use the Atlas-Centaur) were both still far behind schedule.
Pressure on both programs was extreme.
The DSN had participated in the test flights of AC-2 and AC-3 in 1964
I_,_ (_h,_nta_- _ h,,t rllcl nnt h_r_ tha vo_nllvno_ in aid tho AC-4 flight. T,-hnncl
beacons had been placed aboard flights AC-2 and AC-3 to facilitate DSN track-
ing. By the time the AC-5 flight was scheduled, the DSN had convrted to S-band
operation with the exception of the L/S equipment retained at a few stations
for the final Ranger flight. Thus, the last four Atlas-Centaur test flights,
AC-5, AC-6, AC-8, and AC-9 flew with S-band beacons. 8
Flights AC-5 and AC-6 carried Surveyor dynamic models on direct-
ascent, variable-launch-azimuth trajectories that were targeted to impact
the Moon. Itwas for such direct-ascent flightsthat NASA was installing
facilitieson Ascension Island. The AC-5 and AC-6 launches were to demon-
strate thatthe Atlas-Centaur could be launched on time and possessed an
adequate guidance system for the first Surveyor flight, now just a few months
away. Operational procedures to be used for this all-important Surveyor shot
were to be tested out on these flights: A midcourse maneuver was also to be
simulated.
The AC-8 and AC-9 flights, in contrast, were to be launched into
parking orbits and employ second bttrns to inject Surveyor mass models into
simulated lunar transfer orbits. Several of the actual Surveyor flights did
use this parking-orbit mode, and this pair of test flights was planned to
demonstrate that the Atlas-Centaur was ready for such missions. During
these flights, the DSN was to provide two-way angle and Doppler tracking of
the S-band beacons on the mass models, as well as space vectors, orbital
elements, injection conditions, midcourse correction requirements, and
similar data.
"]'he AC-5 Flight. This launch took place March 2, 1965, less than three weeks
before Ranger 9. The DSN assigned Goldstone Pioneer, Johannesburg, and
Loomera 9 to the AC-5 llight, but they were not needed because the Atlas
booster engines shut down after the booster had risen only a few feet off the
launch pad. The vehicle dropped back onto the launch pad, exploded, and
bu rned.
8AC-7 was used for the launch of Surveyor 2. See Chapter 7.
9The Ascension Island station was not operational until April 1966 and could
not support AC-5 and AC-6.
J",.:;_ I'%V.L3 U_J&i:5_..__ ]...
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Th,', ::.C-.(:, Ftigilt. The AC-6 was much more _;uc_::-;sful. I_ w:,_: launched
A:_l',_:s_ -1, i965---the first vehicle to use Cornp',cx 36B a c the .;;_pe. The
DS. configuration was ident:ical to that for AC-5 c:.:cept that Echo replaced
Pio,'eer at Goldstone. The Launch Station (DSS 71i, although not formally
corr,n-_itted t_ the flight, did participate in the com,[down and maintained one-
_','a) loci: um:l 200 seconds after liftoff. The [ligi_t ;rajectory was normal and
tnc model sv.aeecraft was successfully injected into s simulated lunar trans-
fer trajectory. The DSN tracked AC-6 without incident until a little over 16
hours after iiftoff, when the beacon signal dropped abruptly to zero. At the
time, three stations (DSS 11, 12, and 42) had contact with the spacecraft.
The signal could not be _eaequired by any DSN station. The beacon battery,
designed for 20 hours of operation, may have been drained prematurely.
The AC-8 Flight. During the last two Atlas-Centaur test flights, the DSN was
committed to tracking the S-band beacons for 40 hours (the new battery life).
Longer beacon lifetimes were required because these two flights were to be
injected first into parking orbits. Goldstone Pioneer, Tidbinbilla, and
Johannesburg were designated as prime for AC-8. The station on Ascension
was now complete and the AC-9 flight was used for training purposes.
Training exercises were also carried out at the Launch Station and Robledo.
After three aborted launch attempts, AC-8 finally left its launch
pad on April 8, 1966. The injection into the parking orbit occurred accord-
ing to plan, but the second burn was unsuccessful so that a lunar transfer
orbit was not achieved. The DSN tracked AC-8 for 26 hours until the signal
ceased. The flight was far from expectations, but the DSN performed well.
Apparently, AC-8 was tumbling in space, and there were numerous losses
of signal. The Ascension station (DSS 72), with its high tracking rate 30-foot
antenna was actually able to follow the orbiting spacecraft better than the
slower 26-m dishes which were not designed to work fast-moving, Earth-
orbiting satellites.
The AC-9 Flight. The flight objectives were essentially those of AC-8. The
prime DSN stations were Goldstone Pioneer, Woomera, Johannesburg, and
the Launch Station at the Cape. A successful launch occurred on October 26,
1966---on the second attempt. This time the flight went well, and the proper
parking orbit and simulated lunar transfer orbit were achieved. The second
burn of AC-9 signaled the first successful restart in space of a-rocket engine
employing cryogenic fuel (liquid hydrogen). Tracking services by the DSN
more than fulfilled the requirements. Although the launch vehicle perfor-
mance was not letter-perfect, the Atlas-Centaur demonstrated that it could
inject a Surveyor vehicle into a parking orbit from which it could be sent to
the Moon. By this time, however, the first two Surveyors had been launched
in the direct-ascent mode. (See Chapter 7.)
Tracking Theory and Accuracy
One of the great and generally unappreciated accomplishments of the
DSN is its exceedingly fine measurement of Earth-spacecraft distances and,
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in consequence,the distances to the other planets and sundry astronomical
objects in the solar system. Astronomers with telescopes can measure
planetary distances only to within thousandsof miles, but with a cooperating
spaceprobe the DSNcan refine planetary distance measurements to less than
a meter. The fact is that the DSN-spacecraft combination has applied a new
kind of radio ruler to the solar system and, in doing so, has revolutionized
our knowledgeof its dimensions. In addition to simple refinements, unexpected
discoveries, suchas that of the lunar mascons, have beenmade through analy-
sis of slight dimensional perturbations. The story related below has two parts:
(1) advancesin radiometric theory; and (2) the tracking down and elimination
of the many tiny sources of error in the measurement system.
Radiometric Theory. Until about 1965, radiometric theory had been patterned
as an astronomer would think;that is, itrelied upon antenna pointing angles
plus the Doppler and range measurements made through the cooperation of
the spacecraft transponder. Thus were acquired the six measurements needed
to deduce the three positional and three velocity values that constitute an un-
equivocal determination of _ny spacecraft's spatial coordinates and motion.
Measurements of this kind were made in the early days of the DSN and did
provide the navigational accuracies expected of them. There were better ways
of measuring the six variables needed for space navigation, but itwas not
until 1965 that the way to much higher accuracy was fully realized.
The most direct navigation system would measure the three position
and three velocity components directly, but this is clearly impossible to do
from Earth with a space probe millions of miles away. The next best thing
is the measurement of variables very closely related to position and velocity.
The DSN range and Doppler measurements meet this criterion, but the antenna
pointing angles do not. The secret to the precision tracking of deep space
vehicles depends upon measuring range and Doppler repeatedly as the aspect
or relative geometry of Earth tracking stations and the space probe vary. In
the case of lunar probes, the rapidly changing aspect of the probe with respect
to the Earth provides enough different data points in a conveniently short
period of time to create this desired "multi-aspect" condition. This is also
true when the space probe is in a fast-changing orbit around the Moon or
planet. Much of the DSN's most critical tracking comes when probes are in
interplanetary transfer orbits and move very slowly against the background
of fixed stars. Range and Doppler measurements would vary too slowly here
if it were not for one factor: the rotation of the Earth of its axis. Because
of the Earth's rotation, we need not wait many months while the probe travels
a large p(_rtion of its orbit around the sun; rather, the diurnal motion of the
Earth modulates the Doppler range-rate measurement in the manner shown
in Figure 6-14. From the modulation, the requisite probe coordinates can be
ascertained with high accuracy. Without going into the mathematical details,
three of the necessary variables can be determined from a single pass of
Doppler tracking. The variables actually measured are range-rate, modula-
tion amplitude, and the time the modulation curve crosses the ordinate (a
phase measurement). A day or two later, the probe position has changed
enough so that when the same measurements are made and then combined with
direct range determinations, they comprise sufficient information to yield aU
six needed coordinates with very high precision. (Figure 6-15)
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FOR THE SITUATION
SHOWN, THE PROBE IS: (I) ACCELERATING OUTWARD, (2) MOVING
COUNTER CLOCKWISE WITH RESPECT TO THE EARTH, AND (3) EXPERIENCING
A DECREASE IN THE DECLINATION MAGNITUDE.
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Figure 6-14. Doppler signature on two successive days.
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Figure 6-15. Basic geometry for DoppIer tracking.
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In the early 1960s, no one foresaw this rather elegant but direct
method of gaining the coordinates of a distant space probe. Everyone seemed
confined by the set _ays of the astronomers.
"i'i,¢: DSN Inherent Accuracy Project. Following the above revolution in radio-
metric melhod_logy. JPL engineers and scientists tackled the host of factors
_.im: deg_aded the accuracy of tracking measurements. Among the most im-
Y_ortant sources of error were:
-Knowledge of DSN station location
-The effect on radio propagation of charged particles between the
tracking station and the tracked spacecraft
-The spacecraft transponder
-The Doppier count accuracy
-The frequency standards and time synchronization methods
-The tropospheric model used to correct for air moisture, etc.
To track down these error sources, in a systematic fashion, Eberhardt
Rechtin formed the DSN Inherent Accuracy Project in 1965. 10 The goals of the
project were two in number:
1. To determine and verify the inherent accuracy of the DSN as a
radio navigation instrument for lunar and planetary missions.
2. To formulate designs and plans for refining this accuracy to its
practical limits.
Initially only two JPL divisions were involved in the project but it soon
became apparent that some of the important sources of error were outside the
tracking system per se. Consequently, in December 1968 a more widely based
program, the JPL Navigation Program, was set up to control such extra-DSN
factors as:
-Transponder accuracy
-Supplemental use of on-board navigation equipment
-Control and/or measurement of nongravitational forces (solar
radiationpressure, etc.)
-Navigation software and mathematical techniques
As work progressed on both programs, not only were the practical results im-
pressive: but the scientific value of the effort was unexpectedly high. Some of
the more importam improvements came when the DSN converted to S-band,
10progress reports on the Inherent Accuracy Project may be found in most JPL
Space Programs Summaries since 1966. In particular, see: Jet Propu'_;ion
Laboratory, "Space Programs Summary, " Vol. III. The Deep Space Network
(Pasadena: SPS 37-43, January 31, 1967) p. 3.
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and it is appropriate to review someof these initial results here. Additional
progress will be reported in the chapters that follow.
The basic approach of the DSN Inherent Accuracy Project was to con-
struct a "model" of what was expected to happen in terms of tracking on new
flight programs using the best available theories and data. Naturally, when
the actual measurements of the spacecraft trajectories were made, theory and
practice did not coincide exactly. The differences between actual and pre-
dicted data are termed "residuals," and they betray the existence of error
sources somewhere. The theoretical goal, of course, is to reduce them all
to zero (an impossible task of course). Actually, the residuals have great
scientific and engineering value, just as bankbook errors help find and correct
problems.
Doppler count accuracy was improved materially by the conversion
from L-band to S-band, as illustrated in Figure 6-16. Not only did the shorter
wavelengths afford greater resolution in Doppler counting, but the effects of
charged particles and the troposphere were also reduced. The X-2 and X-8
improvements indicated in Figure 6-16 came about through specific improve-
ments in the way in which the electronic systems counted the Doppler varia-
tions. The Doppler resolver, introduced into the DSN in early 1967 permitted
the resolution of Doppler shift to within one-hundredth of a cycle, which at
S-band wavelengths corresponds to less than one millimeter.
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Figure 6-16. Improvements in integrated Doppler resolution.
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One example of such detective work involved the analysis of Ranger
Doppler residuals. As the spacecraft distance from Earth increased or as
sample spacing decreased, the residuals displayed high fluctuations. These
changes were eventually attributedto instab{litiesin the reference oscillators
at the DSN stations---the rubidium-vapor frequency standards in this instance.
Gradually. the rubidium-vapor oscillators were improved. The key to this
discovery was the variation of the residuals during some change in the traok-
ing operation: the increasing distance from Earth in this case. These varia-
tions in residuals which are made noticeable by some physical changes are
termed "signatures. "
The signatures of errors due to tropospheric refraction were created
bv tracking the spacecraft firsL al low anu..... mv,,L.... _ ,,_,,,-:+_-=,_._-_+^_ ,,,,_x+_+...... , _+,,,_l,,
the tropospheric signatures varied from station to station. The initial tropos-
pherie model used for correcting Doppler measurements was applied at
stations all over the world. (Figure 6-17) By constructing a separate model
for each station, taking local conditions into account, residuals were later
reduced still further.
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• Figure 6-17. How tropospheric calibration has impr, red with time.
Another kind of residual arises when spacecraft missions are later
"reflown" by computer. During actual flight, it is assumed that the locations
of the DSN stations are known precisely and the spacecraft c,:,ordinates are
unknown. ¢_v the reflown missions, the reverse is assumed: the spacecraft
trajectc, ry !:: :aken as exact and station positions are solved for. These calcu-
lated locations vary as the spacecraft moves away from Earth. _y analyzing
tt:_ese variations errors in station longitudes due to polar mo_:ion_ errors in
universal time, and other factors can be ascertained. Figure 6-1. 8 indicates
the historical improvements in station longitude uncertainty.
The DSN's Doppler and range measurements are made from the
E_rth's rotating surface and this surface does not rotate in _, perfectly regular
manner. Therefore, it is vital that all tracking measurem_ts be tagged with
accurate times. Station clocks must be extremely accurat_ and they must be
_ynchronized precisely with one another. Unfortunately, station clock
synchronization by reference to WWV signals, although ade,:,uate for ocean
craft, is completely unsuitable for spacecraft. A significv.n: improvement was
made in DSN synchronization as a result of an error in un! ,ersal time dis-
cc:vered during the Ranger Program. (See p. 73.) Timing _._qynomials correct-
ing UTC (Universal Time Coordinated) to UTI (Universal Time Inertial) were
made on a crash basis during the flight of Mariner 4 in 1965. The improvement
is detailed in Figure 6-19. Further improvements in syn3hronization will be
reported in later chapters.
The first corrections made in the DSN scheme of things as a result
of the Inherent Accuracy Project generally produced the greatest improve-
ments, as demonstrated in Figures 6-15 through 6-18. This work, however,
has been continued diligently, resulting in slower but cummulatively im-
pressive progress.
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Figure 6-18. Reductions in DSN station longitude uncertainty.
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Chapter 7. GOLDSTONE-MARS BECOMES OPERATIONAL
A New Era Begins
On March 16, 1966, the big 64-m antenna at Goldstone received its first
signals from Mariner 4. The signals had travelled across the solar system from
the spacecraft which was about to be occulted by the Sun. It was fitting that the
first spacecraft trac_::u by this antenna was a Mars probe because the Mars site
antenna •was originally planned for tracking and communicating with Martian
probes. As history has proven, however, the value of this big paraboloid trans-
cends any specific mission and has, in fact, opened up much of the solar system
to exploration by unmanned probes. In addition, the Mars antenna has many
times repaid its debt to radio astronomy, the source of many of its design ideas,
by operating as a high precision radio telescope.
The step-increase in DSN performance afforded by the Mars antenna
was applied within a few weeks of its inauguration to the first Surveyor flights,
yielding much stronger signals for terrestrial processing than possible with the
26-m dishes that had been originally assigned to these missions. The Apollo
flights benefited, too, because live TV from the Moon was now possible. The
small Interplanetary Pioneers, which soon swept out of range of the 26-m
subnets could now be followed all the way around the solar system. The 64-m
antenna at Goldstone was so valuable an asset to space flight that pressure soon
grew to build a three-station subnet of 64-m antennas---an eventuality long
planned for by the DSN but not achieved until the 1970s. The other big dishes
finally built in Australia and Spain are a subject of Chapter 8. In this chapter,
the emphasis is on Goldstone-Mars and the evolution of the DSN through the
remainder of the decade of the 1960s.
Completion of the Mars 64-m Antenna
In previous chapters, the story of the Mars antenna, or AAS {Advanced
Antenna System), was taken through January 25, 1963, when NASA announced
that the Rohr Corporation of Chula Vista, California, had been selected to pre-
pare the detailed design for the antenna and construct it at Goldstone. Rohr
engineers immediately began to complete the detailed design and make a
thorough error analysis of the major parts. In January 1964, the JPL AAS
Project Team (Figure 7-1) formally approved the design, and Rohr began
procurement and fabrication. During the preceding year, under a separate
contract, the road system at Goldstone had been extended 5 miles to the new
site preparatory to building the antenna foundation. In early 1964, concrete
was poured at the site for the antenna pedestal and optical instrument tower.
In April 1964, a Data System Development Plan 1 for the Mars site was
1jet Propulsion Laboratory, "Data System Development Plan, Advanced Antenna
System for the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility, " (Pasadena: April 7, 1964).
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Figure 7-1. The project organization for the 64-m Mars antenna.
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issued. This included not only the antenna proper but all of the electronics
equipment necessary for an operational station. By this time, fabrication of
the steel antenna components had begun. By June 1964. the concrete foundations
were complete. The diesel generator building was completed in September and
the pump house and cooling tower in November.
The 2-million-pound steel alidade was assembled at Goldstone in late
1964, and in December a trial rotation was made on the hydrostatic bearing.
Elevation bearings and tipping parts were erected next. By April 1965, the
second-floor control room had been completed sufficiently so that JPL could
begin installing the radio and data-handling equipment. Gear wheels and bear-
ings were installed next. When, in July 1965, the reflector panels went into
piace, a casual observer would have thought the antenna construction finished.
There was, however, much work remaining inside.
Then, in August 1965, a major accident occurred. An error in the
setting of the pressure control system for the hydrostatic bearing led to the
grounding and damaging of a portion of the hydrostatic bearing. Fortunately,
the antenna had been designed with such a possibility in mind, and it was possible
to jack up the alidade and reflector and repair the bearing. After this disturbing
episode, the final equipment was installed, tests made, and a paint job applied.
The antenna had been completed well within the budget and on schedule----a not-
common event in the aerospace business.
Although the first signals (from Mariner 4) were detected at Mars on
March 16, 1966, formal dedication did not come until April 29, 1966. Even
with the dedication, finishing touches remained, particularly in the areas of
personnel training and performance testing.
General Description of the Mars Dish. The Mars 64-m paraboloid is not the
largest radio antenna in the world but it does possess some unique properties
in comparison with antennas designed specifically for radio astronomy. First,
it is a more rigid structure than the usual radio astronomy antenna. This
feature derives in part from rugged design and the presence of two concentric
structures. The more flimsy radio astronomy antennas commonly shut down
operations when the wind becomes strong enough to distort the antenna struc-
ture. The radio stars will still be there tomorrow, and little is lost by sus-
pending operations. DSN antennas, in contrast, cannot afford this luxury and
must be ready for crucial mission events regardless of terrestrial weather
conditions. The DSN 64-m antennas are rigid and precise enough to be effec-
tive at 15 GHz, which is unusual for antennas of this size. A second unique
feature of the DSN 64-m dishes is their fast slew rates---something unneces-
sary in radio astronomy in which essentially all target motion is caused by
the Earth's rotation.
The Mars dish and its close relatives later erected in Australia and
5_fn employ Cassegrain microwave optics. The 64-m, high precision,
:_araboioidal surfaces have a focal-length-to-diameter ratio of 0.42 (Figure
.'-2). At the normal DSN S-band operating frequencies (around 2.3 GHz), the
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half-power beam width is only 0.14 degree. The corresponding gain is 61.4 db,
and the total receiving system noise temperature can be as low as 16°K. The
antenna mount can rotate:k 270 ° in azimuth; the normal elevation range is 6 to
89 ° . Including the pedestal weight, the Mars antenna weighs about 15 million
pounds. The steerable weight above the azimuth axis is about 5 million pounds.
Even though there are larger dishes available, the Mars antenna is
always busy working the many spacecraft in deep space which are beyond
reach with smaller antennas. It also performs tasks for radio astronomers
who appreciate its high precision and sophisticated electronic support.
During the period covered in this chapter, the Mars antenna experienced
a serious mechanical failure that shut it down from March 10 to April 28, 1967.
Anomalies in the hydrostatic thrust bearing caused short interr_ptions in track-
ing. The problem was solved by reshimming the bearing. During the repair
operation, it was possible to use the antenna for limited periods; i.e., the
terminal phase of Surveyor 3.
Concurrent DSN Improvements
The completion of the Goldstone Mars 64-m antenna represented the
major advance in DSN capability of this period, but it was only one in a series
of stepwise increases in all pertinent areas of technology and management. The
more important of these developments occurring during the middle 1960s are
described below.
Spacecraft Ranging. The capabilities of DSN ranging systems divides naturally
into two classes: lunar and planetary. The physical situation is characterized
by increase of more than a factor of one hundred in distance from one class to
the other. It has been customary to call the two important lunar ranging systems
Mark I and Mark IA. 2 Although designed for lunar use, these sytems success-
fully tracked Mariner 5 to ten :times the. Moon's distance, as a later section
in this chapter will relate. : The two major planetary ranging systems are named
according to their designers; "Tan", for R. C. Tausworth, and "Mu", for
W. L. Martin. The main technical differences between the lunar and planetary
classes of ranging systems is in the method of range coding and receiver code
detection. The Mark I and Mark IA lunar systems were first employed on the
Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor missions from late 1966 through 1967. The Tau
planetary system saw its first use on Mariner 5, 1967-1968, and an improved,
more stable Tau system was used for Mariners 6 and 7, 1969-1971, which are
covered in the next chapter. The Mu ranging system came still later with the
extended missions of Mariners 6 and 7.
2It is important not to confuse the "Mark I ranging system" with the Mark I DSN"
described in such documents as "Deep Space Network Data System Development
Plan; Mark III Project" (Pasadena: JPL 803-1, Rev. A, March 15, 1974).
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This digression on terminology may seem rather dull, but it illustrates
the tendencyof technical specialists to consider the network revolutionized
whenever a major impr(_vementis consummatedin their area. It would, in[act. be much easier to divide this history dawn into chapters if the DSN
actually had evolvedall at once in quantumjumps. But the DSNdid not suddenly
changelrom alunar to aplanetary network, or alow-bit-rate network to a
high-bit-rate network, or a network burdenedwith mission-dependent equip-
ment to a multimission network. The DSNis always being upgraded; someof
the steps are small, some others are big.
Time Synchronization. For accurate ranging at lunar distances, clocks at DSN
stations had to be synchronized to within 50 microseconds (the Lunar Orbiter
requirement). In the early DSN, clocks had been synchronized via high fre-
quency radio signals, but at best the accuracies were a few milliseconds.
Later, the very low frequency signals from WWV provided some improvement,
but not nearly enough for lunar ranging. Ground-wave propagation uncertain-
ties were too high, and some DSN stations could not receive WWV reliably.
Something better was needed for Lunar Orbiter.
Transportable cesium time standards from the National Bureau of
Standards were first proposed because they promised to synchronize stations
to within 5 microseconds. This was an expensive operation, however, and
one which would have to be repeated at least on a monthly basis by a clock-
carrying team shuttling between stations. A second, more convenient concept
used the DSN ranging system and the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft itself. In
essence, one station could send a signal to Lunar Orbiter, which would be
acknowledged by the spacecraft transponder, permitting all stations with Lunar
Orbiter in view to set their clocks upon receipt of the signal from Lunar Orbiter.
In this way. station clocks could be synchronized to within 20 microseconds
during the Lunar Orbiter program. -
Still later, during 1966, a Moon-bounce synchronization scheme was
devised. In this, the Goldstone Venus station was established as the master
timekeeper. 3 It bounced X-band signals off the Moon to other DSN stations
with the Moon in view. By 1968 this technique had demonstrated that it could
set clocks to within 5 microseconds and was subsequently adopted throughout the
enti re DSN.
High-Rate and Multimission Telemetry. By 1967, the future applications of the
DSN required two important changes in the way the network/spacecraft com-
binations handled telemetry:
3Technical details may be found in DSN progress reports; viz., Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network, " Vol. III (Pasadena: SPS 37-43. SPS
37-45, SPS37-53, 1966-1968).
r(:_RODUCIBILITY OF THE
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Future mission, such as the Mariner Mars 1969 camera-mapping
missions, would demand much higher bit rates thaa those used
on early planetary flights.
?, :mething had to be done about all the mission-dependent equipment
installed at DSN stations. This "queer gear" compromised overall
network reliability and complicated operations cc, nsiderably.
The "multimission" approach began to assume more and more importance
at this point in time, and a little digression is in order. Prior to 1967, space-
craft transmitted over a wide range of subcarrier frequencies and data rates with
various types of modulation. Each flight project decided wh_t it wanted in the
way of data and provided whatever special equipment was nec,:ssary to demodu-
late or otherwise process the telemetry to its taste at each DSN station. With
more and more spacecraft having longer and longer lifetimes, this diversity and
extra equipment were becoming intolerable. The adoption of the PCM-PM-P_I
;ype of modulation by most flight projects provided means by which NASA deep
space telemetry systems could be standardized or, equivalently, made "multi-
mission. "
NASA Headquarters initiatedand pushed the multimission concept
strongly because of its cost effectiveness and, most importantly, because it
would substantiallyupgrade network reliabilityand performance. OTDA found
itrather easy to convince the flightprojects to this way of thinking, particu-
larly since the mission-dependent ground equipment, which was funded by the
flight projects and would be completely eliminated in a multimission network. 4
The Multimission Telemetry (MMT) system consisted of a flexible
_ubcarrier receiver tunable from 20 kHz to 1.5 MHz. 5 Almost any conceivable
flight project could design its data system within its capabilities. To change
from one spacecraft to another, a DSN station would only have to change its
computer program and reset some receiver parameters. There would be no
necessity to start up and bring into operation a great variety of different mission-
dependent equipments. This was the basic multimission co_eept, and it was
applied first to telemetry.
On April 4, 1967, JPL established the High Rate Telemetry (HRT)
Project aimed at meeting the Mariner Mars 1969 telemetry requirement of 16,200
b;_s/sec and in the process, advancing the multimission cause. A whole new
approach was required because a design review of the Mariner 1969 project held
in November 1966 had established that simple modifications of previous Mariner
telemetry systems would be completely inadequate for Mariner 1969. 6 (It was
4personal interview, Gerald Truszynski, September 9, 1975.
5Note that to be completely "multimission" the command system would have to
be modified in a similar way. In terms of hardware, this conversion was not
begun until 1969. Thus, the DSN did not go "multimission" all at once.
6jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network," Vol. III (Pasadena:
JPL SPS 37-48, November 30, 1967) pp. 83-130.
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primarily the Mariner 19119 TV requirement thai led to the very high data
rates. !
in th(, end. the telemetry systena that evolved was a nm(lifieati(m of
those use(I (m Mariners 4 and 5. I)ul there were sul)slal_tial (iill't,rences. F()r
example. 111o (htta were I)h)ck-c,,(le(I. there was no synehr(_nization channel, and
the detection process was more cl'fieient. I_\ July of 19(;7. the bast(' engineer-
ingdesign el'the system had I)een coml)ieted. A I)rototyl)e was installed :)t JPL
in earl.v l.()(;s retest eoml)atil)ility, i)uring th(' first hall(,f 19(;S. eqttipment
was installed an(Ichecked out at several I)SN stations. The first step had been
taken toward truc multi mission eal);ll)ility.
Ground Communication. It folh,ws that when the spacecraft-to-I)SNdata stream
is exl)an(le(I, the ground communication lines musI be also. if real-time data
arc desired I):tck at the SF()F. Consequently. in 19(;7. ground communications
were ul)graderl in two ways: (1) a COmlmter-based teletype communications
switchec, called the C()n_mullicati()ns Processor. was put int,)operatiollal use:
and (2) the high-speed data stream was upgraded to 2400 I)its/sec. The latter
improvement was made specifically lor Mariner 5. not Mariner 19(;9.
A 19(;7 snapsh_,t of the steadily evolving ground communications
system is available in one of the DSN progress reports. _ The circuits pertin-
ent to the DSN are shown in 1,'igure 7-3. Actually. the DSN circuits shown are
only a portion ,)l'those maintained by NASCOM. NASA's own communication
system. Besides the high-specd data links, other circuits are provided for
teletype traffic, the tactical intercom system, and intersite microwave communi-
cation.
SFOF Developments. The SFOF likewise had to keep up with the ever-increasing
requirements for higher data rates, especially with reference to the Mariner
1969 mission on the horizon.
The major change in the SFOF data processing system was dictated
by the new high-speed data link and the NASCOM Communications Processor.
As of Septen_ber 1. 1967. the data-processing system consisted of three compu-
ter strings (Figmre 7-4) each with an IBM 7044 computer drum. followed by an
IBM 709411computer. Adisk memory in each string was shared by the two
computers in that string. The IBM 7044 was the input/output processor of the
SFOl,'computer system. The 1BM 70941I. which followed in each string, was
the primary processing elcment for such complex analyses as orbit determina-
tion. tracking data editing, generation of p,redictions for spacecraft acquisition.
and calculation of midcourse maneuvers._ _ All in all. this was a relatively
impressive data processing system for 1967.
7jet l)ropulsion Laboratory. "The Deep Space Network. " Vol. III. (Pasadena:
JPL SI)S 37-4_. November 30. 19(;7) pp. 169-173.
_;For a more complete description, see: Jet Propulsion Laboratory. "The Deep
Space Network. " Vol. Ill (Pas.'_iena: JPL SPS 137-46. July 31. 19(;7) pp. 164-172.
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I)uring 1.t){;S the MaPiner 19t;9 requirements also initiated iml)rovements
in the 1BM 7044-7094 software system to:
-Improve input/output control
-Develop limited multiprogramming capability
-Simplify output formatting
In addition, a new Display Buffer Operating System was developed at the SFOF
which collected and displayed DSN Monitor data and established computer-based
operations control functions.
DSN Management and Scheduling. With the high-priority Apollo building up plus
the many new off-Lab projects, NASA and JPL had to evolve an efficient way of
coordinating all pertinent organizations. Looking only at the facet of mission
support involving tracking and data acquisition, we find that by 1968 a rather
complex set of interfaces had evolved between DSN and project personnel.
Responsibility for tracking and data acquisition for a mission was, as
it had been since 1963, assigned to the JPL Office of Tracking and Data Acquisi-
tion. When a new flight mission was approved, this Office would appoint a TDS
Manager to work with the JPL technical staff at the Cape and to coordinate the
support of the Air Force facilities, the MSFN, NASCOM, and those elements of
the DSN needed for near-Earth support. In addition, the JPL Office of Tracking
and Data Acquisition would assign a DSN Manager and a DSN Project Engineer,
who would put together a design team for the planning and operational phases of
the mission at hand. A most interesting portion of Figure 7-5 consists of a
"DSN Interface Team" which dealt with the mission-dependent aspects of the
hardware and software. As mentioned earlier, an important objective of both
NASA and JPL was to i_educe the task of the DSN Interface Team to zero.
Surveyor and other missions during the late 1960s did have some mission-
dependent equipment, but it was being designed out of new missions as quickly
as possible.
By 1968, the process of designing mission operations had become
formalized, as shown in Figure 7-6. The basic input consisted of the Project
Development Plan (PDP), now a strict requirement within NASA. plus the
mission plan and requirements, which in the case of the DSN were formulated
in the now-standard Support Instrumentation Requirements Document (SIRD_
and the Project Requirements Document (PRD}. The SIRD went to the DSN
while the PRD levied requirements on the Department of Defense. As indicated
in Figure 7-6, the DSN responded to the SIRD with its NASA Support Plan (NSP).
The MSFN, NASCOM, and Department of Defense also responded with equiva-
lent documents. The infrastructure of documentation was most impressive
and a far cry from the back-of-the envelope days a decade before. Space had
become a multibillion dollar activity and managerial controls had to be imposed
to insure each project of sufficient DSN support.
Merely scheduling DSN support was becoming a major task of DSN
management. To cope with this problem, a DSN scheduling system was
established in 1966 to coordinate available facilities. 9 Not only did the
9jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network, " Vol. III, (Pasadena:
:;_:_L SPS 37-45. May 31, 1967) pp. 93-101.
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burgeoning NASA flight schedule complicate matters, but some DSN stations
had mission-dependent equipment and others did not. All stations had varying
maintenance and repair tasks that had to be factored into an overall scheme.
The general approach in the late 1960s was to schedule the DSN at
three levels:
1. A 16-month loading schedule, issued monthly, and aimed at
preventing overloading.
2. A 12-week utilization schedule, also issued monthly, and a finer
look at the schedule.
3. A 7-day operational schedule, issued weekly. (This was actually
14 days long, with the first 7 days considered firm.)
The flow chart for the 16-month loading schedule is given in l_igure 7-7. Compu-
ter support was provided to help cope with the many, often-conflicting requests;
but two special kinds of displays helped planners visualize the overall picture:
the DSN Slide Rule (Figure 7-8) and a large-scale display matrix (Figure 7-9).
Adding to the general complexity was the multi-level priority system and the fact
that a spacecraft emergency could preempt DSN support despite the most care-
ful and thorough planning.
Mission Support 1966-1968
The NASA lunar exploration program absorbed the bulk of DSN support
capability during the 1966-1968 period. Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter, and, of
course, the backup support provided the first Apollo flights combined to
utilize the DSN almost fully. The,lunar program at this time consisted of
short-lived missions, a few days long, and the DSN was able to divert some
of the support necessary for the Mariner 5 shot to Venus and also accord some
support for Pioneers 6-9 which kept on operating long after the ends of their
nominal missions. Mariner 4 was also picked up again and became another
example of an "extended mission. " As the following mission details will reveal,
the new 64-m Mars antenna was called upon to support almost all of these
missions, although not always as a prime station. The DSN during this period
was not yet a multimission network even though it was supporting many missions
simultaneously. The DSN stations were still crowded with mission-dependent
equipment, and this situation was the very antithesis of multimission philosophy.
The Surveyor Lunar Landers
The Surveyor Program had its origin in the late 1950s at JPL where a
comprehensive lunar program was being sketched out. Apollo was not a high
priority program at this moment in history, and the Surveyor lunar landers,
complemented by Lunar Orbiters circling overhead, were primarily scientific
in nature. NASA Headquarters approved Surveyor in the spring of 1960, pre-
ceding President Kennedy's call for a manned lunar landing. After Apollo
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became a national goal, the objectives of Surveyor were aimed more at deter-
mil_ing whe_,her man could land safely on the Moon rather than lunar science
per se.
JPl, managed Surveyor for NASA and, on March 1, 1961. contracted
with Hughes Aircraft Company to design and build the spacecraft. All started
w_,ll, but b) the end of 1963, both Surveyor and its launch vehicle, the Atlas-
Ce_taur. were plagued by slipped schedules and cost overruns. At the insis-
tence of NASA Headquarters, JPL altered its management approach and
assigned more personnel to the program. None of the technical or managerial
problems involved the })SN.
Surveyor introduced several new requirements for the DSN and these
significal_tly influenced the network's development. Most important, video
data had to be received, processed, and then displayed for operational decision-
:_.aking. Goldstone. for example, would feed up to 4400 bits/see into the SFOF,
a,_ over':eas stations would contribute up to 1100 bits/see. (Figure 7-10)
For the SFOF this meant high-speed, real-time data processing. Surveyor
pre-launch testing required the real-time simulation of spacecraft maneuvers
and handling of high-speed telemetry data. In terms of flight operations, some
of the Surveyors used the direct-ascent mode (no parking orbit) and therefore
had recourse to the new DSN Ascension facilities. 10 It is interesting to note
that Surveyor was originally intended to be the first S-band mission for the DSN
but that the schedule slippages gave the honor to Mariner 4. Surveyor did,
l_owever, provide the DSN with another "first. " The spacecraft had few auto-
rnatic features and was highly dependent upon centralized control and the real-
time issuance of commands by the SFOF. This high degree of terrestrial
control was feasible only if high reliability communications could be guaranteed
by NASCOM. The first use of a synchronous communication satellite for DSN
traffic assured mission planners that the requisite reliability was there.
(Tables 7-1, 7-2 and 7-3)
The prime DSN stations for the seven Surveyor missions were:
DSS 51 Johannesburg
DSS 61 Robledo
DSS 42 Tidbinbilla
DSS 11 Goldstone Pioneer
Additionai support was provided on Surveyor 1 by DSS 71 (Cape Canaveral), DSS
12 (Goldstone Echo) for command backup, and DSS 14 (Goldstone Mars) for
receiver backup only. (Table 7-4) The 64-m Mars antenna had been operational
only a few weeks when it was called upon to support Surveyor 1. Although not
a prime station, the much higher gain of the Mars 64-m dish was useful during
the trajectory correction of Surveyor 1 mid especially in detecting (with good
signal-to-noise ratios) the telemetry from the Surveyor-1 touchdown experi-
ments, which were needed by Apollo engineers to ascertain the character of
10The DSN Ascension Station was actually bUilt mainly to fulfill Surveyor
requirements.
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DSS 5) WILL SUPPORT SURVEYOR VII DURING LAUNCH
AND CISLUNAR PHASES ONLY
DSS 14 WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE MIDCOURSE AND
TERM(NAL PHASES ONLY
AEETR 12 WILL SUPPOR_ AS COMMUNICATIONS
INTERFACE POINT FOR DOWNRANGE HIGH-SPEED DATA
(i" -5h, 30 mln to T+ I h)
CARNARVON SUPPORT DURING LAUNCH PHASE ONLY
LAUNCH COMPLEX 36B
CAPE
KENNEDY O"
FACILITY
Figure 7-10. GCF configuration for a typical Surveyor mission.
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Table 7-1. SURVEYOR DEEP-SPACE PHASE TRACKING REQUIREMENTS
1°
Coverage and Sampling Rate
Track spacecraft from separation
to first midcourse at 1-min sample
rate {from initial DSIF acquisition
to launch plus one hour, sample
rate is 1 sample per 10 seconds).
Data Required
Doppler (2 way
and 3 way)
Angles
Data Presentation
a) Teletype page
print and tele-
type tape.
b) Magnetic tape
(FR 1400)
.
,
.
Track spacecraft from first mid-
course to touchdown at 1 min
sample rate.
Track spacecraft from touchdown to
end of mission at 1 min sample
rate at 1 hr after 10 ° elev., 1 hr centered
around max. elev. and 1 hr prior to
10 ° elev. at station set for DSS 11, 42,
51, and 61.
Track spacecraft during midcourse
maneuver and terminal maneuver
executions at 1-sec sample rate and
transmit data at 10-sec sample rate.
Doppler (2 way
and 3 way)
Doppler (2 way
and 3 way)
Angle
Doppler (2 way
and3wayor 1
way_
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
a) Inflight
b) Post Flight
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Table 7-2. SURVEYOR DEEP-SPACE TELEMETRY REQUIREMENTS
SCO Frequency Data Rate Recording Interval Special Note
(kHz_ bps) From To
3.9 550 Prelaunch DSIF
Acquisition
70 2200
33 441)0
7.35 l 100
5.4 550
3.9 550
9(_0 137.5
550 17.2
Remainder of Mission
Special purpose telem-
etry processing equip-
ment is supplied by the
Surv. Proj. Office.
This equipment is
called the Command &
Data Handling Console
Table 7-3. SURVEYOR DEEP-SPACE PHASE COMMAND REQUIREMENTS
Coverage Special Note
It is required that commands can be
sent LO the spacecraft at _iny time
frr_m acqu,:sition by the DSIF to the
end .3i the mi_si(m during times that
_he :spacecraft i_ visibie from the
DSiF slatic:',, _ b_5 il, .t2. 51. 61,
:,l_d 72.
The command signal that modulates
the DSI F transmitter (the modulated
subcarrier) is generated by the
Command and Data Handling
Console (CDC) subsystem, which
is provided by the Surveyor Project
Office.
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Table 7-4. DSIF TELEMETRY COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS
FOR SURVEYOR-1 MISSION
Phase
Transit
If landing is achieved
(1) First lunar day and
night
(2) Second lunar day a
(31 Succeeding lunar
days and nights a
If no landing is achieved
24-h/Earth day
DSIF coverage
24-h/Earth day
(a) 24-h/Earth day for first 3 Earth days
(b) 24-h/Earth day for last 2 Earth days
(c} One 10-h pass/Earth day between (a) and
(b) above
(a} 24-h/Earth day for first 3 Earth days
(b) 24-h/Earth day for last 2 Earth days
(c) One 10-h pass/Earth day between (a) and
(b) above
(a) 24-h/Earth day for not more than 3 Earth
Days after encounter
(b) 8-h/Earth day for additional 10 Earth days
a24-h/Earth day coverage regulated whenever valuable data can be provided
by spacecraft instruments.
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the lunar surface. Robledo and Ascension were used for training purposes only
during Surveyor 1, although they did produce usable data.
The above DSN stations, of course, supported the deep-space phases
of the Surveyor missions. The launch phase required the facilities of the Air
Force Eastern Test Range. During the ne_/r-Earth phase, when the big DSN
antennas were virtually useless, the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) con-
tributed support from its stations at Bermuda, Grand Canary, Carnarvon, and
Kano. 11
Surveyor-1 Flight. Surveyor 1 was intended to be mainly an engineering flight;
that is, its primary objectives were the exercise _f the spacecraft, the launch
vehicle, and other systems. Lunar science was listed only as a 'Ltertiary"
objective! After all the serious problems with the development of spacecraft
and the Atlas-Centaur, it was a welcome surprise for the DSN to follow the
spacecraft to a successful soft landing on the Moon's Sea of Storms.
Launch occurred on May 30, 1966. The direct-ascent mode was
employed. (Figure 7-11) Spacecraft separation proceeded normally and a
midcourse maneuver was commanded on May 31. On June 1, as the lunar
surface drew near, the spacecraft was oriented so that the retrorocket would
slow its descent. The retro engine separated according to plan about 30,000
feet above the Moon. The spacecraft's vernier engines continued to burn and
eased Surveyor 1 gently down to the surface some 63 hours and 36 minutes
after launch. The landing was so gentle that Goldstone Pioneer retained its
lock on the signal the whole time. NASA's first active spacecraft on the Moon
was situated only about 9 miles from the aiming point. It was on a firm sur-
face and not submerged ir_ a sea of dust as some had predicted. And it was
working perfectly.
About 35 minutes after touchdown picture-taking began. The space-
craft had landed on a smooth mare plain studded with craters of all sizes. Over
10,000 pietu_-es were returned by the end of the first lunar day. At the close
of the second lunar day and the end of the nominal mission (July 14, 19661, over
13,000 pictures had been taken and the spacecraft had responded to 108 commands.
On subsequent lunar days, additional data were acquired beyond the planned
scGpe of the nominal mission. From the spacecraft standpoint, Surveyor 1 was
a great success.
All tracking and data acquisition requirements were met by DOD, the
MSFN, and the DSN. However, numerous problems did arise at many stations.
To illustrate, at Goldstone, the key Pioneer station lost about an hour of data
during the first pass from a high noise figure. During the second pass, an
llDetailed descriptions of Surveyor tracking and data acquisition requirements
and the support contributed by all participating stations can be found in: N. A.
Renzetti, "Tracking and Data System Support for Surveyor, Missions I and II, "
Vols. I and II (Pasadena: JPL TM 33-301, July 15, 1969).
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equipment malfunction voided Doppler data for the entire pass. In contrast,
other DSN stations, such as Tidbinbilla,Iperformed almost perfectly. On the
average, the DSN met its commitments. iz
Surveyor 2. The mission objectives for the second Surveyor flight differed
little from these of the first flight. The results, however, were not nearly as
happy. The direct-ascent mode was also employed for Surveyor 2. The track-
ing and data acquisition requirements changed little between missions. Prime
stations were again Goldstone Pioneer, Tidbinbilla, and Johannesburg. The
Launch Station at Cape Canaveral was, of course, needed for launch and check-
out, and Ascension was assigned to first-pass coverage only. 13 Robledo was
to be involved only for training purposes. Equipment was being installed at
the Mars station, and it was scheduled for emergency use only on this flight.
After several launch-vehicle holds, Surveyor 2 left the pad on September
20, 1966, on its direct-ascent trajectory. The Atlas-Centaur appeared to
perform well, with all key events occurring on time. Some 11 minutes after
launch, the Centaur stage injected Surveyor into a trajectory that would have
missed the planned lunar landing point by only 88 miles. Soon, fears arose
that the spacecraft had not separated properly. The basis for the fears came
from Trinidad tracking reports and the intermittent tracking data from Pretoria
and Ascension. Subsequent gyro telemetry indicated that the fears were ground-
less, and Surveyor 2 proceeded on toward midcourse maneuver.
On September 22, 1966, after the spacecraft responded properly to
attitude-control commands, the signal was sent to fire the midcourse maneuver
engine. At this time, DSN telemetry showed that Surveyor 2's attitude had
become unstable; i. e., it was tumbling in space. Emergency action was
commanded to regain attitude control of the spacecraft from DSN 42 (Tidbin-
billa). All DSN stations participating during this critical period had trouble
maintaining lock due to the tumbling of the spacecraft. Analysis of the telem-
etry data pointed toward a stuck valve in one of the vernier engines. Appar-
ently this engine had not fired, and the thrust imbalance caused the tumbling.
Commands were then sent from Goldstor{e Pioneer to pulse fire the other
engines to try and shake loose the stuck valve. These attempts failed. Tidbin-
billa's turn came next; one of the commands it sent was to fire the main retro
engine, which should have imparted a 10-g load to the stuck valve. After this
firing, though, all spacecraft signals ceased. The DSN searched several hours
for Surveyor-2 signals without success. The mission was terminated.
12For a summary of tracking and data acquisition support for all Surveyor
missions see: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, "A Review of Tracking and Data
Acquisition Support for Surveyors A-G" (Pasadena: JPL 602-84, April 1, 1968).
13Note that Ascension was equipped with a paramplifier instead of a maser. The
higher noise temperature combined with the smaller antenna made it necessary
to reduce the spacecraft telemetry data rate to 17.2 bits/sec while over Ascension.
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Surveyor 3. This flight was the first to use the parking-orbit mode. Its
scientific objectives were expanded beyond those of the preceding Surveyors
by the addition of a surface sampler that required manipulatory commands from
Earth. During these runs with the sampler, "the spacecraft's camera provided
visual feedback.
The DSN configuration of prime stations changed for this flight because
Job-annesburg was in the process of checking out and becoming familiar with its
new S-band equipment. Consequently, Goldstone Pioneer, Tidbinbilla, and
Robledo were designated as prime, while Johannesburg supported the mission
on a best-efforts basis. As usual, the Launch Station contributed during the
prelaunch and launch phases. Ascension was employed early in the flight as
the spacecraft passed overhead after launch and also for one pass after touch-
down. Goldstone Echo was placed in backup status for telemetry recording.
The Mars station was not used at all because of mechanical work being done
on the antenna bearings.
Launch of Surveyor 3 occurred on April 17, 1967, from Complex 36B
at the Cape. The powered-flight phase proceeded according to plan, and the
spacecraft was injected into a 167-km parking orbit for 22 minutes. Then the
Centaur was restarted to put Surveyor 3 into a trans-lunar trajectory. The
midcourse and terminal maneuvers went well. The spacecraft soft-landed in
a medium-sized crater near the eastern shore of Oceanus Procellarum, 2.8 km
from the aiming point. The landing was rather rough because the landing radars
were apparently confused by reflections from large rocks in the landing area
and the spacecraft automatically switched to inertial guidance for the touch-
down. Due to the change in guidance systems, the vernier engines did not switch
off just prior to landing as planned. The spacecraft therefore "bounced" until a
command sent via the DSN shut the engines off on the third touchdown.
During the first lunar day, "terminating May 3, 1967, Surveyor 3 took
6315 pictures and accumulated more than 18 hours of surface-sampler opera-
tion. During lunar operations, the DSN had to send more than 10,000 commands,
many in connection with motions of the surface sampler. Surveyor 3 did not
operate beyond the first lunar day.
Surve_or 4. Surveyor 4 was the last of the three missions making use of the
dir_ct-ascent mode. Mission objectives were essentially the same as those of
Surveyor 3. The prime DSN stations were again Pioneer, Tidbinbilla, and
RobLedo. Johannesburg, however, was made prime during the transit phase
due to its better geographical position. The Launch Station and Ascension
participated, as usual, during theearly mission phases. DSN 14, the Mars
station at Goldstone, was brought in during the midcourse and terminal phases
for backup telemetry reception and command.
Surveyor 4 was launched July 14, 1967, and all powered flight events
were nominal; that is, they transpired according to plan. But during the
terminal phase of the mission, just prior to touchdown, during the last 2
seconds of retrorocket burn, the spacecraft signal disappeared. At this
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moment, the DSN had three antennas (Pioneer, Echo, and Mars) with a totalof
five receivers following the touchdown. The loss of signal was simultaneous
everywhere, providing proof that no ground systems had failed. The DSN
stations around the world were requested to send turn-on commands, which
they did, but to no avail. The mission had somehow failedduring the last few
seconds of flight.
Surveyor 5. Each succeeding Surveyor mission brought additional scientific
requirements which, in turn, taxed network capabilities more. During Surveyor
5, the following new experiments were planned: a vernier-engine erosion ex-
periment, an alpha-scattering experiment, a touchdown-dynamics exPeriment,
and surface reflectivity experiments. All these were in addition to the usual
TV-exploration objectives. The surface sampler that required so much net-
work support on Surveyor 3 was omitted from the Surveyor_5 payload.
The prime DSN stations were again Goldstone Pioneer, Tidbinbilla,
and Robledo. Johannesburg, Ascension, and the Launch Station played their
transitory Surveyor roles. At Goldstone, the Mars and Echo sites were in
backup status during the terminal phase of the mission.
Surveyor 5 was injected into its parking orbit on September 8, 1967,
by the Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle. After 6.7 minutes of orbital coast, the
Centaur restarted and placed the spacecraft in a lunar transfer trajectory so
precise that it would have impacted only 46 km from target without midcourse
maneuver was commanded and seemed to go normally.
At this point, the spacecraft began to lose helium pressure at an
alarming rate. A valve.activated during the midcourse maneuver had appar-
ently not reseated properly. The vernier engines were fired five times in
unsuccessful attempts to reseat the valve properly. It seemed that a normal
soft landing would be impossible.
During the 47 hours left until lunar impact, the Mission Operations
Team, consisting of JPL and Hughes Aircraft personnel, worked out a new,
shorter, terminal-descent profile that could be attained with the low residual
helium pressure remaining in the vernier-engine propellant tanks. Through
the DSN, commands were sent to Surveyor to manually override the programmed
descent sequence to maximize the chances for success. The retrorocket was
permitted to fire until the spacecraft was a mere 1300 m above the surface and
the vernier engine firing phase was shortened from its nominal 135 seconds to
about 62 seconds. The emergency strategem worked, and Surveyor 5 made a
good landing in Mare Tranquillitatis on September 11.
During the first lunar day, which ended September 24, Surveyor 5
took over 18,000 pictures. The vernier engines were fired to determine their
effects upon the Moon's surface. The alpha-scattering experiment was also
deployed to perform compositional analyses of the surface. The spacecraft
survived the first lunar night and was reactivated by a command on October 15,
1967. Additional pictures and scientific telemetry were obtained during this
155
second lunar day. The spacecraft was turned off for the final time on November 1,
during the second lunar night.
The DSIF, SFOF, and GCF worked well during the entire period. One
problem that kept cropping up after touchdown consisted of communication outages
due to the overloading of the Goddard Communications Processor that handled
communications for all three NASA networks. The occurrence of these outages
was not surprising considering the increased traffic on NASCOM lines from JPL
and other NASA centers.
Surveyor 6. The scientific objectives of this flight were unchanged from Surveyor
5 except for the addition of a "translation" experiment involving the rocket-
assisted movement of the spacecraft. Tracking and Data acquisition support by
the DSN was modified only slightly, in particular through the withdrawal of
Ascension support, which was not needed because the parking orbit mode was
employed. The Mars 64-m antenna was also assigned to supply special support
during the translation experiment where its high gain would greatly improve
the signal-to-noise ratio.'
The launch of Surveyor 6 was from Complex 36A on November 7, 1967.
The midcourse maneuver was commanded on November 8, and the spacecraft
landed flawlessly on September 10, in Sinus Medii, a heavily cratered mare
area. Over 30,000 pictures were radioed back during the first lunar day. On
November 17. the vernier engines were commanded to fire for 2.5 seconds.
This impulse moved the spacecraft laterally about 8 feet. During this novel
experiment, strain-gauge measurements were picked up by Goldstone Mars to
determine better the character of the lunar surface for Apollo engineers. The
cameras recorded the effects of the rocket blast and, in their translated posi-
tion, provided stereoscopic data of the lunar landscape. On November 26,
lunar night descended and DSN Surveyor operations ceased until December 14,
1967, when the spacecraft was reactivated for a short period.
DSN support was excellent. Over 170,000 commands were sent to
Surveyor 6, illustrating that mission controllers were appreciating the great
value of continuous real-time control. The increased gain of the Mars antenna
was also found to be highly useful, as evidenced by the added use of this instru-
ment during critical maneuvers and experiments.
Surveyor 7. This Surveyor spacecraft carried a surface sampler as well as
the alpha-scattering experiment. There were also the usual photographic and
touchdown dynamics experimental objectives. The previous Surveyor suc-
cesses had made it possible to risk this final flight on a landing in the much
more rugged lunar highlands. The good landing spots were much smaller and
the target radius had to be reduced from the previous 30 km to 10 km. This
necessitated the scheduling of two midcourse maneuvers rather than one.
The DSN configuration for Surveyor 7 differed little from that for Surveyor 6.
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Surveyor 7 was launched on January 7, 1968. It was injected into a
parking orbit with no serious problems. The injection into the translunar orbit
went well, as did the first midcourse maneuver. The launch vehicle and space-
craft performed so well that the anticipated second midcourse maneuver was
not needed. The spacecraft set itself down on January 10 within 1-1/2 miles
of the aiming point. Itrested about 18 miles north of the rim of the crater
Tycho. The flightwas not without problems, though, because spacecraft
temperatures were unexpectedly high. The DSN had hoped to reactivate
Surveyors 5 and 6 during this period of time, but the spacecraft temperatures
had to be monitored almost continuously, preempting the activation attempts.
Scientific operations on the lunar surface proceeded normally until
the alpha-scattering experiment failed to deploy properly. The surface
sampler, however, utilizing commands sent via the DSN, was able to dislodge
the instrument and save the experiment. Later, the sampler picked up the
instrument and moved it to two other locations for further analysis of the
lunar soil. Thus. the advantages of real-time control and manipulatory capa-
bility were amply demonstrated.
On its own, the sampler dug trenches, fractured a rock, and per-
formed other manipulations of great value to the Apollo Program. The first
lunar day ended on January 25, 1968, but Surveyor 7 was kept operating for
15 hours after sunset. It took additional star and Earth pictures. Operations
commenced again on February 12 and continued until February 21. Over
150,000 commands had been sent before the spacecraft was turned off for the
final time.
DSN Performance through the Surveyor Program. Table 7-5 illustrates the
high reliability of the DSN throughout the entire Surveyor effort. In part, this
record was attributed to the high degree of built-in redundancy. All down
times were small fractions of the total, and the missions were not compromised
at any time. Only a few problems of second-order importance were uncovered:
-Unexplained delays in data transmission
-Lack of backup equipment and personnel training applicable to non-
standard events
-Some poor quality real-time and non real-time data
-Doubt over some hardware and software management interfaces
-Delineation of responsibility for operation and maintenance of
mission-dependent equipment
-Adequate documentation of agreements between project and DSN
personnel on level of support
-Lack of definition of ultimate responsibility for communications
support in some areas.
By the time the Surveyor-7 mission rolled around, most of these problems had
been cleared up.
157
'Fable 7-5. SURVEYOR MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION a
Surveyor Flight
Tracking 1 2 3 __4 5 6. 7
Total Time (hr_ 599 86 611 125 657 650 631
Down Time (hr_ 25.1 0.6 5.4 1.3 1.2 3.3 6.0
Commands
Sent Correctly 86,177 1,542 57,107 1,232 104,906 164,867 138,060
Sent Incorrectly 1 1 2 Nil 5 36 1
Down rime Nil Nil 0.5 Nil 1.5 Nil Nil
Video
Pictures Rec'd 12,088 Nil 10,031 Nil 25,750 45,519 20,993
Pictures Lost Nil Nil Nil Nil 98 34 5
Down Time Nil Nil Nil Nil 0.75 6.0 6.2
Telemetry
Total Time (hr) 599 86 611 123 624 634 605
Down Time (hr) 19.4 Nil 0.2 Nil 6.4 Nil 0.2
aFirst Lunar Days for 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
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The Lunar Orbiter Program
In 1958 and 1959, when JPL was trying to synthesize a comprehensive
lunar program, an orbital lunar mapping spacecraft was conceived to help pre-
pare the way for manned lunar landings and for lunar science as well. During
the very early 1960s. JPL engineers viewed the orbiter as an adjunct to
Surveyor, using similar spacecraft technology. The project was in fact called
Surveyor Orbiter. Meanwhile, NASA Headquarters was becoming increasingly
concerned that JPL was overburdened with Ranger, Surveyor, and Mariner.
The decision was made to assign the orbiter effort to Langley Research Center
to relieve JPL. On August 30, 1963, the Project Approval Document was
,¢,.,,._fl _.1 *h,.., T ..... n_h._.t,_-.,. O.,_,",r,-',,.,')'n_, ,'-.f'fini_lly h,_g_n Tie p'r.'i'r'n_l_r n,,,-nnc_
was to search for and survey landing sites for the Apollo Project. On May 8,
1964, Langley signed a contract with Boeing to build five Lunar Orbiter space-
c raft.
In contrast to Surveyor photography, in which a vidicon camera fed
back pictures via telemetry in real time, Lunar Orbiter possessed rather
complex photographic equipment that exposed and developed photographs on-
.board that were later scanned onboard (in non real-time1 after the fashion of
terrestrial facsimile equipment. With this approach, very high resolution
(5 m/ pictures could be taken and then transmitted back to Earth at a rate
compatible with DSN telemetry bandwidths.
Lunar Orbiter flights ran concurrently with those of Surveyor and
Mariner 5 (see later discussion in this chapter.) The overlapping missions,
most of them lunar, and in the same region of the celestial sphere, taxed DSN
support capabilities. In addition to these missions, Mariner 4 and Pioneers 6
through 9 were still alive and transmitting useful data. Precise scheduling
of the DSN plus the cooperation of the several projects involved made this data
acquisition program a very fruitful one in terms of space science.
Like Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter provided several firsts for the DSN.
A new "turn-around" ranging transponder provides the following-
-Extremely precise ranging data that resulted in corrections to the
lunar ephemeris.
-Analysis of the radiometric data led to the discovery of the lunar
mascons. These high mass concentrations pulled the Orbiters
slight but detectable distances off their nominal orbits.
-DSN stations tracking the same Orbiter could synchronize their
clocks to a much higher degree of precision.
The complexity of the Lunar Orbiters and the launch of five of them
within the space of a single year resulted in these new "situations" for the DSN:
-The presence of up to three operating Lunar Orbiters in view of the
same DSN antennas at any one moment and the simultaneous recep-
tion of their signals
-The DSN's first experience with real-time continuous support of
spacecraft (over a lengthy 30-day encounter period) with complex
operational routines of tracking and data acquisition
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-The Lunar Orbiter software system was the most complex supported
by the DSNas of 1966.14
The Lunar Orbiters were launched by the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle.
Like most of the Surveyors, these spacecraft went first into a parking orbit
from which they were injected intotranslunar trajectories. These phases of
the llight were by now routine for personnel on the Air Force's Eastern Test
Range (ETR) and at the various stations in the MSFN, which provided the pri-
mary tracking and data acquisition support from launch through DSN acquisition.
During the early moments of flight, the DSN role involved only the Launch
Station and the SFOF. The latter was responsible for computing and display-
ing essential launch and spacecraft data in the Lunar Orbiter Mission Control
Area.
The DSN coverage required after acquisition is indicated in Table 7-6.
During the photographic phase of the mission, the requirements naturally
ccnt¢,rcd Ul)On taking good pictures and sending them back to Earth. Two
deviations from standard DSN operations were required during the phase:
° Because the FM video transmission technique employed by Lunar
Orbiter did not provide a coherent RF carrier, the DSN antennas
could not track the spacecraft signals automatically. Instead, a
computer provided pointing data which it calculated from orbital
data.
. Special Project-supplied ground reconstruction equipment (GRE)
had to be installed at each prime DSN station to produce photo-
graphs from the telemetry data. A photographic darkroom was
part of each set of mission-dependent equipment. Pictures taken
at Goldstone had to be sent back to the SFOF in real time by a
6-MHz microwave lin]_. Overseas, video tapes and photos were
sent back by mail. The Lunar Orbiter Project supplied its own
personnel to perform this task and operate the mission-dependent
equipment as well.
Following the completion of the photographic phase, the Lunar Orbiters were
tracked with high precision in what was termed the "selenodetic phase. " This
was particularly imt)ortant during the first flight because mission planners
wanted to understand the Moon's gravitational field better so that they could
decide how low they could safely orbit the spacecraft and still collect data for
Apollo use.
When the Lunar Orbiters finished their photographic selenodetic
phases, the Project required that each live spacecraft be accorded at least
14 passes per week. Many engineering and scientific experiments were con-
sumated during these extended missions, including coding experiments and
14Hall, J. R., "Tracking and Data System Support for Lunar Orbiter, "
(Pasadena: JPL TM 33-450, April 15. 1970) pp. 4-5.
: :'?_GDUCIBILITY OF THE
:_._tRAL PAGE IS POOR
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Table 7-6. DEEP-SPACE COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS
Interval
Launch to initial lunar
injection
Injection to completion of
photo mission
Completion of photo mission
plus 30 days (selenodetic
phase)
From end of selenodetic phase
plus 10 months
Required Coverage
31 h/day, average over 4 days
24 to 31 h/day, as required by
Project
Three consecutive orbits, or 11 h,
whichever is less, with one orbit
or 3.5 h overlapping, whichever
is less, every other day
Two consecutive orbits or 7 h.
whichever is less, every third
day with one orbit or 3.5 h,
whichever is less, overlapping
coverage each track period
161
bistatic radar mapping of the lunar surface. Extremely important to NASA's
lunar effort was the performance validation and "sighting in" of MSFN stations
using Lunar Orbiters. Later, these same MSFN stations would track and
communicate with manned Apollo spacecraft orbiting the Moon in similar
orbits.
The fact that the Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor flights transpired during
a period of rapid DSN evolution posed several difficulties. In the engineering
area, DSN configuration "freezes" had to be imposed on Lunar Orbiter hard-
ware and software from iust before flight, when the DSN was all checked out and
in operational readines:, until the critical phases of the mission were complete.
If changes were permitted during this period, no matter how well thought out
they were, the risk was high that some overlooked detail could degrade mission
performance. A second problem area concerned the management of the Lunar
Orbiter-DSN interface during a time when the DSN was undergoing significant
modification and upgrading. A flurry of confusion occurred when the contents
of a JPL planning document containing configuration estimates that did not
materialize was mistakenly written into a Boeing Company contract as an
established design interface. Many hours were spent straightening out this
misunderstanding. This problem eventually led to a thorough and comprehen-
sive interface control procedure.
The facilities supporting the Lunar Orbiter flights began with the Air
Force and MSFN stations which provided the metric and telemetry data during
the launch and near-Earth phases. The prime DSN stations assigned to the
first Lunar Orbiter flights were Woomera, Robledo, and Goldstone Echo. The
DSN's Launch Station provided prelaunch checkout services and early tracking
telemetry. Other DSN stations, although not formally committed to the
mission, did track the spacecraft. For the final three launches, Cerebros
was substituted for Robledo due to preparations for Apollo underway at Robledo.
The DSN GCF (Ground Communication Facility) was upgraded with the addition
of high-speed data lines between Goldstone and the SFOF. At the SFOF itself
were located Mission Control plus the mission-dependent GRE (Ground Recon-
struction Equipment) that created the facsimile pictures from the video data
coming in over the high-speed data link from Goldstone.
Lunar Orbiter 1. The first Lunar Orbiter flight was scheduled for July 1966
but problems with spacecraft performance forced a delay until August 10,
1966. Launch, parking orbit, and translunar injection phases went according
to plan. Johannesburg was the first DSN station (it was not "prime") to
acquire-Lunar Orbiter 1, but it had trouble maintaining lock due to the target's
high angular velocity during this part of its flight. Woomera, the first prime
station, acquired the spacecraft 47 minutes after launch. The first of two
midcourse maneuvers occurred on August 11 and was so accurate that a planned
second maneuver was not required. After 92 hours of translunar flight, Lunar
Orbiter 1 was injected into a high orbit for analysis of the Moon's gravitational
field. (Note that all preceding NASA lunar flights had been scheduled for im-
pacts or soft landings. By August 18, NASA mission controllers committed
the spacecraft to a close-in photographic mission that lasted until August 29.
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DSNoperations continueduntil October 29, 1966, whenthe spacecraft was
commandedto impact on the lunar surface to avoid interference with the second
Lunar Orbiter plannedfor November. A total of 207photographic passes (both
medium and high resolution) pictures were taken and successfully sent back to
Earth. The medium-resolution pictures were goodbut the high resolution ones
were smeared. All DSNsupport requirements were met. Minor problems
occurred with computer hardware and with scheduling computer time for the
DSN, the Lunar Orbiter Project, and other active projects.
Lunar Orbiter 2. This spacecraft in the series was assigned to photograph a
northern latitude band on the Moon, whereas Lunar Orbiter 1 had concentrated
Oil a _outil{2£'Ii lOallU. As w_t_i_eco,,uary oojectzve_, Lunai _ Orbiter 2 Lu once
again assess the lunar gravitational field and make radiation and micrometeor-
old measurements.
Launch took place from Complex 13, Cape Canaveral, on November 6,
1966. The progress along the ETR was according to plan. In addition the DSN
Launch Station tracked the spacecraft manually for over 3 minutes, although it
was not required to provide radiometric data or launch telemetry. From its
parking orbit, the spacecraft was injected into its translunar trajectory 20
minutes after launch. Johannesburg, the first prime station, then acquired
the spacecraft. A single midcourse maneuver and lunar-orbit injection were
executed at the proper times. After 33 orbits, at an altitude of 196 km, Lunar
Orbiter 2 was maneuvered to its photographic orbit (49.7-km periselene).
Lunar photography was carried out between November 18 and 26. Readout of
the photographs progressed routinely for the next 11 days until, on December 7,
the travelling-wave-tube amplifier on the spacecraft failed. During its active
period, 211 out of 212 sets of medium- and high-resolution photos were taken
and returned. The mission was considered very successful. Despite repeated
attempts, the transmitter of Lunar Orbiter 2 could not be revived. The space-
craft could, however, still receive commands and, on October 11, 1967, almost
a year after launch, its orbit was modified so that it would crash into the Moon.
Lunar Orbiter 3. The two preceding Lunar Orbiters had found 12 likely sites
for Apollo landings. This third mission was designed to reexamine these sites
and verify their characteristics rather than search for new landing areas.
Otherwise the mission plan was similar: first launch, parking orbit, translunar
flight, high-orbit photography, and finally terminating with low-orbit photogra-
phy. These flight phases were executed routinely and the mission was normal
in all respects with all planned photography accomplished. The final photo
readout was nearly completed when the film advance failed. In all, 211 sets
of photos had been recovered.
Lunar Orbiter 4. This was another mission aimed at broad, systematic mapping
of the lunar surface for the purpose of Apollo landing site selection. Lunar
Orbiter-4 objectives also included gravitational-field mapping, radiation and
micrometeoroid measurements, and serving as an MSFN tracking target. The
163
I)SNconfiguration of prime stations on this mission was identical to that for
Lunar Orbiter 3, with Cerebros again substituting for Robledo.
On May 4. 1967, from Complex 13, an Atlas-Agena launch vehicle
successfully placed Lunar Orbiter 4 into a 100-mite parking orbit. A relatively
large midcourse maneuver impulse was required due to deviations from the
ideal launch trajectory. It was properly executed 18 hours and 20 minutes
after launch. Nearing the Moon, Lunar Orbiter 4 was injected into a high,
nearly polar orbit with a periselenium of 2706 km. Photography from this
orbit commenced May 11. Prior to this, on May 9, an eclipse of the Sun gave
Cebreros a rare opportunity to track and communicate with the spacecraft as
the Moon crossed the Sun's disk. The system noise rose more than 20 db, but
the mission was not compromised.
Lunar Orbiter 4 did not operate as perfectly as its three predecessors.
The anomalies were mostly with the photographic system. Failure of the
camera thermal door was the most serious event. This and lesser difficulties
required more real-time involvement of the DSN than had been planned. Tech-
niques to circumvent the problems were worked out by Project and DSN per-
sonnel and, in the end, the mission produced many high quality pictures,
Since Lunar Orbiters 2 and 3 were still operating during the critical periods
o1' Lunar Orbiter 4's mission, the DSN had to develop methods to preclude
locking onto the signals from these other spacecraft. Final readout of the
accumulated photos took place on June 1, 1967.
I_unar Orbit-er 5. The four previous spacecraft in the series had achieved the
most important objectives with respect to Apotlo site selection. Lunar
Orl)itcr 5, therefore, was able to devote time to photographing sites of scien-
tific interest, particularly those on the far side of the Moon. This goat made
it mandatory that the launch occur on the first day of the launch windows. On
this day. August 1, 1967, equipment failures delayed the launch for most of
the 231-minute daily window. With the assurance that the first prime DSN
station. Woomerm could acquire the spacecraft on a nominal trajectory wtth-
()tit the usual ETR trajectory data, the Mission Director decided to go ahead
with the launch despite the possible toss of metric data. The launch did go
according to plan. and Woomera acquired the spacecraft with no trouble.
The Launch Station, Ascension, and Johannesburg also acquired the space-
craft easily. Translunar injection, the midcourse maneuver, and lunar-orbit
injection experienced no problems. Photography began in a high orbit. After
four circuits, the spacecraft was put into a low orbit, where picture-taking
continu(Sd. By Aug-ust 27, all possible pictures (212 in total) had been taken
and read out, and the extended mission began.
Management Problems Encountered During Lunar Orbiter. The Lunar Orbiter
program was not managed by JPL (as was the concurrent Surveyor), and some
management difficulties surfaced during this intense program (five launches
in less than one year):
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-There was a lack of definitive documentationdescribing DSNinter-
faces with the Lunar Orbiter Project; viz., the interface with SFOF
software.
-The SIRDand NSPdocuments, which stated requirements levied on
the DSNand the DSNresponse .respectively, proved adequatefor
matching facility (hardware) support but were not effective in provid-
ing timely support for the Lunar Orbiter's ever-changing require-
ments, particularly Tnthe multiple--mission environment.
-It was particularly difficult to schedule Lunar Orbiter passes in the
multimission situation with mission-dependent equipment at only
the three prime DSNstations. (Again the advantageof a truly
muitimission network became apparent.) Overall efficiency was
also degradedby the fact that the Lunar Orbiter project had to supply
its own personnel to operate the mission-dependent equipment at the
three prime sites. In a multimission network, this would have been
unnecessary.
Despite these problems, the DSNmet the tracking and data acquisition
requirements of Lunar Orbiter very successfully, with very few lost pictures
and data. All in all. Lunar Orbiter was one of NASA's most successful space-
craft programs.
The Second Mibsion to Venus: Mariner 5
During 1965. budgetary restrictions caused NASA to delay the first
Vox:ager flighl to Mars from 1971 to 1973. This action left several planetary
firing windows open---a poor situation for a country trying to prove its space
supremacy. To fill some of these windows, two new Mariners were assigned
to the 1969 Mars opportmfity and one (Mariner 5) to the 1967 Venus window.
Mariner 5 was simply a spacecraft left over from the 1964 Mariner shots to
Mars. This spacecraft was rebuilt and reinstrumented by JPL and made ready
for a launch in June of 19(;7 by an AtlasrAgena launch vehicle.
The i,,'imary scientific objective of Mariner 5 was furthering the ex-
ploration of the dense, optically opaque Venusian atmosphere begun by Mariner
2. The Mariner-4 instruments, such as the camera, could be built for the
spare Mars spacecraft but could not be used for Venus. Photometers, radiome-
_:_:_. plasma probes, and other instruments were used instead. Scientifically,
however, the similarity of Mariner 4 and Mariner 5 telecommunication systems
made it att_-active to track and communicate with both spacecraft sinmltaneously
(Mariner .t was nou in its "extended" mission) and thus study the properties of
interplanetary space from three well-separated vantage points (two spacecraft
plus the Earth).
Mariner 5 was aJPL-managed project, and the interfaces wet, _ n_uch
simpler (Figure 7-12) than they were for the concurrent Surveyor and Lunar
Orbiter programs. Interfaces still existed, though, between JPL, the MSFN,
and the A_r F,_rc_-'s Eastern Test Range. The last two organizations eontri-
')uted tracking and data acquisition support, as usual, during the launch and
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near-Earth phases of the mission. (Table 7-7) The actual tracking and data
acquisition requirements for this mission are rather involved due to the com-
petitionof other missions and the desire to integrate the support of both
Mariner 4 and Mariner 5 for simultaneous measurements in deep space. The
lengthy tables detailingthe specific requirements may be found in the JPL
summary of DSN support for the Mariner 5 mission. 15
The deep-space phase of the Mariner-5 flight plan commenced with
DSN acquisition and continued as the three prime stations (Woomera, Goldstone
Pioneer, and Robledo) passed the spacecraft from one to the other. After mid-
course maneuver, however, the joint Mariner 4/Mariner 5 experiments com-
plicated matters. After midcourse-maneuver-plus-two-days, the DSN plan was
to dispense with the "prime station" concept and meet the joint mission require-
ments with whatever pattern of 26-m stations it could put together. (Table 7-8)
The overall support objectives were:
1. Four S-hour passes per day
2. Station pre- and post-track checkout time of 9 hours during
critical phases and 4 hours during noncritical phases of the
mission
3. Appropriate longitudinal separation between stations to provide
continuous coverage when required.
It was understood, though, that three station networks would not always be
available due to the pressure of other missions and that pairs of stations would
sometimes have to suffice. Figure 7-13 further illustrates the DSN approach.
Note that the two 26-m subnets are being employed as separate entities.
Mariner 5 was the first spacecraft to employ a redesigned 7044 com-
puter system in the SFOF. This system successfully processed data from
Mariner 4 and Mariner 5 simultaneously. Another Mariner-5 first was its
use of a newly installed Communications Processor (CP) in the SFOF, which
computer-switched teletype messages th/'oughout the DSN. (Goddard had
previously used a CP in directing NASCOM traffic. )
The Mariner-5 Flight. Launch took place on June 14, 1967, from Cape Canaveral.
Mariner 5 was injected into a parking orbit and then into a trajectory toward
Venus. The DSN lunar ranging system (Mark I type) followed the spacecraft to
a distance of 10 million kilometers, making Mariner 5 the first spacecraft to be
ranged beyond lunar distances. Forty days after launch, (July 24), the command
was sent to decrease the data rate from 33-1/3 to 8-1/3 bits/sec. On October 1,
the spacecraft transmitter was switched to itshigh-gain antenna and the new
Mark IA experimental planetary ranging system was tested and prepared for
15N. A. Renzetti, "Tracking and Data System Support for the Mariner Venus
67 Mission, " Vol. I (Pasadena: JPL TM 33-385, September 1, 1969) pp. 23-24.
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"l'al)le 7-7. MAIUNER-5 SUPPORTING FACtLI?IES
MSi,'N
NASCOM
JPL/AFETR
DSN
Station and ,Location
Stalion 1. Cape Kenned,v/Patrick AFB ;"'KA['S)
Station 3. Grand B'aJlama Island ((;B_)
Station 7, Grand Turk Island /GTb,')
Station 91. Antigua Island (ANT_
StaLion 12. Ascension Island IASC)
Station 15, Pretoria, South Africa (PflE}
I{IS Twin Falls, South Atlantic
RiS Coastal Crusader, South Atlantic
Bc2rmuda Island station (BDA
MSFN/USB site, Ascension Island tASC*
Tananarivc site, Malagasy (TAN}
Carnarvon site. Australia (CRO)
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC_
Worldwide facilities of NASCOM provided communi-
cations between supporting agencies
Building AO. Cape Kennedy
SCS 71, Cape Kennedy
DSS 72, Ascension Island
DSS 51, Johannesburg
SFOF, Pasadena
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use during the forthcoming encounter with Venus. DSN coverage during the
cruise phase is shown in Figure 7-14. The encounter sequence was started on
October 18, 1967, 15 hours prior to the encounter. The closest approach was
3946 km on October 19. On this same day, the spacecraft was occulted by
Venus for about 21 min. giving radio astronomers an opportunity to observe
the effectof the planet's atmosphere upon the spacecraft's transmitter signals.
An experiment in bistatic radio astronomy was also carried out. The Gold-
stone Mars facilitywas prime during the encounter.
The DSN continued to track Mariner 5 on an intermittent basis until it
passed out of radio range at about 160 million km. Before contact was lost on
November 21, a series of five commands was sent to place the spacecraft in a
"long-term-cruise" condition. Contact was reestablished on October 14. 1968.
one year later, but the signal was weak and displaced by 30 kHz in frequency.
Attempts at contact had been underway since July 22, when the Mars station
theoretically should have picked up Mariner 5, but the weak signal and fre-
quency offset precluded success. Telemetry reception and command capabili-
ties could not be resurrected despite many attempts to clear the anomaly.
Consequently, on November 5, the mission was declared at an end.
IMring the Mariner-5 cruise and encounter phases some significant
problems occurred in the DSN-spacecraft system: 16
-Large gaps in real-time data and frequent degradation of operations
resulted from unfavorable high-frequency propagation conditions
between Pretoria and London.
-More data were lost because the DSN ground system could not hold
data for the short periods while the communications processor (CP)
was starting, interchanging, and updating computers.
-Failure of a teletype tone keyer knocked out DSS--14/SFOF teletype
communications during the encounter.
-Two separate anomalies connected with the R&D planetary ranging
system reduced its effectiveness during encounter.
The Reacquisition and Extended Mission of Mariner 4
During June 1965, plans were developed at JPL to reacquire Mariner
4. The extended mission was to consist of two more phases. During phase II,
Mariner 4 would be used alone to conduct long-range communication experi-
ments with the Mars 64-m antenna. Also, various scientific experiments,
such as the determination of the effect of the solar corona on Mariner-4 trans-
mission were to be carried out. Phase III would comprise the joint experi-
ments with Mariner 5 described above.
16N. A. Renzetti, "Tracking and Data System Support for the Mariner Venus
67 Mission, " Vol. II (Pasadena: JPL TM 33-385, September 1, 1969) pp.
19-25.
171
172
Two DSN stations. Venus and Mars. both at Goldstone. were assigned
to Phase II. 17 A 100-kwtransmitter was installed at the Venus site to provide
command capability under emergency conditions. It should be emphasized this
cxtc!!ded mission had lower p_,'iority than the lunar programs progressing
simultaneouslv. Ill addition, the DSN was also committed to the Pioneer space-
craft which were lurnin o out to be challenging long-distance targets. The agree-
menl between NASA and JPL left it that the DSN would search for Mariner-4's
signal "at times opportune to its own activities."18 During the five-month
period beginning November 1. 1965. the Venus site picked up and unequivocally
identified the spacecraft's very weak signal. From March 18 to October 18.
1966. the Mars station was calibrated and checked out using the Mariner-4
signal. (Actually the Mars site was not yet complete, but the antenna contractor
permitted these tests.) The Mars 64-m dish was the listening station between
March 18 and April 12 when Mariner 4 was occulted by the Sun. The Venus
station acted as the transmitting site during the occultation experiment.
From October 18. 1966, until June 1, 1967. the DSN made 27 tracks
of Mariner 4. DSS 14 (Mars) continued to use the Mariner-4 signal to check
out equipment and train its crew. On the May 8 pass, spacecraft telemetry
revealed that. for some unknown reasons, the spacecraft had switched from
its travelling-wa\'e-tube amplifier to its cavity-maser amplifier. It was sur-
mised that a large power transient within the spacecraft had caused the switch.
The change, unfortunately, caused a severe reduction in transmitter signal
streng'th and, in consequence, the signal received on Earth.
Phase Ill of the extended mission began officially on June l, 1967.
On October 6. Robledo successfully sent a series of 23 commands to Mariner
4 which switched it to its high-gain antenna and pointed that antenna at the
Earth. The DSN next ,carried out some engineering tests. After nearly three
years in space, upon command from DSS 14, Mariner 4 performed a midcourse
maneuver. It then played back one of the pictures taken during its encounter
with Mars. Amazingly. there was no degradation in quality. Then. to every-
one's surprise, a command to Mariner 4 to turn on the supposedly defunct
travelling-wave tube succeeded. By December 8, however, the spacecraft's
supply of attitude-control gas had been exhausted. DSS 14 (Mars) continued
to work Mariner 4 but with diminishing success. On December 20, the Mariner
Project decided to end the lengthy (1119 passes) mission of Mariner 4.
The Pioneer Program: Extended Missions
The expected lifetimes of the four successfully launched Interplane-
tary Pioneers were 6-to-8 months each. Instead of failing at their appointed
times, these remarkable spacecraft kept on transmitting data back to Earth
17N. A. Renzetti, "Tracking and Data Acquisition Report: Mariner Mar_ 1964
Mission. Volume III. Extended Mission," (Pasadena: JPL TM33-239, December
1. 19G8).
18Ibid, p. 23
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from their orbits between Mars and Venus. Their unpredicted longevities pro-
vided scientists with much more data about interplanetary space than they had
expected, but it has also kept the DSN busy tracking and acquiring data from
them. Brief synopses of the Pioneer-6 extended mission follows.
Pioneer 6. The distance of Pioneer 6 during the extended mission relegated the
tracking task to the 64-m ant6nna at Goldstone Mars: 19 During the first year
(July 1966 to July 1967), Pioneer 6 was engaged in watching for solar-flare
activity, particularly large flares that might compromise the lunar programs.
A radar-bounce experiment with Mercury was performed on June 25, 1967.
Solar-flare monitoring continued into the second year of extended mission. In
August 1968, a Type-II orientation maneuver was carried out satisfactorily
despite the loss in late 1967 of the craft's high-gain antenna. Part of this
signal loss was recovered when a new cone (an ultracone) was installed in the
64-m antenna. During this second year, Pioneer 6 reached a point 293 million
kilometers from Earth, setting a new distance record. The DSN tracked
Pioneer 6 [or a total of 1107 hours during this year. The third year of the
extended mission encompassed a solar occultation experiment in November
1968. DSN support during this period was compromised by the use of the
Mars antenna (the only one tracking Pioneer 6)for the higher priority Apollo
flights. Repairs to the antenna's main bearing atso took time away from
Pioneer 6.
DSN Support to Project Apollo
Although the MSFN provided the bulk of the Tracking and Data acqui-
sition support for the Apollo flights, the DSN contributed much in terms of
technology and facility support. The JPL/DSN role in Apollo is discussed in
detail in a companion volume of thi_ history. The reader is referred to it for
this important segment of the DSN history. 20
Radio Science
The DSN precision Tanging system greatly improved our knowledge of
the positions of the Moon and planets and, in consequence, their ephemerides.
For example, the flight of Mariner 5 determined the orbit of Venus to within
15 m; the Lunar Orbiters pinned down the Moon's orbit to the same degree of
accuracy. It was the precise tracking of the Lunar Orbiters that led to the
discovery of the lunar mascons (mass concentrations) that seem to exist
19N. A. Renzetti, "Tracking and Data System Support for the Pioneer Project.
Pioneer VI. Extended Mission: July 1, 1966-July 1, 1969, " Vol. V, (Pasadena:
JPL TM 33-426, February 1, 1971).
20William R. Corliss, "Histories of the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition
Network (STADAN), The Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), and the NASA
Communications Network (NASCOM), " (Washington: NASA CR-140390, June 1974).
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beneath the Moon's surface. Two JPL scientists reported anomalies in DSN
tracking data in 1968 and interpreted the orbital perturbations in terms of
inhomogeneities in the lunar crust. 21
Data on the Sun's corona and plasma emissions were obtained when
Mariner 4 and Pioneer 6 passed behind the Sun, in April 1966 and November 1968,
respectively. In the first instance, the predicted spectral broadening of the
signal caused by the corona was observed: Pioneer 6's linearly polarized sig-
nal permitted Faraday rotation measurements of the solar plasma.'
The Lunar Orbiters also participated in bistatic radar measurements
of the Moon. In these experiments, high power signals were aimed at the
Moon from Goldstone. Goldstone receivers could then detect direct reflec-
tions from the lunar surface as well as I._nar Orbiter signals recording receipt
of the direct beam. The interference patterns that resulted were used to draw
radar maps of several areas near the Moon's limb.
When DSN antennas could be spared during this busy period, they were
engaged in planetary radar experiments. Radar observations of the asteroid
Icarus were made in mid-June of 1968. 22 They indicated that the radius of
Icarus is between 0.3 and 0.6 km and that it had a period of rotation between
1.5 and 3.3 hours.
The Next Step Forward
The addition of the 64-m Mars antenna to the DSN marked a natural
beginning for this chapter. However, during virtually every mission described,
the DSN experienced problems with mission-dependent equipment. This equip-
ment degraded the network's effectiveness as mentioned at several points in
this chapter. Some small improvements had been made in the direction of a
mission-independent network during this period, but they were not enough.
A forceful, comprehensive technical revolution was required.
2.1p. M. Muller and W. L. Sjogren, "Mascons: Lunar Mass Concentrations,
Vol. II, (Pasadena: JPL SPS 37-53) September 30, 1968, pp. 10-16. See
also: Science, Vol. CLXI (August 16, 1968) pp. 681-684.
22R. M. Goldstein, "Radar Observations of Icarus," Science, Vol. CLXII
(November 22, 1968) pp. 903-904.
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Chapter 8. EUILDING THE MULTIMISSION NI-.TWORK
Wit}; the completion of the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter programs in
c'ar!3' 1._)_i.q.the DSN in effect turned its antennas outward toward the planets.
The manned Apo!lo effort was in full swing and the DSN played an important
support role there. At the R&Dlevel it was pushing ahead rapidly with its con-
\'e:'<ion to a multimission network. The period 1968-1974 brought into opera-
tim:al status a multimission command system, amultimission network control
_ ,_1,,m. and a new spectrum of equipment designed to eliminate the mission-
,iel)endent. project-supplied gear that had plagued the DSN for so long. Improve-
ments in precision tracking continued and deep--space communication distance
:',,t,,rds were broken repeatedly during this period. Nevertheless, the dominant
'he,>e of this period was conversion to a multimission network:.
IA_e in part to budgetary pressures, deep space missions declined in
number during the 1968-1974 period, but they also became more complex and
ci,e!mrted for more distant and more difficult targets. In response, the DSN
also went through a period of consolidation to fewer but better-instrumented
stations. Several stations of marginal utility were closed, but in the same
period Spain and Australia received their 64-m dishes, completing the 64-m
subnet that had long been a goal of DSN management. The DSN was being
readied for the more ambitious exploration of the solar system, with flybys of
Venus, Mercury, Jupiter, and Saturn, and Mars landers.
The Multimission Concept
Many references have been made in the preceding chapters to the
desirability of standardizing equipment in the DSN and at the same time expur-
gating mission- or project-dependent equipment. In essence, the multimission
co_.,'ept means asking flight projects to design to a specific telemetry/command
ime_-face while restraining their natural impulses to introduce highly specialized
apparatus at DSN stations. Such special equipment is often very effective in
ae<mmplishing narrow project objectives but, as DSN experience has proved, it
era: seriously reduce the overall efficiency of DSN operations, particularly in
*_e,:ms of reliability, cost of operations (extra personnel), general clutter, cost
of spares, and the cost of familiarization. Since the DSN multimission inter-
face places an extra design burden on the flight projects, it is only fair that the
DSN make multimission interfaces as versatile, efficient, and convenient as
possible. This is exactly what was done, as the following descriptions of the
various technological and management facets of the multimission DSN will
prove.
The DSN did not become multimission all at once. The development
of multimission telemetry equipment began in the mid-1960s and was proven
out on Mariner Mars 1969. The command system and network control system
were next reworked. The conversion to multimission capability, in fact,
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reached into every corner of the DSN. Whenthe Mariner Mars 1969Spacecraft
(Mariners 6 and 7) were launched, the DSNwas ready to demonstrate the first
of its multimission hardware. The telemetry system debut was successful and,
whenMariner 1971and Pioneer 10 were ready for flight, the entire DSNhad
converted to the multimission configuration. _
Total conversion to multimission operations, however, is an unattain-
able ideal. True, new flight projects did not movebulky equipment and extra
personnel into DSNstations, but almost every one of them had "special require-
ments" that entailed somenonstandard changein the DSN---just for that mission.
The 1975Viking flights, for example, were immensely complicated missions
with requirements that the standard DSNinterface could not satisfy completely.
Viking required manyengineering changesto the standard DSNmultimission
configuration andthe shipping of many modification "kits" to DSNstations. 2
Thus, the multimission concept is not an all-or-nothing property of a tracking-
and-data acquisition network; rather, it is a design philosophy that works well
in practice for bothnetwork and project. Exceptions are permitted, but they
should be few and superficial.
DSN Technology Advances
Multimission Telemetry. The Multimission Telemetry System (MMTS) and
High Rate Telemetry (HRT) project were introduced in Chapter 7 in connection
with JPL's first hardware efforts in the direction of multimission capability.
NASA and JPL wanted to demonstrate the new telemetry system on Mariner
Mars 1969. As originally planned, the two new Mariner spacecraft were to
take many more pictures of Mars than Mariner 4 and store them on analog tape.
This tape was then to be played at reduced speed through an analog-to-digital
converter and rerecorded on another tape. Finally, this digital tape was to be
played through the spacecraft transmitter at a still lower rate (270 bits/sec)
and picked up by the DSN. The reliability of the double taping process natur-
ally came into question. JPL engineers wondered whether they could possibly
transmit back the pictures at the rate of the analog tape recorder (16,200 bits/sec),
eliminating one of the tape recorders. 3 The desired bit rate was roughly 2000
times that of Mariner 4, but computations showed that with the 64-m Mars
antenna, higher spacecraft power, and certain other changes, it could be done.
The HRT project was born of these considerations. Therefore, Mariner Mars
1969 tested out not only multimission telemetry but very-high-rate telemetry.
1N. A. Renzetti, personal interview, April 14, 1975.
2D. Mudgway, personal interview, April 16, 1975.
3R. C. Tausworthe, et al, "A High-Rate Telemetry System for the Mariner
Mars 1969 Mission, " (Pasadena: JPL TM 32-1354, April 1, 1969).
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The special high-data-rate requirement of Mariner Mars 1969forced the DSN
to incorporate higher telemetry rates sooner than it might otherwise have done.
It was also hopedthat MMTS with HRT incorporated would satisfy the require-
ments of the new Pioneers (10and 11), Viking, Helios, Mariner Venus-Mercury
1973, and other missions on the horizon. 4
During the actual flights of Mariner 6 and 7 in 1969, both the MMTS and
HRT facets of telemetry, transmission achievedhigh success. The HRT (16,000
bits/sec) playbacks of the pictures were so goodthat the slow (270bits/sec)
playback via the 26-m a:_tennasbecameunnecessary. MMTS was also used for
supporting the Interpla,.etary Pioneers during their extended-mission cruise
phases.
A similar situation occurred whenthe Mariner Mars 1971Project
levied requirements for additional, higher-capacity telemetry channels. 5 The
DSNTelemetry System, as it was now called in JPL reports, once again had
[o expandits capacity accordingly, as did the GCF andSFOF. In this light,
multimission capability does not mean a static capability but rather the ability
to handle new missions with a minimum of changein the DSNand with the intro-
duction of as l'ittle mission-dependentequipmentas possible.
This evolutionary aspect of the multimission approachis epitomized
by the DSNTelemetry System, perhapsbecausethe flight projects always want
higher data rates than are plannedwhenthe project is initiated. Telemetry
system evolution continuedafter the Mariner Mars 1971flights, but as telem-
etry system capabilities expanded,so did the number of projects the DSNcould
handle in true multimission fashion. The point here is that sometimes flight
projects stimulated DSNdevelopmentsandvice versa.
In the early 1970s, the DSNwasmoving toward what was termed a
"Mark III" plateau of support capability. The missions to be supported com-
prised Pioneers 6-11, Mariner Venus/Mercury, Helios, and Viking. Once
again, however, DSNengineers conceived a step-by-step development, with
each succeedingstep making the network less andless mission-dependent. 6
Betweenthe Mark III-73 and Mark III-74 network models, for example, the
•DSNdeveloped the capability to handle convolutionally codedtransmissions
from both Pioneer and Helios spacecraft.
4jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The DeepSpaceNetwork,
JPL SPS37-58) p. 3.
5jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The DeepSpaceNetwork,
JPL SPS37-61, January 31, 1970)pp. 121-122.
6jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The DeepSpaceNetwork,
Report 42-23, October 15, 1974)pp. 5-7.
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Multimission Command of Spacecraft. The DSN Multiple-Mission Command
System (MMCS) lagged the multimission DSN Telemetry System by two to three
years, mainly because the spacecraft command function did not involve nearly
as much communication traffic and ground equipment. Even in 1969, each DSN
station was burdened with a different command system for each flight project.
Each system had its own configuration, procedures (many of them manual), and
equipment. The command process was needlessly long and complicated and,
worse yet, different for each project. (Figure 8-1)
Commands originated in the SFOF Mission Control Center using
mission-dependent programs. No less than five separate and distinct methods
existed for the transmission of commands to the DSN station working the target
spacecraft. (Figure 8-1) In one method, the IBM 7044 computer in the SFOF
would take command data from disk memory or IBM cards and format it for
teletype transmission to DSN stations. Another scheme was simply to relay
the command verbally over voice circuits. At each transfer point, the command
data had to be checked and verified manually because an erroneous command
could abort a mission. Finally, if all went well, the DSN station would radio
the proper command to the spacecraft. The system worked, but it was cumber-
some and the antithesis of multimission philosophy.
Like the multimission DSN Telemetry System, the MMCS development
proceeded stepwise. The mission targeted for the first demonstration was
Mariner Mars 1971. 7 The objectives of the MMCS specifically stated that no
mission-dependent equipment would be required at any DSN station for any
mission. The system was to be as automatic as possible with no special
operator being required at any station. All actions necessary for the trans-
mission of a command would reside in the SFOF at Pasadena. (Figure 8-2)
The all-important function of command verification would be accomplished
by the DSN station (Figure 8-3) which would return the received command to
the SFOF bit-by-bit to confirm that it had been received correctly. Only
then would the command be "enabled" and sent to the spacecraft. The GCF
high-speed data lines were to be the primary mode of command ground trans-
mission with voice-circuit backup. The new command system was tagged
Mark III-71. It was installed throughout the network by November 1970 and
supported the flights of Mariners 6 and 7.
The new command capability did not satisfy mission requirements
for long. Viking in particular forced a redesign of the MMCS beginning in
September 1972. 8 The Telemetry and Command Processor installed at DSN
stations had reached the limits of its capacity in both command-processing
time and storage capacity. (Viking required not only much higher command
rates (8 rather than 1 symbols/sec) but also the simultaneous execution of
7jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network,
JPL SPS 37-56, March 31, 1969) pp. 3-7.
8jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network,
JPL TR 32-1526, February 15, 1973) pp. 203-208.
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command and telemetry functions. The bottleneck was the Telemetry and
Command Processor and it was here that the redesign focussed. The problem
was not so much in the hardware as in the timing constraints caused by the
Mark III-71 software. This software was redesigned and, along with other
lesser system changes, combined to make the Mark III-74 Command System,
which has supported Helios, Viking, and the immortal Pioneers.
DSN Monitor and Control. With the advent of high-capacity data circuitsl the
DSN stations became less and less isolated. In fact, it became possible to
view the DSN as one, vast,electronically integrated machine. Rather than
measure and control the performance of each station individually, advancing
technology made it possible to centralize the monitor and control functions.
(Figure 8-4)
Basically, the DSN Monitor and Control System detected and reported
on the status of the DSN facilities. The various systems within DSN stations
(the DSIF), the GCF, and the SFOF are all monitored as to their operational
status, performance level, and configuration. 9 Such information collected
DSIF
TRACKING AND TELEMETRY DATA
COMMAND AND MISSION
SIMULATION DATA
DSN MONITOR AND
CONTROL DATA
DSN
T
I
l
NETWORK
CONTROL
FLIGHT
PROJECT
_
_i MISSION i
CONTROL
i - (LOCAL ANDJ REMOTE)I
I
JMISSION
J INFORMATION
J FOR
Ii OPERATIONSCONTROL
I
j DSN STATUS
DATA EXTRACTS
J FROM GCF LOG
m
CENTRAL
COMPUTERS
NON-OPERAT IO N-
DRIVEN DATA
PROCESSl N G
Figure 8-4. DSN Control System functional characteristics.
9jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network, " Vol. II (Pasadena:
JPL SPS 37-65, September 30, 1970) pp. 6-13.
__3
anddisplayed in the DSNOperations Control Center enabledthe DSNOpera-
tions Team to make network-wide decisions quickly and effectively. The
Monitor and Control Systemalso created a permanent record of DSNparame-
ters as a histn-,, of DSNperformance andr'ecord for later analysis. Obviously,
the monitoring, of the DSNhad to be in parallel with project data; that is, its
operation (or its failure) could not compromise the normal DSNtelemetry,
tracking, and command functions, o
During the early 1970s, the sophistication of the DSN Monitoring
and Control System grew incrementally and became multimission in charac-
ter. 10 Since the system by design had to have zero effect on the usual DSN
tracking, command, and telemetry functions, the only interface with flight
projects was in the displays showing network status. Therefore, making the
Monitor and Control System multimission in nature involved presenting an
interface via standard GCF/NASCOM data formats. This was the major
objective of the Mark-Ill DSN.
The DSN Tracking System.' The trajectory of Mariner 5 took it beyond the
tracking capabilities of the Mark-IA system, and the new Tau ranging system
(See Chapter 7) was applied. It was successful in tracking Mariner 5 to
about 0.5 A. U., which included Venus encounter. For the Mariner Mars
1969 mission (described later in the chapter), an improved Tau ranging system
followed Mariners 6 and 7 well beyond the Mars encounter to a distance of
about 0.8 A.U. This tracking system is diagrammed in Figure 8-5. The
data obtained by the system consists of:
. Doppler and digital resolver data, which are derived by compar-
ing the received signal with a reference signal---usually ob-
tained from the DSN transmitter signal.
2. Antenna pointing angle data from the antenna shaft encoders.
3. Ranging data derived from the round-trip transmission time. 11
The Tau system worked well for Mars and Venus encounters but more distant
NASA missions were soon to be forthcoming.
Mariners 6 and 7, in fact, soon swept beyond the ranging capabilities
of the improved Tau system. Fortunately, the longer-distance Mu ranging
system was ready in time for the Mariner Mars 1969 Extended Mission. The
Mu ranging system differed from the Tau system in its use of a different kind
of coding (sequential binary instead of pseudorandom coding) and RF Doppler
10jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network,
JPL TR 32-1526, October 15, 1972) pp. 5-11.
lljet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network,
JPL SPS 37-51, May 31, 1968) pp. 3-10.
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rate-aiding for range decoding. The high-speed digital logic of the Mu system
made an extremely stable ranging system. Since the round trip times for
radio signals from a spacecraft 1 A.U. distant run about 16 minutes, this
added stability is vital to accuracy at great.ranges. The Mu system has ranged
spacecraft beyond 2.6 A. U.---distances involving round trip travel times of
close to an hour. The Mu system also produced DRVID data automatically.
(See next section. )
For missions beyond 1972, the "Mark-III" era, the DSN tracking system
was upgraded in several ways: 12
-Improved Doppler quality at greater distances
-Real-time reporting of tracking system status
-Increased use of software to improve flexibility
-Use of high-speed data lines for tracking data and predicts
GeneL'all_, the most important changes for the Mark-III network were increased
automation _many functions used to be manual or at best semi-automatic) and
[aster generation and distribution of more detailed provision of tracking and
status information.
Charged Particle Calibration. The presence of electrically charged particles
in the space traversed by lunar and interplanetary radio signals has always
been a nagging source of error in spacecraft ranging measurements. One way
to correct for the retarding effect on signal transmission is to estimate the
total quantity of charged particles per unit area between DSN station and space-
craft. The error can then be computed from /'adio propagation formulas.
Several techniques for charged particle calibration of DSN ranging
systems have been attempted. One of the first approaches involved making
Faraday rotation measurements of the signals from synchronous Earth satel-
lites. The amount of Faraday rotation could be related to the total quantity of
charged particles (mostly electrons) between the satellite and DSN station.
This made possible ranging corrections for the first and last 22,000 miles of
the round-trip ranging signals. This was useful because a large fraction of
the perturbing of charged particles resided near the Earth. (Figure 8--6)
Between 1968 and 1975, the most important calibration system was
called DR\2D, for Differenced Range Versus Integrated Doppler. Technically,
the method utilized the fac! that charged particles _.ffected group and phase
veioeiti6s of the signal in aifferent ways. 13 DRVID is a "dispersive Doppler"
technique and. though demonstrated on Mariners 6 through 9, is not con-
sisc_red the best approach to charged particle correction.
12jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network,
JPL SPS 37-59, September 30, 1969) pp. 3-6.
13H. Fosque, personal interview, February 18, 1975.
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Fig_are 8-6. Improvements due to charged-particle calibration.
With the advent of X-band experiments at 3.5-em wavelength on
Mariner 10, an opportunity existed to calibrate the ranging system in a differ-
ent way. Sinee Mariner 10 also carried a standard S-band transmitter radia-
ting at 13-cm wavelength, the differential effect of charged particles on the
different wavelengths could be measured, leading to better estimates of the
charged particle content of the space traversed by the signal. On the Mariner-
10 flight, tim X/S-band correction technique reduced the ranging error by
about'S0%. 14 The 1975 Vikings will also carry X-band and S-band trans-
mitters to permit DSN engineers to further evaluate this method of charged
particle correction.
The DSN Simulation _,stem. All NASA tracking and data acquisition networks
have relied on simulation to check out the networks prior to a mission and [or
t_'aming operating personnel. As the DsN evoh'ed, the simulation function
i::_:cnn,u more and mo,:e foemalized _nd, in the latter half of the 1960s, was
a.:corded the status of a fffl!-scale DSN "system." Li_e most other DSN
systems, the Simulation System has been upgraded severa_ times, partic,z-
larl:,: in connectlon with the Mark-III DSN of the 1970s.
14jet Propulsion Laboratory, "Annual Report, 1973-1974, " (Pasadena: 1974)
pp. 14-15.
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The basic purposeof the DSNSimulation Systemis the creation of a
realistic operational environment for DSNoperators. To do this it inserts
streams of typical and atypical tracking andtelemetry data into the DSNat
appropriate rates and times. To DSNoperhtors, these data streams are in-
distinguishable from those emanatingfrom an actual spacemission.
In the late 1960s through Mm'iner Mars 1969, the heart of the system
was the Simulation Data Conversion Center (SDCC) at Pasadena, which had an
ASI 6050 computer, special consoles for controlling simulation data, teletype
equipment, and tape recorders. Each DSN station had an FR 1200 tape
recorder for playing simulation tapes and inserting their data into the telem-
etry stream.
In the post-Mariner-1969 era, when the Mark-III network was being
ushered in, the DSN Simulation System was also improved. A Simulation
Center was created at JPL and "simulation conversion assemblies" were
installed at all DSN stations .15 Figure 8-7 is a function block diagram of the
upgraded system. The trends exemplified in the Mark-III Simulation System
were:
-The ability to simulate a multimission environment
-Real-time generation and control of simulation data
-Minimization of simulation hardware outside the JPL-located DSN
Simulation Center
-Some capability to simulate all DSN functions simultaneously.
The DSN Simulation System was obviously getting more and more realistic.
Antenna Cone Development. The cone-shaped container for microwave devices
located between the vertex and t:he focal point of a DSN paraboloid has long been
a primary target for research and development. Low noise and interchane-
ability have been the most important criteria used in developing new cones.
(Ihehistory of JPL work on paramplifiers and masers has been reported in
previous chapters.) During the period covered by this chapter, two signifi-
cant advances were made in cone design. Most pertinent in terms of the
multimission environment was the tricone or multicone, a concept that was
pioneered in the late 1960s on the 64-m subnet. The tricone solved an awkward
problem at DSN stations: it took considerable time (on the order of 24 hours)
to replace an antenna cone when a change in spacecraft targets demanded it.
Station effectiveness was compromised, especially when many different space-
craft had to be tracked on a tight schedule. The solution, the so-called tri-
cone, was simply three cones mounted on one base. (Figure 8-8) By tilting
the antenna subreflector remotely via an electrical motor, the microwave
beam can be directed toward any one of the three cones. The tricone enabled
a DSN station to switch signals between cones in less than a minute and greatly
increased operating efficiency.
L/
15jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network,
JPL SPS 37-61, January 31, 1970) pp. 3-7.
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Figure 8-8. Hoisting one of the cones into place on a tricone assembly. 
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The ultra-low-noise feed cone or "ultra cone" represented a stepwise
reduction in total system operating temperature. 16 The ultra cone possessed
a maser amplifier (See Chapter 5) which was cooled by a closed-cycle refriger-
ation system. It was in fact the ultra cone that made it possible for the Gold-
stone \,enus station to serve as an effective backup station for the much larger
Mars antenna during the Mariner-5 encounter with Venus. The ultra cone
reduced the system noise temperature to about 16°K which helped to partially
close the gap in signal-to-noise ratio between the two antennas. The ultra cone
was later added to the 64-m antennas and, on the Mariner-10 flight, reduced
system noise temperatures from 18.5 to 12.4°K which made the high data
transmission rate of 117 kilobits/sec from Mercury possible.
Expanding GCF Capabilities
Lest it become a data bottleneck, the DSN Ground Communication
Facility (GCF) had to increase its ability to transmit large volumes of data with
high reliability. The last big expansion in capacity had been in response to the
Surveyor requirement for 4400 bits/see, as manifested in the High Speed Data
(HSD) system of that era.
A 1971-1972 snapshot of GCF capability reveals the transmission
capabilities shown in Figure 8-9. Four kinds of capability are manifest: voice,
high-speed-data, teletype, and wideband (50,000 bits/sec). The HSD circuits
carry 4800 bits/see, substantially the same as during the Surveyor period.
Most DSN stations possess one voice, one HSD, and four teletype circuits back
to the SFOF. 17 These are usually provided by NASCOM. Wideband links exist
only between the SFOF and Goldstone Mars (DSS 14), and two areas at the Cape
(the Compatability Test Area (CTA-21) and Hangar AO). The Cape circuits
were added specifically for Mariner Mars 1971. Also shown in the figure are
lines from the SFOF to Ames Resei_rch Center (for Pioneer) and the Laboratory
lor Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP). Special lines such as these were
proliferating during this period and not all are shown.
The 5(I. 000-bits/zec wideband circuits were the major addition above
the Surveyor capabilities. Mariner Mars 1971 stimulated their installation
wilh its l(;.000-bits/sec requirement. The voice, teletype (still 100 words/min),
and HSDcapabilities remained about the same. The 1973-1974 upgrading, in
cow_.ast, was more far-reaching. The new missions (Mariner Venus-Mercury
1,q7:_. [t:,lios. and Viking) demanded additional circuits almost everywhere.
.Mari_e_' Venus, [or example, had adata rate of 117,000 bits/see at encounter.
l(;c]crald S. Levv, eta!, "The Ultra Cone: An Ultra-Low-Noise Space
Co:_lnltlnic:ttion Ground Radio Frequency System, " IEEE Transactions, MMT-16
(Seplcmber 19t;8_ pp. 5.q(;-602.
17jet Propulsion Laboratory. "The Deep Space Network," Vol. II (Pasadena
JPL SPS 37-(;(;, November 30. 1970) pp. 99-105.
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Figure 8-9. GCF principal transmission circuits 1971-1972.
A major enhancement of GCF capabilities came when wideband circuits
were provided to the Spanish and Australian stations (D_Ss 42, 43, 61, and 63).
These circuits each had a capacity of 28,500 bits/sec. For the Mariner Venus
1973 encounter, the link between Goldstone Mars (D88 14) and the SFOF in
Pasadena was upgraded to 230,000 bits/see but only for the short period re-
quired. 18 HSD service was also improved in several minor ways. The
teletype system, which was little used _vith the coming of the HSD and wide-
band circuits, was actually reduced in capacity. Instead of the typical four
lines to each station, one sufficed now.
SFOF Improvements
By the mid-1960s it was clear that the SFOF built to support Surveyor,
Lunar Orbiter, and the early deep-space Mariners and Pioneers was not going
to suffice for the 1970s. The data streams from Mariner Venus 1973 and
18jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network, " Vol. XI (Pasadena:
JPL TR 32-1526, October 15, 1972)pp. 124-127.
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Viking would overwhelm the SFOF's data-handlingability. This realization
instigated the creation of an AdvancedDataSystems Project within JPL's
Systems Division. This Project wascharged with recommendinga conceptual
design for a third-generation SFOFto be operational in 1972. The new SFOF
wouldbe the counterpart of the Mark-III systems being formulated in other
parts of the DSN. A "pilot" system analogousto the VenusR&D antennasite
at Goldstone, to be called the Scientific ComputingFacility, was also proposed
to iron out developmentproblems. 19
Foremost amongthe problems posedby the missions of the 1970s
were the questionable reliabilities of menand machines in the light of greatly
increased mission durations andcomplexities of operations. The humanand
machineerror rates experienced with the second-generationSFOFequipment
were considered unacceptablefor the advancedmissions. A secondclass
of problems that had to be solved originated with the increasing demands
made lor the sinmltaneous use of fixed resources; i.e., the overlapping re-
quirements for the same SFOFcomputers.
Four different app'roacheswere proposedfor alleviating these
problems: 20
1. Upgradeonboard spacecraft computers to relieve taxed ground
systems
2. Add redundancyto the humansystem
3. Increase the speedof information transmission andcontrol more
carefully the dispersal of information to operators
4. Automatea much greater portion of the monitoring, analysis_
anddecision making.
The Mark-III SFOF that finally emerged in hardware form provided
the following capabilities over and abovethoseavailable from the Marl_II
SFOF:
-Outboundtransmission of data via high-speed lines (SeeFigure 8-10)
-Reception of widebanddata
-Processing anddisplay of high-rate telemetry data
-Incorporation of multiehannel digital television
:Redesign of the physical plant to accommodateadditional DSNusers.
19jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The DeepSpaceNetwork, " Vol. II (Pasadena:
JPL SPS37-49. ,January31, 1968)pp. 140-145.
20jet Propulsion Laboralory, "The DeepSpaceProgram, " Vol. II (Pasadena:
JPL SPS37-65, September30, 1970)pp. 126-131.
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In addition, the proposed Scientific Computing Facility was implemented using
UNIVAC 1108 computers. In the upgraded SFOF, the old IBM 7094/7044
computer strings were replaeedby IBM360/75s. (Figure 8-10)
The deep-space missions of the late 1960s and early 1970s brought
with them substantial increases in the SFOF'sdata-proeessingload. Much
of this data processing was strictly scientific and unrelated to DSN operations.
Yet, the tracking and data acquisition function was obligated to provide for
this computer time without the authority to review requirements. The flight
projects were, in essence requesting and getting large blocks of computer time
and were neither financially nor managerially accountable for them. It was a
bad managerial situation. NASA Headquarters recognized the situation and,
in October 1971, Gerald Truszynski (OTDA) and John Naugle (OSS) reviewed
the problem and decided to transfer the SFOF functions from OTDA to OSS. 21
In this way, the responsibility for review and validation of requirements and
the associated costs of scientific data processing would be borne by flight
projects themselves. The transfer took place as of July 1, 1972. Fig_tre
8-4 indicates the new interfaces created. The DSN was now responsible only
for network control and associated data processing. Minicomputers which
had adequate capacities for the modest needs of the DSN's new data handling
needs were now used instead of the large number-crunching SFOF computers.
The Headquarters change of responsibility was paralleled at JPL
where the SFOF was moved out of the Tracking and Data Acquisition office
and placed in the newly created Office of Computing and Information Systems.
This JPL office, as would be expected, reported to Headquarters through
OSS rather than OTDA. 22
Management Reviews of the Traekir_= and Data Acquisition Function
The increasing national investment in tracking and data acquisition
facilitiesand operations in the early 1970s attracted the attentionat three
Federal levels:
-NASA top management
-The United States Congress
-The Office of Management and Budget
21jet Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network,
JPL TR 32-1526, October 15, 1972) pp. 5-11.
22Robertson Stevens, personal interview, July 28, 1975.
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Reviews of NASA's tracking and data acquisition activities followed. Only the
results of the first two reviews are available for public study. 23
The first review was directed by the NASA Administrator for the
purpose of determining whether:
1. Flight missions were being supported adequately
2. A reasonable balance existed between data requirements by flight
projects and support costs
3. Long-term plans matched projected requirements
. Investments should be made in new technologies that would make
the tracking and data acquisition function more effective from the
cost standpoint.
The review was conducted by an ad hoc Tracking and Data Acquisition Panel
chaired by Dr. Gerald P. Dinneen, from MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, and
staffed by six others with varied industrial and academic affiliations. The
Panel served from January 4, 1972, to June 30, 1972. Since the conclusions
and recommendations of the Panel strongly affect the DSN, they are reproduced
below in their entireties:
"Here is a list of our conclusions and recommendations according
to the four questions stated in the introduction. Each of these is
discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this report.
o Level of Support
(a) We find that the support being provided by OTDA adequately
meets the needs of the flight mission directors and principal
investigators.
. Balance of Effort
(a) The Panel finds that a reasonable balance is being main-
tained between the data requirements and the network and data-
processing costs.
(b) We find that the budget for OTDA which has averaged 7.1%
of NASA's total over past years is not out of place.
23(1) The so-called Dinneen Report: NASA, "Report of the Tracking and Data
Acquisition Advisory Panel, " (Washington: NASA report) July 31, 1972.
Also available in: U.S. Congress, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
"Review of Tracking and Data Acquisition Program, " (Washington: GPO) 1974,
pp. 873-901. (2) U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space
Technology, "Tracking and Data Acquisition Program, " (Washington: GPO)
1974.
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. Long-Range Plans
(a) We conclude that the OTDA long-range plans are well directed
to meet future mission requirements.
(b) 2_e Panel concurs with the current plans for the development
of the 15-Station Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN).
(e) We conclude that a second 64-meter subnet is necessary in
the Deep Space Network (DSN) and endorse the OTDA plan.
(d_ We recommend the X-band addition to the Deep Space Network.
(e) We endorse Phase 1 of the Telemetry On-line Processing
System (TELOPS) plan.
(f) We note that Phase 2 of TELOPS is R&D and recommend some
small-scale experiments.
(g) The Panel recommends the introduction of automation as
planned and urges a continuing effort to automate OTDA functions.
(h) We recommend a vigorous system definition and technology
effort for the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS).
(i) We recommend that NASA expand its role in the proeessing
reduction and analysis of imagery data.
(j) We encourage continued work on laser tracking.
. New Technology
(a) We believe more attention should be given to trade-offs
b_q:ween spacecraft and ground-based developments.
(b) We feel OTDA should be encouraged to continue a modest
level of research on laser communications with an eye to the
far future.
(c) The DSN requirements presented to the Panel do not necessi-
tate the construction of 128-meter ground stations for the fore-
seeable future; however, the Panel recommends continued tech-
n ic al desig?_ studies.
(d) We recommend that NASA consider a mechanism to assure
attention to spacecraft improvements comparable to that given
to ground equipment for T&DA functions. "
Of particular note is the recommendation that a second subnet of 64-m antennas
be added to tim DSN. (The completion of the first subnet is described below;
the plans for a second subnet were scrapped as NASA money became tighter.)
The i_troducti,,m or" the X-band also was recommended and, as mentioned
earlier, did occur.
The second review, this time by the House Subcommittee on a_ conau-
ties and Space Technology, took a less technical track. One of the stimuli for
the review waa the controversy in Congress about the real need for the Johannes-
burg traeMng stations in view of the South African government's apartheid
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policy. NASA announced in July of 1973 that it was closing the Johannesburg
station (see later discussion) but the Subcommittee decided to continue with its
review anyway. The review was extremely broad and dealt with the need for
the networks and specific stations, the NASA relationships with DOD and NOAA,
the management of the tracking and data acquisition function within NASA itself,
the international aspects, and the need for the proposed Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite. The hearings of the Subcommittee took place during the fall
and winter of 1973-1974.
The conclusions and recommendations pertaining to the DSN focus on
the introduction of X-band technology (strongly supported) and the need for a
second 64-m subnet (questioned). In fact, it was specifically recommended
that NASA provide Congress with a "detailed analysis of the need for an
additional subnet of three 64-m antennas for the Deep Space Netv¢ork" as part
of the Fiscal Year 1976 Authorization Request.
It is important to note, however, that the tone and final results of
each study are very favorable regarding the effective management, technolo-
gical proficiency, and effective operation of all of the NASA tracking and data
acquisition networks.
DSN Stations: Better But Fewer
Paralleling the trends in the other NASA networks, the DSN began a
phase of station consolidation during the late 1960s. The primary pressures
were changing support requirements coupled with cost-effectiveness consider-
ations. Coupled with consolidation was a general upgrading of station capa-
bilities. The completion of the first 64-m subnet (three approximately 120 °
apart stations) was the key factor, but the technical advances described
earlier in this chapter were also important. Basically, the DSN of the mid-
70s consisted of three terrestrial locations; California, Australia, and Spain;
each boasting a well-instrumented complex consisting of at least two 26-m
dishes and one 64-m antenna.
Station Closings. The DSN station on Ascension Island (DSS 72) was constructed
mainly to support Surveyor flights employing the direct-ascent mode. With the
completion of the Surveyor program, Ascension became superfluous. Its 9.1-m
(30-ft) antenna was of the size standard in both STDN and the MSFN. Conse-
quently, it made sense to transfer the site to one of these other networks.
This was accomplished in November 1969, when Goddard Space Flight Center
took over operation of the site. DSS 71, the Launch Station in back of the
launch pads at the Cape, was consolidated with the STDN launch station and
moved to Merritt Island in February 1974. The combined station was desig-
nated MIL-71. The basis for this change was simply cost effectiveness.
One of the earliest DSN stations, that at Woomera, Australia, became
a casualty during DSN consolidation. NASA had always had trouble manning its
facilities at Woomera and wished to consolidate its tracking stations elsewhere
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in Australia. TheDSNalready had Tidbinbilla, near Canberra, with its 26-m
antenna. The MSFN had its Honeysuckle Creek station in the same area, also
wilh a 26-m antenna. Furthermore, with Apgllo drawing to a close, the
Itoncysucklc Creek station was no longer vit'a! to the MSFN. Thus, it made
sense to dismantle the Woomera DSN facility and transfer Honeysuckle Creek
from lhe MSFN to the DSN. There would still be two DSN 26-m dishes in
Ausl calla but they would both be near Canberra and also near the Tidbinbilla
site selected for the 64-m antenna. Reeonfiguration of Honeysuckle Creek
was complete by May 1973 when it became an operational part of the DSN.
(Tabl e 8-1 )
The Johannesburg DSN 26-m dish was long deemed essential for deep-
spa('c launches coming down the ETR across southern Africa and then, as they
gained altitude and the Earth rotated under them, sweeping back across Africa
once more. The Australian DSN stations were often prime stations on a deep
space mission although Johannesburg usually saw the spacecraft first. As the
Australian stations became better instrumented and some deep-space launch
Irajcctories moved northward, Johannesburg became less critical and it was
deled'mined that a location in Southern Europe was best from an overall view-
point for long range support commitments.
The Mutual Stations. During the GSFC preparations for Apollo, two types of
tl'acking networks were required; (1) a large number of 9-m stations to handle
the Apollo spacecraft during earth orbit; and (2) a network of three 26-m
MSFN stations to handle the translunar and lunar phases of the flights. These
2(;-m stations were located near the DSN complexes at Goldstone, Madrid, and
Canl)crra. It was also decided, since the Apollo telecommunications equip-
ment was very similar to DSN equipment, to equip one DSN station at each
complex (DSS 11, 42, and 61) to provide backup capability to the MSFN 26-m
stations. These were affectionately known as the "Mutual Stations." A second
control room was built at each station and equipped with MSFN electronics
and a microwave link to the prime Apollo MSFN sites nearby. After comple-
tion of the project, the DSNassumed cognizance of the mutual stations and a
major portion of the electronics which has been put intodeep-space tracking
service. 24
Completing tile First (;4-m Subnct
•The 64-m antenna at the Mars site at Goldstone had proven to be of
immense operational value to NASA's lunar and planetary programs. Unfortun-
ately, it could only "see" alittle more than one-third theeelestial sphere at
any one time. It could not track spacecraft continuously and its 7-db (factor-
of-six) gain over the 2¢;-m DSN antennas was sorely missed when spacecraft
240et Propulsion Laboratory, "The Deep Space Network, " VoI. VIII (Pasadena:
JPL TR 32-1526, April 15, 1972) pp. 5-7.
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Tabl e 8-1. HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF DSN STATIONS
DSS Const ruction Ope r-
Name No. Start End ational
Goldstone Pioneer 11 6-58 11-58 12-58
Goldstone Echo 12 7-59 12-59 4-60
Goldstone Venus 13 _-62 11-62 8-62
Goldstone Mars 14 10-63 2-(36 5-66
\Voomera -t 1 3-60 9--60 11-60
Tidbinbilla, 42 7-63 10-64 3-65
Weemala
Tidt)inbilla,
Ballima
43 11-69 7-72 4-73
44Honeysuckle Creek 5-73
Johannesburg 51 1-61 6-61 7-61
Robledo 61 8-64 7-65 7-65
Cebreros 62 1-66 12-66 1-67
Robledo 63 6-70 -- 9-73
Launch Station 71 10-64 4-65 5-65
Ascension 72 1-65 3-66 4-66
Remarks
26-m antenna
26-m antenna
26-m antenna
64-m antenna
26--m antenna
closed
26-m antenna
64-m antenna
26-m antenna
Transferred from
STDN
26-m antenna
closed 6-30-74
26-m antenna
26-m antenna
64-m antenna
1.3-m antenna
Moved to MILA
9.1-m antenna
Transferred to
MSFN 1968 (now
STDN)
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dropped below its horizon. During Apollo, for example, the big radio astronomy
antenna at Parkes, Australia, was asked to aid the MSFN in obtaining critical
TV coverage of lunar operations. (See MSFN history.) With many ambitious
deep-space missions, such as Viking, on the drawing board, a full subnet of three
64-m antennas equally spaced in longitude seemed essential to NASA's mission.
Consequently, after a competition involving four bidders, NASA and JPL announced
on June 27, 1969, the selection of Collins Radio Co. of Richardson, Texas, to
build 64-m antennas in Australia and Spain. 25
NASA had, of course, already surveyed Australia and Spain for good
locations for its subnets of 26-m DSN antennas. In keeping with its policy of
consolidating facilities, NASA made the decision to locate the 64-m antennas near
the 26-m sites. Logistics would be simpler and support facilities, such as
power supplies, could be shared. The Australian site was therefore near Can-
berra at a location called Ballima (also Booroomba) in the Tidbinbilla Valley.
In Spain, the 64-m dish was installed near the 26-m Robledo station, which is
near Madrid. 26
Construction began first in Australia on November 3, 1969. While most
of the engineering personnel were employees of Collins, the major construction
effort was carried out by the Australians. Australia also furnished most of the
construction materials. The main antenna structural elements, though, were
fabricated in the United States and shipped to Australia. A dock strike on the
West Coast during this period threatened to delay construction, but NASA
utilized DOD shipping channels which were unaffected. 27 Construction was
completed in July of 1972. All in alll the job went very smoothly with few
technical or labor difficulties.
In Spain, construction began formally on June 18, 1970. It did not go
as smoothly as it had in Australia. One of the most serious problems involved
the hard granite encountered during excavation of the foundation. In addition,
there was a language barrier and a difference in systems of measurement. On
crucial tasks, it was found to be safer to use either all-American or all-Spanish
crews to avoid misunderstandings. Collins subcontracted in Europe for all
construction labor, materials, and equipment. The organizational picture was
rather complicated and led to some diffusion of responsibilities. In some
instances, American job practices were rejected by local workers. Safety
shoes, for example, were disdained by Spaniards working on the antenna
structure. The construction delays were later made up when antenna erection
25NASA Release 69-98, June 27, 1969.
26K. P. Bartos, et al, "Implementation of the 64-Meter-Diameter Antennas
at the Deep Space Stations in Australia and Spain, T, (Pasadena: JPL TM
33-692, January 15, 1975).
27Robert A. Rapp, personal interview, April 2, 1975.
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went faster than scheduled. The antenna was officially dedicated on May 10,
1974. 28
The first 64-m subnet was thus completed. But already there was dis-
cussion at JPL and NASA regarding the desirabilities of a second 64-m network
and even 128-m antennas. A second 64-m antenna was proposed for Goldstone,
but NASA's diminishing budgets have not permitted this valuable addition. The
reason is that when new NASA missions are reviewed for possible funding, they
are evaluated in terms of total mission cost. If a mission were to "require"
an additional 64-m dish, the not inconsiderable costs thereof are included as
part of the mission co_s. It is therefore understandable that, with tight
budgets, no projects "require" additional 64-m antennas, despite general agree-
ment that the additional capability would enhance scientific data return and
mission reliability, as well as provide more time for radio science. The con-
struction of a second 64-m subnet will probably have to wait for some great
new effort in space, such as a manned mission to Mars.
Similarly, a 128-m antenna would be most useful in deep-space work,
but the funds for such a large undertaking are also not yet available. A cheaper
method of increasing antenna aperture would be "ganging" or arraying existing
antennas together; that is, connecting them electrically or by a precise timing
system so that their areas are effectively added together. Experiments of this
type were carried out at Goldstone in 1974. Radio astronomers have pooled
geographically separated antennas for some years in long baseline interfer-
ometers.
The New Deep Space Missions
After the outstandingly successful Ranger/Lunar Orbiter/Surveyor/
Apollo sequence of lunar missions, NASA's focus in deep space turned to the
planets. Exploration strategy was two-pronged: (1) send the first flyby probes
to planets beyond Mars and Venus; and (2) study Mars in more detail with
flybys, orbiters, and unmanned landers. During the early 1970s, Mariner 10
and Pioneers 10 and 11 fulfilled the first goal, and Mariners 6 through 9 plus
Viking, the second. It was no accident of course that the Mariner 6 and 7 fly-
bys, the Mariner 8 and 9 orbiters, and the Viking landers paralleled closely
the NASA lunar flyby-orbiter-lander strategy that had been so fruitful.
The DSN was ready for the much greater distances and higher data
rates required. The various technical advances and new facilities just described
had been begun years before the new missions left their launch pads. As usual,
though, the new DSN capabilities, which had seemed perhaps unnecessarily
ambitious when proposed, were quickly absorbed by mission designers.
28NASA Press Release 74-119A, May 8, 1974.
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Mariner Mars 19(;9 (Mariners 6 and 7)
Earlier probes to Venus and Mars had indicated that Mars was the
most likely planet in the solar system to support life. The richly detailed and
eratered surface of the planet revealed by Mariner 4 had surprised planetolo-
gists and made them anxious for more photos. Mars thusbeeame NASA's
prime planetary target. The Mariner Mars 1969 mission, therefore, eoneen-
trated on TV imaging of the planet's surface, and experiments that might aid
the design of future missions particularly thoselooMng for life. Besides the
TVcameras, the two new Mariner-type spacecraft assigned to the mission
carried an ultraviolet spectrometer, an infrared spectrometer, and an infra-
red radiometer. Of special import to the DSN was a telemetry experiment in
block coding at 1(i, 200 bits/see, roughly a thousand times the data rates used
at previous encounters with Mars. At this speed, low resolutionpietures in
real time could be sent from Mars.
Like all other deep-space launches, the 1969 Mariners were to be
launched down the ETR from the Cape. Air Force and MSFN stations were
assigned to cover the launch and near-Earth phase, which was brief because
the direct-ascent mode was used. The deep-space requirements, as indicated
in Table 8-2, consisted of continuous coverage during launeh, trajeetory
correction maneuvers, and encounter, and frequent but not continuous eoverage
during cruise. Radio metric data were required at least every four days. Once
the spacecraft got beyond the range of the Mark-IA ranging equipment at the
26-m stations, the Mars antenna was obviously a necessity.
The liftoff of Mariner 6 occurred on February 25, 1969. 29 As the space-
craft approached South Africa, the 26-m antenna at Johannesburg quickly acquired
the spacecraft's signal. Early in the flight, Woomera and Goldstone Echo were
committed as prime DSN stations..Four days later a midcourse maneuver was
commanded from Woomera, and subsequent analysis of radiometric data showed
that the maneuver was successful. Mariner 6 was aimed to encounter Mars
five months later and sweep by its equatorial region at a distance of about
3200 km. (Figure 8-11)
The launch of Mariner 7 followed the Mariner-6 pattern. Liftoff was
on March 27; midcourse maneuver, 12 days later. For the first time, NASA had
successfully launched both of a pair of Mariner spacecraft. Both spacecraft
were on target and, from the DSN standpoint, in the same portion of the sky.
The DSN had to handle the two telemetry streams simultaneously as well as the
Pioneers. and its Apollo assignment.
Toward the end of July, both Mariners were drawing near Mars with
Mariner 7 now only five days behind Mariner 6. The encounter operations for
Mariner 6 began on July 28, 1969, when Cebreros sent a command to turn on
the High Rate Telemetry (HRT) experiment. Of course, the only station
29N. A. Renzetti, et al, "Tracking and Data System Support for the Mariner
Mars 1969 Mission, " Vol. I (Pasadena: JPL TM 33-474, September 1, 1971).
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Table 8-2. DEEP-SPACE TRACKING AND TELEMETRY COVERAGE
FOR MARINERS 6 AND 7.
Radiometric data required Telemetry coverage
Mission interval Type Sample rate required Remarks
First acquisition to Range
launch +- :I 11 doppler
(two-way)
angles
Launch- 3 h to mid- Range
cou rse maneuve r doppler
+- 5 days
Cruise Range
doppler
Second mideourse Range
maneuver - I0 days Doppler
to _ 5 days
Encounter (E)
(1) E - 14 days to Range
E - 1day
E'+ 1 day to doppler
E*- 15 days
(2) E - 1 day to Range
E-lh
Exit occultation doppler
_- lh to E*-I day
(3) IRS gas jetting Range
- 30 min to
occultation
Exit occultation doppler
20 rain to exit
0ccultation_- 1 h
Cent i nuous at
1 sample/min
1 sample/10 s
Continuous
Continuous at
1 sample/15 min
1 sample/rain
To be specified
during opera-
tions
1 sample/min
Continuous at
l sample/15 min
1 sample/min
(i sample/s
during maneuver)
I sample/15 rain
1 sample/rain
l sample/rain
1 sample/rain
1 sample/s
I sample/s
Continuous
Two complete S/C
commutator cycles
separated by no
more than 5.6 h
Continuous
Continuous -
(8 i/3 or 33 1/3
bits/s and 66 2/3
or 270 or 16,200
bits/s)
Mark 1 ranging expected
only to about lunar dis-
tahoe. Assumes R&D
ranging thereafter at
64-m antenna only: one
pass every 2 weeks per
spacecraft desired to
meet secondary
objective
Metric data requirement
is for one complete
horizon-to-horizon pass
every 4 days, separated
I)y not more than 90 h.
No single station shall be
used for more than three
consecutive passes. At
8 1/3 bits/s, two com-
mutator cycles are of
112 rain duration, at
33 1/2 bits/s. 28 min.
May not be performed
Mission design assumes
three 26-m antennas and
one 64-m antenna for
standard operations and
plans to take advantage
of any additional support
that may become
available
1 sample/s data required
in real time
2()I
MARS ORBII --_
9-7-70,
s/c F
11-26- 70,
I-5-71
-S-7
10-17-70
Y
6-19-70
9-7-70
180
160
1-10-70
120
100
ORBIT 80
2-19-70
ER 24, 69 60
2¢
-t40-120-100 40 --@0 -40 -2
f
-160
106 km
3-31-70
6-19-70
7-29-70
12-1-69
11-26-70
2-19-70
I" 1 - I 0-70
20 40 60 80 100 120
9-7-70.
7-29-70
(SIC F) AT SUPERIOR
CONJUNCTION
F ORBI1
4-12-70 MAXIMUM RANGE
3-31-70 404,057,310 km
2-19-70
106 km
220 240 260 280
1-10-70
SECOND CLOSEST
APPROACH
10-21-71
FIRST CLOSEST APPROACH 7-31-69
I,'i-_rc. S-ll. Heliocentric view of the Mariner-(; trajectory
to Maz's.
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capable of receiving 16,200 bits/see from the distance of Mars was the Mars
antenna at Goldstone. To reserve the Mars antenna exclusively for this
function, the HRT experiment was turned on by Cebreros and off by Woomera.
All seemed to be going well until approximately six hours before the Mariner-6
encounter, when Johannesburg reported that the signal from Mariner 7 had
disappeared, it was an emergency that came at the worst possible time. The
I{obledo 26-m antenna broke off from its tracking of Pioneer 8 and began to
search for the lost spacecraft. When the region of Mars came into view for
Goldstone, DSS 11 (Pioneer) joined the search. Cebreros passed Mariner 6
over to the Goldstone Echo station and also began looking. Mariner 7. still
silent, went over the horizon for Johannesburg and Spain. It was decided to
send a command to Mariner 7 to switch from the highly directional high-gain
antenna to the omnidirectional low-gain antenna. The spacecraft responded
and Pioneer and Tidbinbilla both began to acquire telemetry from the recovered
spacecraft. Something had happened to Mariner 7, but no one knew just what.
The DSN was committed only to supporting one Mariner in a critical
phase, but here was one approaching encounter and a second one with serious.
unknown problems. A small, special team was set up to study the Mariner-7
problem while the main DSN effort was applied to the encounter of Mariner 6.
The Mariner-6 encounter went well, and three series of pictures were taken,
using both the HRT and re_malar telemetry systems to send them back to Earth.
Meanwhile, as in a suspense movie. Mariner 7's encounter was only
hours away and no solution to the dilemma was at hand. Telemetry data indicated
that the reference potentiometer for determining the position of the spacecraft
scan platform was no longer on an operating telemetry channel. A plan was
devised to obtain spacecraft attitude reference by turning on the TV camera and
sighting in on Mars using the HRT experiment to get real-time data. This
worked, thanks to the high bit rate stream available, and ground commands were
able to correct spacecraft attitude and get the high-gain antenna back in opera-
tion in time for the encounter. The encounter sequence began late (on August 5)
but was still considered very successful. Mariner 7 obtained good photos of the
Martian southern hemisphere, including the polar cap. As for the cause of
Mariner 7's perturbation, no clear-cut answer has been found. Evidently, the
spacecraft experienced a sharp change in radial velocity as well as a change of
attitude. The emergency did underscore the desirability of having a high-speed
data channel for such crises. In addition, the HRT channel provided an alternate,
much faster route for relaying the TV pictures of Mars back to Earth. All told,
202 pictures (showing 20 times the area seen by Mariner 4) were returned.
The formal end of the Mariner Mars 1969 mission was on November 1,
1969. but both spacecraft were still performing so well that the project decided
on an extended mission. Scientists wished to perform relativity experiments,
improve astronomical constants and make measurements of electron densities
in interplanetary space and in the Sun's corona. (Superior conjunction occurred
in April and May 1970.) Until an official program was formulated and approved
at NASA Headquarters, the DSN supported the spacecraft on a reduced scale
from Cebreros and Goldstone Mars. When the formal extension was approved
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in January 1:)70, Goldstone Echo was added to the station roster. The Mars
station was temporarily taken out of service from January 25 to March 1. 1970.
while a triconc was installed along with the new 400-kw transmitter.
Mariner Mars 1971 (Mariners 8 and 9}
The logical lollow-on mission to Mariner Mars 1969, using the lunar
program analogy, would be picture-taking orbiters around Mars. The next
Mars opportunity was in the springof 1971. and two Mariner-class spacecraft
were prepared accordingly. The new Mariners drew heavily upon the technology
of the 1!_(;:) mission. Instrumentation was very similar, with emphasis again
(m photogral)hy. The primary objectives were the search for evidence of life
nnd the gathering of data that would aid Mars landers. After mapping as much
of the surface as possible, scientists wanted more data on the density and eom-
imsition of the Martian atmosphere. A 90-dayorbital mission for each space-
craft was l)lanned. These spacecraft would be the first terrestrial satellites
ol another planet.
The requirements levied upon the DSN for this mission were more
extensive than those of the 1969 mission, due in part to the orbital injection
manc'uvers needed at Mars and the 90 days of orbital coverage for both space-
craft. The specific requirements were so extensive that they cannot be
rel)roduced here. 30
During the two years intervening between the Mars opportunities. DSN
cal)abilities had expanded. The Multimission Telemetry System (MMTS) had
been inaugurated on the 1969 flights; for the 1971 mission, the new multi-
mission command was available. The High Rate Telemetry (HRT) system,
which was experimental in 1969. was now fully operational. With it. pictures
and science dala could be relayed b/_ek from Mars much more rapidly. The
wideband. 50.000-bits/see link between Goldstone and JPLwas ready to send
lhe two 16. 200-bits/see data streams simultaneously. The Mars station at
Goldstone was still the only 64-m station in operation, but the high-speed
readouts of the Mariner tape recorders were planned only when DSS 14 had
Mars in view. Another important feature of these missions to Mars was the
ability of a single DSN antenna to handle two deep-space probes located within
its beam width.
The 1971 flights began badly. When the first Atlas-Centaur lifted off
on M,qy 8, 1971, preliminary information on the flight of Mariner 8 looked good.
Shortly after ignition, though, the Centaur stage went out of control, and
Mariner 8 landed in the Atlantic just northeast of Puerto Rico.
30See: R. P. Laeser, et al. "Tracking and Data System Support for the
Mariner Mars 1971 Mission," Vol. I (Pasadena: JPL TM 33-523, March 15,
1972). (Four volumes in this series cover various phases of the mission.)
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Mariner 9 was originally scheduled for a May 18 liftoff, but this was
delayed until May 29 while the Centaur problem was under investigation.
Trouble with the Centaur ground-support equipment then delayed the launch
until May 30. Finally, Mariner 9 blasted off successfully on a direct-ascent
trajectory which would take it to the rendesvous with Mars in the middle of
November 1_)71. Mariner 9 had to bear the burden of the entire scientific
program with the loss of Mariner 8. The Mariner Project prepared a new
plan for observations by a single spacecraft, but the requirements placed on
the DSN changed only in minor ways. The tracking and data acquisition task
was now, of course, easier with only one spacecraft.
The first midcourse maneuver of Mariner 9 was consummated on
June 4. The cruise to Mars was uneventful and, on Nocembec 14, a long,
2-hour 47-minute burn was commanded to insert Mariner 9 into orbit about
Mars. The resultant orbit had a period of 12. 567 hours and a periapsis of
1398 kin. Mariner 9 was in good shape and ready to begin a detailed photo-
o raphic survey of the Martian surface. Unhappily, most of tl_e planet was
shrouded in an immense dust storm. The cameras could see almost nothing.
But the unhappiness was temporary; the very. existence of the dust revealed
a dynamic planet, and scientists waited anxiously for the dust to settle.
The mission plan was revised and Mariner 9 waited in orbit. In the
interim, the other scientific instruments were busy and pictures of the moons
Phobos and Deimos were snapped. By January 3, 1972, the dust storm had
subsided enough to begin the 90-day primary mission. Then, the deluge of
pictures began. They came by the thousands and led to the discovery of
channels, possibly cut by water, and evidence of ice action in the polar regions.
The detailed maps of the surface needed to plan the Viking landings were drawn
as Mariner 9 cameras co, vered more and more of the planet.
The Mariner-9 spacecraft was still operating well at the end of the
nominal mission on April 1, 1972. NASA used this opportunity to schedule
extended operations. Second looks were taken at especially interesting areas
of Mars. Beginning on April 2 and lasting through June 4, scientists were
fortunate enough to observe solar occultations repeatedly as the spacecraft
passed through the shadow of Mars twice a day. Prior to each passage into
th(, cold shadow zone. the DSN commanded the spacecraft to go into a "sur-
vi',al mode. " Despite its rigorous and longer-than-planned mission, Mariner
9 survived until October 27. Both spacecraft and the supporting ground systems
had performed remarkably well. It was one of the most successful of all NASA's
planetary missions.
The Jupiter Pioneers
The remarkably long lifetimes of the Interplanetary Pioneers
(Pioneers 6 through 9) made the technology they employed a good choice for
the long missions to the outer planets. The Pioneers were simple, rugged,
and much smaller than the Mariner-class spacecraft. Unlike the Mariners,
they were spin-stabilized thus avoiding the complications of three-axis
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attitude control. Sincethe trip to Jupiter required much more energy than flights
to Mars and Venusand also passagethrough the asteroid belts andJupiter's
intense magnetic field, it was no surprise that NASAselected "third-generation"
Pioneers for this mission. NASAHeadquai-tersapprovedthe Jupiter Pioneer
program on February 8, 1969.
The Jupiter Pioneers were designedto measure the parameters of
interplanetary spaceon their ways to Jupiter and after their encounters. To
obtain knowledgeof this unexplored part of the solar system and mysterious
Jupiter, the spacecraft carried such instruments as a cosmic-ray telescope,
plasma analyzer, magnetometer, asteroid-meteoroid detector, and an imaging
polarimeter. Most of the scientific instruments were thus associatedwith
ficlds-and-particles experiments. The flights were also to test equipment for
future flights into this new realm. For example, radioisotopic power supplies
replaced the usual solar cells becausesunlight weakensgreatly at Jupiter's
distance. The new Pioneers had 2.75-m high-gain parabolic antennasmounted
on them rather than the shorter-range mast-types used on the Interplanetary
Pioneers. Thrustors were also required on the Jupiter mission to correct
spacecraft trajectories. Thus the Jupiter Pioneers incorporated many tech-
nological advancesover the Interplanetary Pioneers. Nevertheless, the design
philosophy was much the same, andthe samedesign team (NASA's Ames
Research Center and TRW Systems) wascarried over from the Interplanetary
Pioneers. (Figure 8-12)
The first Jupiter Pioneer, hereafter called Pioneer 10, was launched
from the Capeby an Atlas-Centaur during the Jupiter window in March 1972;
the secondspacecraft, Pioneer 11, was scheduledfor the next Jupiter window
13 months later, in April of 1973. The launch trajectories were of the direct-
ascent type, with the resources of the Air Force ETR andthe MSFNtracking
and acquiring dataduring the launches and near-Earth phases. 31
Oncethe DSNacquired the Pioneers it was originally required to provide
continuous telemetry support with 26-m stations until 6 months after the Jupiter
encounter. The 64-.msubnetwas to support at least onehorizon-to-horizon pass
per week during the sameperiod. The data rates possible with the big antennas
were of course muchhigher (SeeFigure 8-13). 32 The tracking requirements
varied with mission phase, being most critical during Jupiter encounter andthe
trajectory corrections. Goodtracking data were especially important during
and after the encounter phasebecauseof the nonautomatic nature of the space-
craft and its lack of on-board data storage. Continuous64-m coverage was
31A. J. Siegmeth, et al, "Tracking and Data System Support for the Pioneer
Project, " Vol. I (Pasadena:JPL TM 33-584, April 1, 1973).
32Evenwith the 64-m antennas, the data rate during encounter would be less
than 1000bits/sec due to Jupiter's great distance from Earth (over 5 A. U.)
Still, this rate was muchhigher than the Mariner-2 data rate from Venus in
1962 ( 8 1/3 bits/sec).
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required for 30 days on each side of the date of closest approach to Jupiter for
the measurements of fields and particles in the vicinity of the planet. Pioneer
10 will become the first man-made object to leave the solar system, while
Pioneer 11 was held in reserve for possible redirection to Saturn should the
Pioneer-10 encounter be unsuccessful. With present DSN capabilities, Pioneer
10 will be tracked to about 22 A. U. (about 1980) when the limits of the tele-
communication link will be reached.
Pioneer I0. After three fruitlesscountdowns, Pioneer 10 finallyleftthe
launch pad on March 3, 1972. The Centaur stage injected Pioneer 10 into a
Jupiter-bound trajectory 16 minutes afterlaunch. About 5 minutes after injec-
tion, the DSN acquired the spacecraft at Johannesburg. The spacecraft was
oriented and its transmitter was turned on with no problems. The 26-m DSN
stations provided most of the support, with some help from DSS 14, during
this early flightphase. On the fourth day of flight,March 7, two midcourse
maneuvers were commanded, with the obiect of timing the arrival of the space-
craft at Jupiter for December 4, 1973, 3_ when the satelliteIo would be in a
position to occult Pioneer 10. The encounter of Pioneer 10 also had to be
adjusted so that Goldstone Mars and the 64-m antenna stillunder construction
near Canberra would be able to view it.
Pioneer 10 entered the asteroid belt in July of 1972 and left in the
following January. Surprisingly, the meteoroid-asteroid detector aboard
indicated no important changes in the flux of particles recorded. Solar occul-
tation of the spacecraft lasted from January 11 to 21, 1973. This was a rather
difficult period because the high-gain antenna had to be pointed away from the
Sun but yet radio contact had to be maintained or the spacecraft would auto-
matically switch elements in its radio system. The new high-power (400-kw)
transmitter at the Mars station helped retain contact with Earth even with the
spacecraft's high-gain antenna off-pointed from the Sun. Closest approach to
Jupiter was reached December 4, 1973 at 2.86 Jupiter radii, 203,250 km,
from the planet's center. The encounter was highly successful for science,
with the instruments confirming that Jupiter was much more complex and
intriguing than expected. Close-up photos of the planet were obtained and an
atmosphere was detected on the satellite Io.
The DSN supported the flight with its 26.-m and 64-m stations but
there were serious conflicts with the overlapping Mariner 10 mission to
Mercury and Venus as well as the Viking Project. The latter needed radar
data on Mars obtainable only from the DSS 14 antenna. The multiplicity and
complicated nature of these conflicts made them the most difficult ever en-
countered by the DSN. A Network Allocation Working Group had to be set up
to resolve the conflicts, which in most cases could only be settled by com-
promising through and taking support time from one project and giving itto
another. Such extensive conflictswillbe more common in the future and the
33The 21-month flight was several times the length of previous Mariner trips
toVenus and Mars.
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machinery for reso]ving them evolved during the Jupiter Pioneer flights has
become permanent. The DSN, which used to have the luxury of assigning entire
subnets to projects on an exclusive basis, l_admoved into a period where it
would have to assign support to missions antennasby antennaand day by day
and even hour by hour.
Ground communications were made more difficult by the fact that
Pioneers 10 and 11 were the first de_p-space projects to be controlled from
outside the SFOF. (Figure 8-14) The Pioneer Mission Control Center at Ames
had complete control of the spacecraft. To illustrate the redundancy built into
the network, the following example is provided. An operational problem
occurred on October 18, 1972, when a transatlantic submarine cable failed
connecting Johannesburg to the GCF. Communications to Johannesburg were
reestablished quickly over landline teletype circuits but not before the imaging
polarimeter on the spacecraft had passed through Jupiter. Fortunately,
commands were sent in time to avoid Sun damage to the instrument. The
DSN was also able to divert the Robledo 26-m antenna to Pioneer 10 during
this emergency.
LOCATION: GOLDSTONE, SPAIN, J
AUSTRALIA, SOUTH AFRICA J
DEEP SPACE STATION (DSS) J
,
I
I
TELEMETRY (TLM) _ TLM I
I I CMO I I
_1 COMMAND (CMD)_
T"ACK,NOIRMDI
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Figure 8-14. Pioneer-10 data system during Jupiter encounter. The
schematic shows that telemetry bypasses SFOF and is
routed directly to Ames Research Center, but the bypass
mode was a backup during Pioneer-10 encounter. Ames
actually operated with processed telemetry from the SFOF.
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To provide a feeling for the extent of DSNsupport for Pioneer, eleven
DSNstations supported Pioneer 10 for 21,000 hours (2000tracks} between
April 1, 1972, and January 1974. During this time, the spacecraft-to-Earth
distance varied from 22 million to 890million kilometers. During the 60-day
encounter period, over 17,000 commandswere sent to control the spacecraft
during its intricate studies of Jupiter.
Pioneer 11. The mission of Pioneer 11 was essentially identical to that of
Pioneer 10 except for the slingshot trajectory by Jupiter. Launch was on
April 6, 1973. (Figure 8-15)
A TIME : 1 h
-24
-18
-24
-18
EARTH
24 12
PIONEER 11
GANYMEDE
EUROPA
I0
24
AMALTHEA
I
Figure 8-15. Pioneer-10 and-ll trajectories near Jupiter as seen
from celestial North Pole.
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DSN Contributions to Radio Science
The DSN of course has been primarily concerned with developing
instrumentation appropriate to supporting deep-space missions, but in the
process it has created excellent antennas and data-processing systems for
radio astronomy. In 1975, the DSN 64-m antennas were the best instruments
for planetary radar in the world. 34 The increases in DSN performance have
been spectacular:
Early 1960s Mid 1970s
Transmitter power (kw)
Antenna diameter (m)
System noise
temperature (OK)
9 40O
26 64
64 20
With such performance, the 64-m dishes are in great demand for scientific
research. The experiments proposed are so many that scientists have
organized a Radio ScienceExperiment Selection Panel to assign high priori-
ties to the best. The total operating time that the DSN can divert from its
primary spacecraft support mission runs only about 10 to 15% of the antenna
time at Goldstone Mars. This does not come close to satisfying the demand
generated within the radio astronomy community.
The DSN accomplishments in radio astronomy during the period en-
compassed by this chapter are numerous. Only a few highlights can be men-
tioned here. Starting at the innermost planet, in 1969 radar experiments at
Goldstone Mars showed that the surface of theplanet Mercury consisted of
several large rough features and one very smooth area. 35 Later, in 1972,
radar probes at 2. 388 GHz revealed the existence of hills and valleys with
relief of about 1 km. The data also suggested craters with 50-km diameters
and depths of about 700 m. 36 The Mariner-10 flyby confirmed these findings.
Venus has been a radar target of special interest because while its
surface cannot be seen through the optical telescope radar can penetrate its
clouds. Surface features were detected early (Chapter 6) and in the 1970s,
radar maps of its surface were greatly improved through better instruments
and image-enhancement techniques. Figure 8-16 shows that, like the other
inners planets, Venus has a heavily cratered surface. 37
34R. M: Goldstein, personal interview, April 15, 1975.
35R. M. Goldstein, "Mercury: Surface Features Observed During Radar
Studies, " Science, Vol. CLXVIII (April 24, 1970} pp. 467-469.
36S. Zohar and R. M. Goldstein, "Surface Features on Mercury, " Th__.__e
Astronomical Journal, Vol. LXXIX (.January 1974) pp. 85-91.
37H. C. Rumsey, et al, "A Radar Brightness and Altitude Image of a Portion
of Venus, " Icarus, Vol. XXIII (1974) pp. 1-7.
i 
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1:igiirc S-l(i.  tIigh-resolutioii radar brightness image of part of Venus 
showing the heavily craterecl surface. 
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Farther out in the solar system, the 64-m Mars radar detected the
rings of Saturn for the first time. g9 The particles that make up the rings were
efficient reflectors of the 12.6-cm waves, indicating that they were probably
rough objects a meter or more in diameter. Some of the radar-reflecting
objects do not seem to be visible at all !
Looking outside the solar system, DSN antennas, particularly the
64-m ones, have been active in the Quasar Patrol program established in 1972.
This cooperative project has actually taken the bulk of the time the Mars
antenna can be diverted to radio astronomy. Another kind of cooperative
project has been Very Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) whereby several
big radio astronomy antennas work together in an interferometer array to
make extremely precise measurements of distant radio objects. 40 In this
manner, the DSN has contributed to the knowledge of the universe from the
nearby planets to the outermost objects known.
39R. M. Goldstein and G. A. Morris, "Radar Observations of the Rings of
Saturn, " Icarus, Vol. XX (1973) pp. 260-262.
40Curtis A. Knight, et al, "Quasars: Millisecond-of-Arc Structure Revealed
by Very-Long-Baseline lnterferometry, " Science, Vol. CLXXII (April 2, 1971)
pp. 52-54.
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Chapter 9. DSN TRENDS
One of the hallmarks of the DSN has been its continual forward evolution
and pursuit of higher performance. This property---really the collective
property of the people who built the DSN---has permitted us to see close-up
pictures from Mercury to Jupiter, to dig remotely into the lunar surface, and
plumb the interplanetary medium. Radio astronomers, too, have found the DSN
an instrument par excellence. The following points summarize the trends that
have characterized the evolution of the DSN:
1. The DSN has always been a "state-of-the-art" network; it has
always been on the technological frontier.
. Through its progress in several avenues of technology, the DSN
has continually increased its capacity to acquire data and track
spacecraft at greater and greater distances. (Figure 9-1)
. New technology is introduced to almost every new mission on
experimental, non-interference basis, and then is implemented
as an operational capability on the next mission.
o The ever-increasing technological capability of the DSN has
allowed itto respond "beyond the call of duty" on all flightpro-
grams, particularly in emergency, situations.
o Even with the rising complexities of missions and the DSN itself,
the DSN has steadily improved its overall reliability. No space-
craft has ever been lost due to a communications failure.
o The decision of NASA and JPL to establish a separate tracking-
and-data-acquisition function has resulted in integrated research,
development, and budget planning on a long-term basis that is
independent of specific, often rather narrow flight project
requirements.
7. Since 1965, there has been steady progress toward a multimission
network.
. In recent years, there has been a strong trend in the direction of
of site consolidation, wherein fewer but better-instruments are
able to provide better support at lower overall cost.
0 The continuing NASA policy of insisting that foreign nationals
operate its overseas sites has kept the DSN relatively free of
international political problems.
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10.
11.
12.
Initially, the tracking-and-data-acquisition function also included
the project data-processing function for deep-space missions but
this responsibility was divorced from the DSN in the early 1970s
to provide a simpler, more manageable interface.
Radio science has worked hand-in-hand with the DSN in terms of
network enhancement. Developments in geodesy charged-particle
calibration, and precision timing, for example, have been stimu-
lated by the needs of both radio science and the tracking-and-data-
acquisition function. Both, of course, have benefited.
The trend toward network automation exists in the DSN but it is
evolving more slowly than in Earth satellite tracking and data
acquisition. The DSN, however, was "computerized" rapidly
at the station and network levels.
The trend toward centralization of all mission ,qperational
activities within the 8FOF has been reversed in recent years
as more and more off-Lab projects developed their own mission
operation facilities. However. the redefinition of the roles of
NASA facilities may counter this trend.
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Appendix B.
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
To: Senior Staff
Section Chiefs
Section Managers
From: W.H. Picketing
MEMO ESTABLISHING TIlE DEEP SPACE NETWORK
Subject: Establishment of the Deep Space Network
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
Interoffice Memo 218
December 24. 1963
Effective immediately, the Deep Space Network is established by combining
the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility, Interstation Communications. and the
_nission-in_Jependent portion of the Space Flight Operations Facility. Development
and operation of this network is the responsibility of the Assistant Laboratory
Director for Tracking and Data Acquisition by extension of the role statement for
this Assistant Director (Office of the Director IOM 200, October 2, 1963).
Funding sources are unchanged for Fiscal 1964 and for the budget sub-
mitted by JPL for Fiscal 1965. However, JPL will endeavor to have OTDA and
OSSA agree on a single source of funding as quickly as possible.
The interface with mission peculiar facilitiesand organizations will be
worked out between the Assistant Laboratory Director for Tracking and Data
Acquisition and the Assistant Laboratory Director for Lunar and Planetary projects
using as a guideline the definitionof "mission-independent" as:
1. Required for two or more flight projects.
2. Best handled by JPL and not outside flight project organizations
(ARC Pioneer, GSFC-MSFN, LeRc Centaur, etc.).
This change is made in order to accommodate efficiently the increasing
number of outside flight projects for which the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has
been tasked to supply tracking and data acquisition support. The change should
also assist in closer integration of the previously separate facilities.
WHP:mc
W. H. Pickering
Director
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